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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the role of the secular State in the making of modern constitutional 
government in India and argues that the practice of constitutional secularism is an 
unrealised pedagogical project whose goal is the transformation of Indian society and its 
politics. 
 
Toleration is the core value defended by the liberal secular State and the Indian State is no 
exception; however, its institution in the Indian Constitution compels religious groups to 
reformulate their traditions as doctrinal truths. Through decisions of Indian courts I 
demonstrate that this is an odd demand made on non-Semitic traditions like Hinduism 
because even up the contemporary moment it is difficult to cast these traditions in terms of 
doctrinal truths. 
 
Though reformulated religious identities are occluded descriptions of Indian religious 
traditions, I argue that they have gained considerable force in contemporary India because 
they were drawn into constitutional government as the problem of accommodating minority 
interests. Accommodating minority identities was part of an explicitly stated pedagogical 
project through which the British colonial government was to steward what they supposed 
to be irreconcilably fragmented ‗interests‘ that comprised Indian society towards a unified 
polity. Though the Indian Constitution reworked the politics of interests toward the 
amelioration of social and economic ‗backwardness‘, I argue that the rights granted to the 
Scheduled Castes, Other Backward Classes, and Minorities continue to mobilise these 
groups as reformulated religious identities with associated interests. 
 
Thus as recognisably occluded accounts of Indian society, I demonstrate that reformed 
religious identities and indeed the practice of secular constitutionalism functions like a 
discursive veil that screens off Indian social experience from the task of generating 
solutions to legal and institutional problems.  
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Introduction: The Problem of the Secular State in India 
 
In this thesis I examine the role played by the liberal secular State in the making of 
constitutional government in modern India. I will argue that constitutional secularism is 
structured as a pedagogical project whose goal, though largely unrealised, is the 
reformulation of Indian society and its politics. The claim that the secular State is an agent 
of social and political reform might seem at odds with liberal constitutional theory within 
which the secular State is understood to be an institutional form that imposes normative 
restraints on government. Nonetheless I demonstrate that social and political reform is at 
the heart of the institution and practice of liberal secular government in India. As an 
unrealised and perhaps even unrealisable project of social and political reform, I also 
demonstrate that the secular State operates as a discursive veneer that screens off Indian 
social experience from constitutional debates about Indian society. In this chapter I 
introduce the contours of my problem by setting the challenge of Indian secularism both 
within contemporary global debates on the secular State as well as its practice in Indian 
constitutional history. 
 
i. On the Nature of the Secular State 
Debates on the nature of the liberal secular State present a sizeable body of literature that 
elaborates a highly contested terrain whose detail I cannot outline in this introductory 
chapter. Nonetheless to commence my enquiry I will proceed on the assumption that the 
central problem that the liberal secular State seeks to address is the manner in which 
contending ideas of what many liberals call the ‗good life‘ or ultimately cherished values 
can be tolerated in a neutral or secular public sphere.
1
 The task of managing and regulating 
a tolerant public sphere is cast on States who are charged with instituting and defending a 
form of government which is capable of tolerating diversity without establishing or overtly 
                                                 
1
 Though secular constitutionalism is commonly associated with the toleration of religious difference, 
contemporary liberals draw on this model to deal with all kinds of cultural difference. I deal with this 
extension of the secular State in my discussion of the debate on multiculturalism in section ii of this chapter. 
See for instance Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
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associating with any particular sectarian position. That is, the secular constitutional State is 
one that strives to be neutral and tolerant among contending ideas of the good life.
2
  
 
Legally and constitutionally the task of liberal toleration has been made possible by 
imposing restrictions on the behaviour of the State through three normative propositions. 
First, the State is to ensure the unimpeded exercise of personal liberty, especially the 
freedom of religious belief and practice. Second, the State is required to maintain equality 
of treatment to its citizens irrespective of their religious or other parochial affiliations. 
Third, the State is to deal with all religious and parochial groups in an even-handed or 
neutral manner. In other words the State is to shape public institutions so that it favours no 
one group over others.
 3
 However, the toleration and protection of sectarian and even 
extreme sectarian opinions is critically dependent on the manner in which different States 
understand and interpret these normative propositions. 
 
It is important to note that within the liberal democratic tradition the normative 
commitments to liberty and equality (neutrality being understood as a proposition that 
derives from equality) are understood to be constitutively in tension with each other.
4
 In 
contemporary history one of the most dramatic instances of tension between these values 
was witnessed in the cold war conflict between the North Atlantic alliance and the erstwhile 
Soviet Union.
5
 However, even at a more prosaic level most liberal democracies have 
                                                 
2
 For an interesting discussion the challenge of defending liberal toleration See Bernard Williams, ―Toleration: 
An Impossible Virtue?,‖ in Toleration an elusive virtue, ed. David Heyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press,, 1996), 18-27. 
3
 For a classic defence of these values See Robert Audi, ―The Separation of Church and State and the 
Obligations of Citizenship,‖ Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 259-296. 
4
 This point is considered in considerable detail in Berlin‘s much celebrated essay on liberty. Isaiah Berlin, 
―Two Concepts of Liberty,‖ in Four essays on liberty (London: Oxford U.P, 1969). Similarly Rawls following 
Constant characterises this as the contending implications of the two strands of the democratic tradition 
defined by Locke and Rousseau respectively. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 2nd ed. (Columbia University 
Press, 2005), 4-5. 
5
 This ideological conflict also brings to notice the fact that the secular state is not only found in liberal 
democracies but could also be found in communist states and perhaps many other kinds of states. However, I 
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assigned different weights to these norms resulting in very different historically located 
instances of the secular State. Thus there are material historical differences between secular 
States in Europe, most having had or continuing to have established churches, and the 
secular model established in the United States. Similarly even within a national legal 
jurisdiction it is perhaps possible to conceive of different weights being accorded to 
different liberal norms over time.
6
 Nonetheless, it is this normative defence of religious 
liberty and equality that is at the heart of the contemporary project to fashion secular States. 
 
As a normative institutional scheme designed to tolerate religious and cultural difference, 
the commitment to the secular State has often been framed as a universal model applicable 
in all social and cultural contexts. This has undoubtedly allowed the secular State and 
liberal constitutionalism to emerge as contemporary common sense not just in North 
Atlantic countries but in large parts of the contemporary world. However, challenges 
arising out of the export of this model to contexts outside Western Europe as well as the 
explosion of cultural difference in Western democracies have raised doubts about the ability 
of the secular State to cope with such differences. Addressing this challenge liberal debates 
on multiculturalism have made a formidable attempt to save what many critics assert is the 
inability of the liberal secular State to recognise or tolerate difference. Thus I commence 
my discussion on the secular State by discussing the adequacy of liberal multiculturalism to 
explain the universal significance of the secular State and especially its relevance in non 
Western contexts. 
 
ii. The Limits of Contemporary Multiculturalism 
Through the debates on liberal multiculturalism Western democracies have considered the 
                                                                                                                                                    
will focus only on the liberal model of the secular state simply because it is the most dominant model 
currently available to deal with the problem of sectarian conflict. 
6
 Thus the United States Supreme Court has strongly defended state neutrality toward religion or the thesis 
advocating the erection of a wall of separation between the church and the state as exemplified by cases such 
as Everson v. Board Of Education Of Ewing 330 US 1 (1947). Similarly in cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 
U.S. 205 the court defended liberty to the extent that it almost equated the customs of the Amish as 
constituting a plural legal order. 
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problem that radical social difference poses to the liberal secular State. Multiculturalism 
modifies the framework of the secular State to recognise the rights of various identity 
groups, especially migrants and minorities. The multiculturalism debate addresses the 
following problem – despite being an institutional frame designed to deal with cultural 
diversity, the only identity that liberal democracies seem to recognise are citizen identities 
within nation states. That is, liberal democracies have been uncertain in their responses to 
demands for various kinds of recognition stemming from sub-nationalisms, federalisms, 
supra-national associations, linguistic and ethnic minorities, feminisms, aboriginal 
communities and so on.
7
 Thus grappling with this problem liberal multiculturalism asks the 
question – what role do particular identities have in the conduct of politics and public 
affairs in nation states committed to notions of equal democratic citizenship? 
 
Granting that cultural location is constitutive of identity, many liberals have argued for 
some form of compensation for morally arbitrary disadvantage.
8
 However, granting these 
rights to communities raises a further set of questions. For instance, does the grant of group 
rights imply a violation of liberal principles, especially the protection of illiberal practices? 
Similarly there is also the question whether dissenting members of a group should have the 
right to exit the group?
9
 These questions demonstrate the ease with which a consideration 
for particular identity can slide into a cultural relativism, from which liberals have tried to 
recuperate liberal values by granting particular claims but only within a broader framework 
                                                 
7
 The classic liberal response has been the assertion of neutrality in the public sphere to remove issues that 
produce deep and fundamental division from public debate. Thomas Nagel, ―Moral conflict and political 
legitimacy,‖ Philosophy and Public Affairs 16, no. 3 (1987): 215-240; John Rawls, ―The Priority of Right and 
Ideas of the Good,‖ Philosophy and Public Affairs 17, no. 4 (October 1, 1988): 251-276. However Many 
liberal thinkers are deeply uncomfortable with this thin and procedural conceptual of the public sphere. For 
instance See Amy Gutmann, ―Religion and State in the United States: A Defense of Two-Way Protection,‖ in 
Obligations of Citizenship and the Demands of Faith, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Princeton University Press, 
2000), 127-64. 
8
 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, community and culture (Oxford, 1989). 
9
These issues are discussed in a classic exchange between Chandran Kukathas and Will Kymlicka. Chandran 
Kukathas, ―Are There Any Cultural Rights?,‖ Political Theory 20, no. 1 (February 1992): 105-139; Will 
Kymlicka, ―The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas,‖ Political Theory 20, no. 1 (February 1992): 
140-146. 
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of universal rights.
10
  
 
Multiculturalism therefore seems delicately poised between un-reconciled and opposing 
commitments to universal citizenship on the one hand and the specific or relative claims of 
specific groups on the other. Addressing this challenge and especially the problem that 
relativism poses for the secular State, Akeel Bilgrami restates the problem I have outlined 
above in the following manner: 
Classical arguments for secular liberalism have assumed that there are reasons that 
all rational people should be bound by, and these reasons justify basic secular and 
liberal ideals. But there are no such reasons. The only reasons there are for secular 
liberalism are reasons that appeal not to something that all rational people will find 
compelling, just in virtue of their rationality, but rather reasons that appeal to 
substantive value commitments that some may hold but others may not. If that is 
right, then the task of achieving secular ideals in a world in which there are strong 
religious and cultural identities becomes distinctly more demanding. One is now 
required to look for reasons that will appeal even to those with these identities.
11
 
Bilgrami therefore pitches his essay as an attempt to save the commitment to secular liberal 
values from the loss of universal reason. I am less concerned with his attempt to recuperate 
secularism than with the manner in which he defines the nature of this condition. 
 
An important distinction on which Bilgrami‘s account of the loss of universal reason rests 
is the distinction he draws between internal and external reasons. The philosopher Bernard 
Williams, from whom Bilgrami draws this distinction characterises it as the difference 
between reasons offered from a first person perspective and a third person perspective 
respectively.
12
 According to Bilgrami the challenge of the multicultural secular State is to 
                                                 
10
 Taylor, Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition. 
11
 Akeel Bilgrami, ―Secularism and Relativism,‖ boundary 2 31, no. 2 (2004): 175. 
12
 Williams characterises this distinction in the following manner 
Sentences of the forms ‗A has a reason to ¢, or ‗‘There is a reason for A to ¢, (where ¢ stands in for 
some verb of action) seem on the face of it to have two different sorts of interpretation. On the first, 
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be able to defend secular norms from the first person perspective or that of internal 
reasons.
13
 However, this is a task which I bracket in order to focus on the manner in which 
he argues the impossibility of defending secularism through external reasons. That is, the 
manner in which he outlines the condition in which external reasons no longer holds sway. 
 
To understand the nature of the condition against which Bilgrami argues his case it is useful 
to ask the question – what are the external reasons that the liberal State offers in its 
defence? Bilgrami formulates these reasons through what he calls liberalism‘s most time 
honoured slogan – ‗Individual citizens should be left unimpeded to pursue the good life‘. 
He analyses this sentence by dividing it into two parts. The first, which asserts that 
‗individual citizens must be left unimpeded‘, deals with a normative commitment to non-
interference in the lives of individual citizens especially though not exclusively by the 
State. The second half of the sentence deals with dispositions of citizens to pursue their 
notions of the good life which could perhaps range from their deepest religious convictions 
to those that relate to their more everyday life preferences. However, this is nothing but the 
liberal defence of toleration which, in constitutional legal terms, would imply a neutral 
State committed to the defence of individual citizen liberty.
14
 
 
Thus if Bilgrami is right then the loss of external reason threatens to reduce the secular 
State itself to a relativist creed that only those who subscribe to liberal reasons can value 
and defend. In other words, in sharp contrast to its self image as a universal doctrine that 
                                                                                                                                                    
the truth of the sentence implies, very roughly, that A has some motive which will be served or 
furthered by his ¢-ing, and if this turns out not to be so the sentence is false: there is a condition 
relating to the agent‘s aims, and if this is not satisfied it is not true to say, on this interpretation, that 
he has a reason to ¢. On the second interpretation, there is no such condition, and the reason-sentence 
will not be falsified by the absence of an appropriate motive. I shall call the first the ‗internal‘, the 
second the ‗external‘, interpretation Bernard Williams, ―Internal and External Reasons,‖ in Moral 
Luck (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 101. 
13
 A task Bilgrami regards as considerably more difficult in multicultural conditions because agreement in 
contentious issues ought to be secured through internal reasons. Bilgrami, ―Secularism and Relativism,‖ 175. 
14
 Ibid., 176-82. 
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shines forth like the light of day, the liberal State has no external reasons to offer to those 
who do not share its fundamental commitments. As Bilgrami himself states, it is only an 
evaluative stance that makes for the secular liberal confidence ―that disputes in identitarian 
contexts with illiberal tendencies need not ever produce the despondency of saying that 
perhaps both sets of principles (liberal and illiberal) may have their own sort of right on 
their side.‖15 
 
The loss of external reasons however does not imply that there are no reasons to defend the 
current commitment to the values of the secular State. Accordingly important strands of 
liberal scholarship have tried to arrive at the grounds on which liberal values might be 
rendered plausible. Thus Charles Taylor argues for a ‗politics of equal dignity‘ which 
allows for all citizens an equal set of rights and privileges that run along with a politics of 
difference;
16
 scholars like Rawls have elaborated a scheme of reasonable pluralism where 
only reasonable sectarian positions are deemed worthy of recognition;
17
 while yet others 
like Bilgrami argue that liberalism could be defended through historical dialogue and 
backed by a conception of humanism.
18
 However, it is important to note that all these 
defences of liberal values seem to have conceded that the defence of secular liberal values 
in a multicultural world is only possible by appealing to internal reasons. 
 
If internal reasons are all there are to defend the secular State then the implications of this 
normative framework for non-Western parts of the world are much less clear. In this regard 
it is also important to note that the multiculturalism debate as I have recounted it is one that 
is internal to liberalism and has arisen largely out of the recent problems posed by the rise 
of identity politics in many north Atlantic countries. Understandably therefore it is a debate 
that has primarily implied the reiteration of liberal secular norms so as to make them 
plausible to different groups (often immigrants and indigenous people) inhabiting these 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., 195. 
16
 Taylor, Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition. 
17
 Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
18
 Bilgrami, ―Secularism and Relativism.‖ 
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societies.
19
 In other words liberal multiculturalism is a project to legitimise and make 
plausible contemporary institutions and principles that deep roots in the intellectual and 
political history of Western Europe, especially as it has evolved out of problems such as the 
conflicting relations between the church and the state and the problem of tolerating 
heretical sects after the Protestant reformation broke the hegemony of the Catholic Church. 
 
Thus despite being an account that defends the secular State in the face of cultural 
difference, multiculturalism cannot perhaps account for the manner in which the secular 
State acquires significance in non-Western contexts like India. It is in this context that I turn 
to the ‗secularisation thesis‘ which claims to offer a sociological account for the 
globalisation of the secular State. 
 
iii. Secularisation and Change in Modern Politics 
As one of the most influential contemporary explanations of the globalisation of the secular 
State, the ‗secularisation thesis‘ owes in large measure to the scholarship of Max Weber.20 
In its contemporary form this theory claims to explain the diminished role that religion has 
come to play in Western European democracies and marks these societies by the following 
three features. First, the structural differentiation of society resulting in the separation of 
religion from secular fields like politics, economy and science; second, the privatization of 
religion; and third, the declining social significance of religious belief and institutions.
21
 As 
a part of theories on Western modernity, it was believed that the history of Western Europe 
bore out the truth of the secularisation thesis
22
 and it was believed that the history of the 
                                                 
19
It is perhaps also important to note that Multiculturalism is one kind of liberal response to the problem of 
identity politics. There are also strands of liberalism that believe that multiculturalism harms the liberal 
concern for liberty and justice. For an important discussion of this point See Brian Barry, Culture and 
equality: an egalitarian critique of multiculturalism (Harvard University Press, 2002). 
20
 In particular See Max Weber, The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, ed. Talcott Parsons, 2nd ed. 
(London: Routledge, 1992). 
21
 José Casanova, Public religions in the modern world (University of Chicago Press, 1994), 19-39. 
22
 For example See Casanova, Public religions in the modern world. 
14 
 
rest of the world would confirm it.
23
 
 
All aspects of the secularisation thesis are however in crisis across the world. José 
Casanova describes this crisis through what he calls the rise of public religion or the 
increasing tendency of religious movements to play a determining role in contemporary 
politics. As a key theme in Western debates on politics there is an enormous literature on 
the problem of secularisation which I will not review in this introductory chapter. Instead I 
frame my discussion of the subject by sifting through a debate between Talal Asad and José 
Casanova that discusses the possibilities of recuperating the secularisation thesis in the face 
of challenges mounted by the resurgence of religion in the public sphere. 
 
Casanova and Asad represent two ways of thinking about the impact of the secularisation 
thesis on contemporary politics. Both recognise that the secularisation thesis has had 
profound transformative effects on modern politics but differ in the manner in which this 
transformation is to be characterised. Casanova defends the secularisation thesis as a 
sociological explanation of the modern condition while Asad emphasises secularisation as 
an aspect of contemporary political practices. 
 
Casanova situates his defence of secularisation against what he considers a debilitating 
debate between European and American sociologists on the truth of the secularisation 
thesis. As he reconstructs this debate, the European scholars make a case for the truth of the 
secularisation thesis by arguing that contemporary Europe, and especially Western Europe, 
presents empirical evidence verifying the three features that mark out modern secular 
societies. That is, the differentiation of the religious and secular spheres, privatisation of 
religion and the decline of religion. On the other hand the American scholars view evidence 
of the vibrancy of religion in public life in the United States to contest the European claim 
that secularisation produces the decline of religion or its necessary privatisation. On these 
                                                 
23
 This was a position advanced by modernisation theories and Deshpande‘s review essay on modernisation is 
a good example of the Indian debate on the subject. Satish Deshpande, ―Modernisation,‖ in The Oxford 
India companion to sociology and social anthropology, ed. Veena Das (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
15 
 
grounds the American scholars have dismissed the secularisation thesis itself as a as a 
European myth.
24
 In addition some of these scholars even go so far as to argue that the 
paradigmatic model of model of secularisation is represented by constitutional practice of 
the United States which is based on a public sphere marked by open free competitive and 
pluralistic religious markets and high levels of individual religiosity.
25
 
 
As Casanova points out, the nub of the disagreement between the sparring parties does not 
extend to all the three features that define modern secular societies but only to the truth of 
the ‗privatisation‘ and ‗decline of religion‘ theses. A conception of secularisation premised 
on the eventual privatisation and the decline of religion in modern societies necessarily 
implies a commitment to a teleological conception of history whose ends are already 
known. Casanova resists the universal history implied by this teleology but argues that it is 
possible to defend and recuperate the secularisation thesis in terms of the differentiation of 
society as it occurred in Europe resulting in the modern separation of religion from politics, 
economy, science, arts and so on. Defending the secularisation thesis in this manner is 
crucial to Casanova because he argues that it is ―interwoven with all the theories of the 
modern world and with the self-understanding of modernity‖.26 
 
Casanova therefore pins the burden of defending the secularization thesis on the process of 
social differentiation of the various social spheres that occurred in modern Europe. Through 
                                                 
24
 For instance the positions of Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, The Future of Religion: 
Secularization, Revival and Cult Formation, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 1986); Andrew Greeley, 
Religious Change in America (Harvard University Press, 1996). These arguments are in contrast to those of 
Bryan Wilson and Karel Dobbelaere who continue to defend the secularisation thesis. Karel Dobbelaere, 
Secularization: A multi-dimensional concept (Sage Publications, 1981); Bryan Wilson, ―Secularization: The 
Inherited Model,‖ in The Sacred in a secular age: toward revision in the scientific study of religion, ed. Phillip 
E. Hammond (University of California Press, 1985). 
25
 José Casanova, ―A Reply to Talal Asad,‖ in Powers of the secular modern: Talal Asad and his interlocutors, 
ed. David Scott and Charles Hirschkind (Stanford University Press, 2006), 19; Rodney Stark and Laurence R. 
Iannaccone, ―A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the ‗Secularization‘ of Europe,‖ Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion 33, no. 3 (1994): 230-252. 
26
 Casanova, Public religions in the modern world, 19. 
16 
 
this process modern European societies are supposed to have emerged as fundamentally 
distinct from medieval societies in which most aspects of social life were defined against 
and through the unity of the Catholic Church. That is, spurred by developments such as the 
Protestant reformation, the modern absolutist state, the capitalist form of economic 
organization, and the modern scientific project, the authority of the Catholic Church was 
displaced and the secular spheres were gradually but distinctly differentiated from the 
determining influence of the Church. I do not pursue these claims as an aspect of the 
history of Western Europe but draw on Talal Asad to demonstrate that Casanova‘s defence 
of the secularisation thesis is not entirely tenable. 
 
Casanova argues for the recuperation of the secularisation thesis by emphasising that the 
social differentiation of spheres in modern Europe is compatible with the presence of 
politicised religion in the secular public sphere. That is, he concedes that de-privatisation 
and the contemporary explosion of religious influence in the public sphere do not 
necessarily rule out the significance of the secularisation thesis. Asad attacks this line of 
argument by contending that if religion is an important aspect of modern politics, then the 
secular spheres of the economy, the sciences, and the arts cannot be kept insulated from 
religious argument. Therefore he raises the issue of the manner in which a politically 
involved religion can be said to be compatible with the differentiated secular public sphere. 
 
Asad locates his response to the challenge of public religion within the practices of modern 
politics. He demonstrates that the only way in which Casanova can defend his contention is 
by arguing for a rational and tolerant conception of public religion that accords with the 
demands of liberal politics. However, Asad demonstrates that the implications of a public 
religion compatible with liberal politics only suggests further interpenetration of the 
spheres which he demonstrates by posing three questions. First, he shows that opinions and 
experiences of religion in the private sphere serve as the interpretative background to 
foreground political principles in the public sphere. Thus demands to confine religion to 
particular rational and tolerant forms could very easily entail many other demands on the 
kinds of private religious practices and opinions that ought to be encouraged or 
discouraged. Second, when articulating their positions in the public sphere religious 
17 
 
opinions are extremely unlikely to inhabit existing practices without some disruption of 
existing beliefs and practices. In this context Asad asks if these challenges to the practices 
of the secular public sphere can be said to be rational and tolerant. Lastly, Asad asks how 
the proponents of a deprivatised religion can appeal to those who do not share its values 
and persuade them about issues of religious and moral significance. As he points out the 
only option that religious leaders have in such situations is to act as secular politicians in 
liberal democracy. That is, they seek to manipulate the conditions in which citizens act by 
using instruments of propaganda and mobilization that play on the desires and anxieties of 
citizens.
27
 
 
Asad does not go on to dismiss the secularisation thesis as nonsense but argues that 
... the secularisation thesis seems increasingly implausible ... not simply because 
religion is now playing a vibrant part in the modern world of nations... If the 
secularisation thesis no longer carries the conviction it once did, this is because the 
categories of ―politics‖ and ―religion‖ turn out to implicate each other more 
profoundly than we thought, .... 
28
 
That is, he argues that secularisation is a constellation of effects produced by modern 
political practices which reveal the interpenetration of the spheres. More significantly Asad 
argues that this interpenetration is historically constituted, carried out through ―accidental 
processes bringing together a variety of concepts, practices and sensibilities‖ and most 
importantly ―in modern society the law is crucially involved in defining and defending the 
distinctiveness of social spaces – especially the legitimate space for religion.‖29  
 
Commenting on Asad‘s characterisation of secularisation as a set of political practices, 
Partha Chatterjee notes that it enables him to ―cut through the make-believe discursive 
                                                 
27
 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 1st ed. (Stanford University Press, 
2003), 185-87. 
28
 Ibid., 200. 
29
 Talal Asad, ―Responses,‖ in Powers of the secular modern: Talal Asad and his interlocutors, ed. David 
Scott and Charles Hirschkind (Stanford University Press, 2006), 209. 
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screens of analytical philosophy and multicultural ethics to reach the stark facts of power 
that underlie and surround the entire process of secularization.‖30 As Chatterjee notes  
… secularization has been a coercive process in which the legal powers of the state, 
the disciplinary powers of family and school, and the persuasive powers of 
government and media have been used to produce the secular citizen … Sometimes 
this has been done by putting external and forcible constraints on the public political 
presence of religion, as in the Jacobin tradition of laïcisme, or in the Soviet Union 
and contemporary China, or in Kemalist Turkey. More compatible with liberal 
political values, however, and in many ways the more successful process has been 
the secularization resulting from an internal reform of religion itself. Thus, 
secularization in England and France gained decisively in the late nineteenth 
century from Tractarianism and Ultramontanism, respectively – both religious 
movements seeking to extricate the church from its dependence on the state.
31
 
Chatterjee‘s suggestion that European countries have engendered religious and social 
movements that have made their peace with the coercive demands of secular State practices 
is not relevant for present purposes.
32
 On the other hand I am particularly concerned with 
what Chatterjee calls the coercive practices of secularisation, especially the manner in 
which these practices have unfolded in Indian constitutional law. 
 
Thus following scholars like Asad and Chatterjee I argue that secularisation in India is a 
project that is managed by the law and is defined by the challenge of having to demarcate 
the legitimate space for religion. More importantly, I also argue that the constitutional 
processes which determine the appropriate role of religion also envisions very significant 
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 Partha Chatterjee, ―Fasting for Bin Laden: The Politics of Secularization in Contemporary India,‖ in 
Powers of the secular modern: Talal Asad and his interlocutors, ed. David Scott and Charles Hirschkind 
(Stanford University Press, 2006), 60. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Charles Taylors recent book on the modern secular age is perhaps one of the most important recent 
contributions on the role that secularisation has played in the transformation of Western attitudes to 
religion ever since the enlightenment. See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Belknap Press, Harvard 
University Press, 2007). 
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‗reform‘ or transformation of Indian social and religious practices whose detail I will 
elaborate in the course of this thesis. However, before I commence my discussion of the 
reforming effects of secular constitutionalism in India, I first outline the socio-historical 
context in which the secular constitutional project of reform is set, and its implications for 
Indian religious and social traditions. 
 
 
iv. The Challenge and Legacy of Socio-Religious Reform in India 
The problem of ‗reform‘ in the history of the modern Indian nation traces back to attempts 
made by Indian elites in the 19
th
 century to come to terms with the dramatic changes that 
were ushered in by British colonial government. Dealing with issues such as the 
emancipation of women, attacks on certain social customs, religious rituals, and caste 
restrictions, ‗reform‘ was a complex project that attempted to reject aspects of the Indian 
social structure.
 33
 However, towards the latter part of the 19
th
 century following the 
rediscovery of India‘s ancient past by Orientalist scholars like Max Muller and also the 
emergence of a nascent conception of the Indian nation, the process of ‗reform‘ was also 
animated or influenced by the revivalist reformulation of Indian traditions as well as the 
desire to protect Indian traditions from colonial interference. Thus while the movement 
leading up to the abolition of Sati represented one face of ‗reform‘, the strong indigenous 
opposition to the increase in the age of consent for consummation of marriage at the end of 
the nineteenth century is another face of the process of ‗reform‘.34 
 
Sumit Sarkar argues that the process of social reform that commenced in the early part of 
the 19
th
 century was of a qualitatively different kind from what he calls traditional social 
reform, which was marked by features such as the absence of a secular or rationalistic 
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 Sumit Sarkar, Bibliographical Survey of Social Reform Movements in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries (New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1975), 1. 
34
 Sarkar suggests that the rejection of social practices and the revivalism in relation to certain other practices 
are part of a continuum that identified the phenomenon of reform. Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, 1885-1947 
(Macmillan India, 2002), 70-76. 
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outlook, other-worldliness and guru-worship, and a tendency to develop into isolated sects 
or sub-castes, which get absorbed into the traditional socio-religious structure.
35
 In contrast 
modern social reform was thought of as very distinct from all previous and traditional 
efforts to bring about social change and by the end of the 19
th
 century modern reform 
exerted a commanding influence on various elites imagining the social and institutional task 
of a future nation.
36
 Arguably no other scholar has exerted as profound an influence on the 
significance of reform for the modern Indian nation as Partha Chatterjee.
37
 Therefore I will 
frame my account of the Indian secular State against Chatterjee‘s path-breaking work on 
Indian nationalism and the manner in which it is implicated in the history of ‗reform‘. 
 
Chatterjee‘s work seeks to demonstrate that the nationalism as it developed in Western 
Europe, the Americas, and Russia did not set the modular form of the phenomenon as it 
was adopted by elites in India or indeed other countries in Asia and Africa. That is, he has 
argued that the history of nationalism in the non-western world is not ‗part of the universal 
history of the modern world‘ but that these nationalisms were constitutively different from 
nationalism as it developed in the modern West.
38
 Making this argument in the Indian 
instance involved challenging the linear account of nationalism or Indian modernity which 
was said to have entirely derived from the history and influence of British colonial 
institutions in India.
39
 In its place he offers a different account of the career of European 
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form that the phenomena assumed in all other parts of the world. Chatterjee, The nation and its fragments, 
5. 
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 As he mentions a standard account of this history would involve the story of Indians realizing the errors of 
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modernity in India and the manner in which it has impinged on the making of the modern 
Indian nation. 
 
Chatterjee does not deny the influence of Europe on the making of the modern Indian 
nation, nor does he over emphasise the exceptional nature of Indian nationalism. On the 
other hand he argues that the Indian nation is produced by a constitutive tension with 
Europe. As he argues  
... anticolonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial 
society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power. It does this 
by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains – the 
material and the spiritual. The material is the domain of the ―outside‖, of the 
economy and of statecraft, of science and technology, a domain where the West had 
proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. In this domain, then, Western 
superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and 
replicated. The spiritual, on the other hand, is an ―inner‖ domain bearing the 
―essential‖ marks of cultural identity. The greater one‘s success in imitating Western 
skills in the material domain, therefore, the greater the need to preserve the 
distinctness of one‘s spiritual culture. This formula is ... a fundamental feature of 
anticolonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa.
40
  
To illustrate the sovereign domain carved out by Indian nationalism, he notes the different 
native responses to colonial reform of Indian social practices. In first half of the 19
th
 
century Indian reformers were dependent on the colonial State to bring about reform of 
traditional institutions and customs. However, there was strong resistance to colonial 
‗reform‘ in the latter part of the 19th century which significantly coincided with the 
emergence of a nascent nationalist sentiment.
41
 
                                                                                                                                                    
their traditional society leading to the first movements for change that began in the 1820‘s with the 
demand for the abolition of Sati. Gradually this was said to be followed by growing nationalist 
consciousness which organized under the banner of the Indian National Congress in 1885 which body is 
said to have led India to independence in 1947. Ibid. 
40
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The nationalists did not question the need for reform of many aspects of Indian society 
except that they denied that the colonial government should be the agent that would bring 
these reforms into effect. Thus as nationalists were elected to run government under the 
colonial constitutions of the early 20
th
 century they began to introduce a whole range of 
reform measures dealing with religious and customary practices like child marriage, the 
regulation of Hindu religious trusts, and eventually in 1955 a set of reform measures that 
dramatically altered the character of the Hindu personal law on marriage, inheritance, 
guardianship and so on.
42
 Significantly this mandate for reform was incorporated into the 
Indian constitution, with religious freedom being constitutively qualified or perhaps even 
determined by the nationalist mission of socio-religious reform.
43
  
 
Chatterjee believes that this organisation of religious freedom does not seem compatible 
with a common sense understanding of a secular State as one premised on the grant of 
religious autonomy, and of a State that is removed from what are essentially religious 
matters. Thus in Chatterjee‘s framework the project of ‗reform‘ makes for a distinct Indian 
conception and practice of the secular State because ‗reform‘ is a project that is given life 
by the spiritual or the ‗inner‘ aspect of Indian nationalism.44 On the contrary through a 
detailed description of Indian constitutional practice I will argue that the contours of both 
inner and outer aspects of the reform project in India are constitutively defined by the 
institution and operation of European political ideas, especially normative toleration, in the 
government of India. 
 
Though the secular State is organised as a project of ‗reform‘ I also argue that it is a largely 
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unrealised project. By describing the discursive operation of ‗reform‘ as it is implied by the 
Indian secular State I demonstrate that ‗reform‘ operates as a semantic veneer which 
screens social experience from the description of social practices. Thus even though the 
secular State is formulated as a project of social and religious reform it functions as a 
process by which Indian religious and social experiences are screened off from the 
conception and resolution of Indian institutional problems. I organise and set out my case 
as follows. 
 
v. The Organisation of Chapters 
In chapter 1 I elaborate the reforming aspect of the secular State through its legal operation 
in the Indian constitutional scheme. Through my reading of various Indian Supreme Court 
decisions I show that the question of ‗reform‘ confronts Indian courts with the challenge of 
distinguishing between Indian and Semitic religious traditions. I argue that Indian religions 
and especially the Hindu religious traditions are entities whose value is derived from their 
status as valuable traditions or practices passed down over generations. In contrast the 
Semitic religions are creedal faiths that seek to establish doctrinal foundations for practices. 
These are very distinct ways of being religious; however, Indian constitutional practice 
proceeds as though this distinction is of little significance for the determination of the 
character of a religion. This constitutional attitude or disposition commits Indian and 
especially the Hindu religious traditions to present themselves in the law as religions 
founded in doctrines if they are to make successful claims to their traditional religious 
practices. Thus ‗reform‘ in the Indian secular constitutional scheme is the process by which 
traditional religions are reformulated through the judicial process into religion founded in 
doctrines. However, I will also suggest that traditional Indian religions continue to have a 
vibrant presence in contemporary India, making ‗reform‘ function only as semantic 
reformulation of these traditions. In other words ‗reform‘ is made possible by a 
counterintuitive constitutional discourse that is unable to give expression to religion as it 
exists sociologically and empirically, in favour of a normative constitutional conception of 
religion that is founded on doctrine. 
 
In chapter 2 I support my hypothesis on secular constitutional reform as I have developed it 
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in chapter 1 by tracing the manner in which a reformed and judicially determined Hinduism 
determines the shape of Indian constitutional debates on equality. I do so by demonstrating 
the manner in which a reformed conception of the Hindu religion has been normalised in 
the practice of Indian equality jurisprudence. Equality jurisprudence in the Indian 
Constitution takes the form of a commitment to a substantial equality which is elaborated 
through a scheme of differentiated citizenship, granting group rights to various 
communities constitutionally designated as ‗scheduled castes‘, ‗scheduled tribes‘, ‗other 
backward classes‘ and ‗minorities‘. Elaborating the rights granted to these constitutional 
groups, I demonstrate the significance of a reformed doctrinal conception of the Hindu 
religion, to maintain the intelligibility of each of these constitutional groups. Consequently 
I argue that this produces a sacralisation of Indian equality jurisprudence, a state of affairs 
in which the reformulated nature of the Hindu religion makes it extremely difficult to 
formulate the challenge posed by inequality and injustice in terms of empirical sociology. 
 
In chapter 3 I begin the task of explaining the doctrinalising and sacralising dispositions of 
the Indian secular State. I do so by situating the Indian secular State against various strands 
of scholarship on the subject and advance reasons for pursuing some of these scholarly 
approaches as more appropriate explanations for the reforming character of the secular 
State. To theoretically organise and analyse the large literature on the secular State in India 
I re-describe the enormously large scholarly opinion on the subject into four intellectual 
strands. These are – (1) Normative Conceptions of the secular State, (2) Exceptionalist 
conceptions of the secular State, (3) Descriptivist conceptions of the secular State, and 
finally (4) Post-colonial conceptions of the secular State. As an analytical re-description of 
existing literature, these strands of scholarship are not strictly self contained and could 
shade into each other. Nonetheless they identify key positions all of which have a bearing 
on the understanding of the practice of the secular State in the Indian Constitution. 
 
The normative conception of the secular State as the term suggests defends the 
constitutional scheme of the secular State as a normatively desirable institutional 
framework. In the Indian context this also includes a normative duty cast on the State to 
reform aspects of the Indian religious and social structure. However, from the perspective 
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of generating explanations for the specific reforming aspect of the Indian secular State, I 
argue that this strand of scholarship actively masks or even obstructs the task of generating 
a historically and sociologically located account of the practices of the Indian secular State. 
On the other hand, arguments suggesting Indian exceptionalism argue that the secular State 
in India is entirely free of the secular State as it developed in Western Europe. However, the 
inheritance and practice of the Indian secular State clearly suggests that this is not the case. 
That is, even if there are culturally distinct and Indian forms of arguing for toleration, the 
exceptionalism argument does not explain Indian constitutional practice as it currently 
exists. Thus the normative and exceptional lines of argument are not carried forward in this 
thesis. 
 
I therefore place the burden of explaining the dispositions of constitutional secularism in 
India on the strands of scholarship that I have termed ‗descriptivist‘ and ‗post-colonial‘ 
conceptions of the secular State. These strands of scholarship draw attention to the 
significance of explaining the secular State as a historical and political project driven by the 
constitutional mandate to reform Indian socio-religious traditions. However, the fragmented 
and potted nature of these accounts as they presently exist points to the need for a more 
integrated and comprehensive genealogical map of the secular State in India. I therefore 
take up this task in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
In chapter 4 I develop an explanatory account of the reforming disposition of the Indian 
secular State. I do so by outlining a genealogy of the Indian secular State through which I 
demonstrate the manner in which reform emerged from and continues to be tied to the 
institution and practice of ‗normative toleration‘ in India by the British colonial 
government. In particular I demonstrate the manner in which toleration accorded by the 
colonial government to Indian religious traditions occluded or reformed the description of 
Indian socio-religious traditions. That is, I show that colonial toleration identified these 
traditions as religions founded on doctrines – a description that is carried into contemporary 
constitutional practice and which is inappropriate to understand many Indian religious 
traditions like Hinduism even up to the contemporary moment. 
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I sketch the reforming effects of normative toleration both at a micro and a macro level. At 
the micro level I use the example of Sati to argue that the eventual proscription of the 
practice in 1829 was born out of the colonial policy of normative toleration which 
transformed the representation of local social norms into religious truth embodied in the 
religious laws of the Hindus. At the macro level I demonstrate that specific practices like 
Sati were set in a broader debate in which the ethical framework of the dharma shastra 
tradition was reformed and incorporated into the framework of government discourse as the 
positivist legal injunctions of the Hindus religion. However, the dharma shastra tradition 
was not positive-law nor was it associated with particular ‗identity‘ groups until it was 
absorbed as such by the British legal system. 
 
In Chapter 5 I argue that the occlusion produced by the reformed identification of Indian 
socio-religious traditions acquired considerable force and intelligibility because it was tied 
to a more explicitly stated project of reform – that is, the making of modern Indian politics 
and nationhood. I trace the birth of colonial politics to the grammar of ‗trust‘ developed in 
Edmund Burke‘s reflections on the challenge of the colonial mission in India and later 
clarified in the work of scholar administrators of British India like T. B. Macaulay and J.S. 
Mill. Holding India in trust implied that the project of British rule in India was one of 
tutelage in the business of responsible government, which could at some future point render 
the presence of the British in India redundant. However, not all British administrators 
shared the optimism that the tutelage of Indians was possible and some like James 
Fitzjames Stephen entirely ruled out such a possibility. I suggest that unifying both these 
opinions about the possibility of a future indigenous politics were their notions of the 
fundamentally and irreconcilably fragmented ‗interests‘ that comprised Indian society. 
 
Reformed religious identities were drawn into this conception of Indian society understood 
as deeply fragmented by its numerous ‗interests‘. Through the Indian Councils Act 1909, 
the Government of India Act 1919 and the Government of India Act 1935, the three major 
attempts by the colonial government to advance the constitutional project in India, I 
describe the colonial project to build government in the backdrop of what was believed to 
be an irreconcilably divided society. While the first of these statutes characterised the 
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nature of Indian society as irremediably divided, the latter two argued that it is possible that 
the present state of affairs might be overcome in a future nation. Accordingly the role of 
colonial government in these respective regimes was conceived as the holder of the peace 
or the force of authority that would guide India towards united nationhood. 
 
This colonial modelling of Indian society as fundamentally divided by contending interests 
was not drawn from any community which was empirically in place in India, and Indians 
were often puzzled at being identified with these contending interests. However, 
participation in government required that Indians learn the language of interests and 
articulate their demands through this language. Thus it is my case that this language of 
interests has defined Indian constitutional politics ever since it was introduced in 1909 and 
that contemporary constitutional identities like caste, backward classes and minorities 
replay and entrench British conceptions of political community in India. 
 
Throughout this thesis I will draw on the making of modern constitutionalism in India to 
argue that the theoretical conception of the secular State in India is unable to draw on 
Indian experiences of religion and society. As I have framed it in this introductory chapter I 
argue that the idea of the secular State operates as a conceptual and theoretical veneer that 
excludes Indian social experiences in important constitutional debates. In chapter 6 I treat 
this issue in greater detail through the manner in which the High Court at Allahabad 
addressed one of the longest standing disputes in independent India between Hindus and 
Muslims over a religious structure located at the temple town at Ayodhya. Through this 
chapter I demonstrate a disconnection between the religious rights of the Hindus identified 
as a reformed community and the actual solution that the judges devised to resolve the 
dispute between the parties. Chapter 6 is only illustrative of a deeper problem which 
requires more detailed study. Nonetheless it signals to the task of future scholarship – viz. 
bridging the gap between Indian institutional discourse and Indian social experience. I 
elaborate my case in the following chapters.  
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1. The Making of a Secular Constitution: Religious Freedom in the Indian 
Constitution 
 
In the Introductory chapter I outlined the challenge that debates on multiculturalism pose to 
the liberal secular State in North Atlantic liberal democracies. The strength of the secular 
State is its claims to tolerate diversity on the back of universally formulated and supposedly 
neutral reasons. However, as the discussion in the introductory chapter showed, it was 
precisely these claims that were challenged in the debates on identity and multiculturalism. 
By merely reiterating the plausibility of the secular State when faced with challenge the 
North Atlantic debates on multiculturalism have been unable to formulate the implications 
of cultural difference for the secular State. It was against this background that I suggested 
the globalisation of secular constitutionalism and especially its adoption in a non-Western 
country like India as a useful way of coming to grips with the challenges it is faced with. 
 
To clarify what was at stake in the multicultural challenges to the secular State I asserted 
the significance of the transforming or the reforming effect of secular norms. In this chapter 
I elaborate this reforming aspect of the secular State by drawing on its legal operation in the 
Indian constitutional scheme. By doing so I will argue that the institutionalisation of the 
Indian secular State is also committed to the semantic reformulation of Indian religious 
traditions as dogmas and doctrines. My claim about the reform of religious traditions does 
not merely imply that religious categories are expected to conform to the legal requirements 
and categories of the secular State. This is perhaps true of any kind of legal categorisation. I 
make the stronger claim that religious traditions, and especially Indian religious traditions, 
are unintelligible to the legal framework of the secular State unless they are suitably recast 
or reformed as doctrines. 
 
1.1. Situating Religious Reform in the Indian Constitution 
Adopted on the 26
th
 of January 1950 the Indian Constitution drew heavily from the liberal 
constitutional cultures of the North Atlantic world. This included a Bill of Rights chapter 
modelled along the lines of the Constitution of the United States, a chapter titled ‗Directive 
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Principles for State Policy‘ borrowed from the Irish Constitution and, by retaining much of 
the earlier 1935 Government of India Act, a form of government modelled on the British 
parliamentary system. Constitutional clauses facilitating social, economic, cultural and 
religious reform are understood to be a uniquely Indian aspect of the Constitution making 
project.
45
 In this chapter I emphasise the implications of these constitutional provisions 
facilitating socio-religious reform both in the Fundamental Rights chapter and in the 
chapter on Directive Principles for State Policy on the form that the secular State assumes 
in the Indian Constitutional scheme. 
 
The word ‗secular‘ was inserted into the preamble of the constitution in 1976 as an 
amendment describing the character of the Indian republic. However, the inclusion of the 
word only emphasised what was already understood to be a secular constitution deriving 
from the liberal democratic tradition. That is, the constitution had already instituted the 
secular State through its provisions for the protection of religious freedom subject to 
restrictions in the interests of broader public good,
46
 disallowed discrimination on grounds 
of religion,
47
 disallowed taxation on grounds of religious persuasion,
48
 and mandated that 
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 In his landmark book Granville Austin presents these clauses as embodying the case for social revolution as 
envisaged by the national movement for Independent India. Granville Austin, The Indian constitution: 
cornerstone of a nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966). 
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 Art. 25(1) which reads ―Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, 
all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and 
propagate religion.‖ The right to religious freedom is further elaborated in Article 26 providing for 
corporate freedom to all religious denominations, permitting them to manage their affairs in matters of 
religion, to own and acquire property and to administer property in accordance with law. 
47
 Art. 14 which reads “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection 
of the laws within the territory of India.‖  
Art. 15(1) which reads ―The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, 
race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.‖ 
48
 Art. 27 which reads ―No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically 
appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or 
religious denomination.‖ 
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no religious instruction would be provided in schools run by State funds.
49
 All these 
provisions instituting the secular liberal values of religious liberty, equality treatment of 
religions and neutrality towards religions are however qualified by the State‘s powers to 
reform aspects of religious belief and practice. 
 
The Constitution contains many provisions furthering the agenda of social reform and 
which also have a bearing on religious freedom. For instance, Article 17 outlaws the 
practice of untouchability associated especially though perhaps not exclusively with the 
Hindu religion. Article 23 addresses issues in relation to human trafficking and bonded 
labour, which has a bearing on prohibited practices like those of temple dancing or the 
devadasi system. Article 44, a directive principle, calls for the progressive realisation of a 
uniform civil code. Similarly, Article 48, another directive principle, exhorts the 
government to work progressively towards the prohibition of cow slaughter, which is said 
to be contrary to the tenets of the Hindu religion. Of these provisions Articles 17 and 23 are 
part of the fundamental rights chapter and are rights directly enforceable against the State. 
Articles 44 and 48 are directive principles which, though not enforceable in courts, are 
deemed to be fundamental to the process of conducting government. In addition to the 
specific reforming powers that the Constitution grants to the Indian State, Article 25(2) 
grants a more general power to socially reform religious practice. This chapter focuses on 
the judicial construction of this provision. 
 
Article 25(2) subjects religious liberty to the State‘s power to ‗regulate or restrict economic, 
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financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice‘ 
(Art 25(a)) or ‗provide for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu 
religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.‘ 
(Art.25(2)(b))
50
 Though the wording of these clauses empowers the State to regulate 
religion in two distinct ways, courts have interpreted them as cognate and related powers. 
Therefore, by following the judicial interpretation of the regulatory power embodied in 
these clauses, I will demonstrate the peculiar manner in which they reform Indian religious 
traditions. 
 
1.2. The Challenge of Reform in a Secular Constitution 
From the perspective of liberal constitutional theory it would seem that social reform 
provisions are inconsistent with the liberal democratic scheme of religious freedom. It is 
not difficult to see why this is the case because social reform clauses pose obvious and 
significant difficulties for defending a secular State conceived in terms of a commitment to 
religious liberty, equality and neutrality. In an extremely insightful essay on the secular 
State in India, Partha Chatterjee demonstrates the legal and conceptual challenges that 
social reform poses for the defence of liberty, equality and neutrality in the following 
manner.
51
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First, reform strains the liberal democratic idea of religious liberty contained in the 
normative proposition that States ought not to play a determining role in religious or other 
notions of the good life. This of course does not imply that the liberal democratic notion of 
religious liberty does not envision constraints on freedom. Constraints on freedom are 
always tenable when overwhelming public interests are at stake or when the basic rights of 
citizens are materially affected by a particular exercise of religious freedom. However, the 
reforming power granted by the constitution permits the imposition of a substantially 
greater burden on the exercise of religious freedom. That is, it empowers State intervention 
in matters of religious practice even where no such public interest or the basic rights of 
other citizens are at stake. 
 
Chatterjee demonstrates this by citing the instance of the Madras Animal and Bird 
Sacrifices Abolition Act, 1950, a statute which banned animal sacrifice as representing a 
‗primitive form of worship‘. In judging that these religious practices were primitive, the 
State strains the liberal democratic conception of liberty as being driven by autonomous 
conceptions of the good life.
52
 However, making such judgments on the nature and 
character of religion is common to the manner in which religion is determined in the Indian 
constitutional scheme. Similar judgments were made when reforming Hindu Personal 
Law,
53
 in legislation prohibiting the dedication of devadasis (temple dancers), and while 
permitting temple entry for untouchables in the immediate years after Independence. 
Without in any way condoning various ethically unconscionable practices that were the 
object of these reforms, it is important to note that reform targets religious communities in a 
manner that undermines the liberal conception of religious liberty as being autonomous or 
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self generating. 
 
Second, reform strains the liberal democratic ideal of equal citizenship. Equal citizenship is 
a particularly complex political and legal value and it is beyond the scope of this discussion 
to decide whether reform per se derogates from a commitment to equal citizenship. Instead, 
I only point to the uneven and unequal manner in which reform has been applied in Indian 
constitutional practice.
 54
 In independent India the reform of religious laws has been 
effected primarily on Hindu Personal laws.
55
 Chatterjee points out that in post independent 
India there has been a fundamental lack of clarity about who represented the interests of 
minority communities like the Muslims, therefore raising questions about the legitimacy of 
the nation state taking on the task of the reforms of their religious personal law. The 
Muslim Personal Law has therefore been exempted in many cases from reform on the 
grounds that these personal laws constitute an aspect of Muslim religious freedom. Any 
departure from this position has been politically explosive as demonstrated by the decision 
of the Supreme Court in the infamous Shah Bano Case.
56
  
 
Third, the interventionist and reformist structure of the Indian constitution allows little 
possibility for strict government neutrality towards matters of religion. Donald Smith points 
out how the powers granted by the Constitution under Art 25(2)(a) to ‗regulate or restrict 
economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with 
religious practice‘ has allowed the State to assume vast powers in relation to many religious 
institutions.
57
 The State of course argues that it only assumes control of secular matters 
associated with religion leaving core religious activities completely in the control of 
religious communities. However with no foolproof way of making distinctions between the 
religious and the secular, a large part of the management of many religious institutions have 
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ended up under the control of the Indian State.
58
 In addition, the Constitution also explicitly 
permits many forms of State entanglement in religious activity, making the symmetrical 
treatment of religious and non religious activity particularly difficult. For instance, the 
Constitution mandates that the provincial State governments contribute towards temple 
funds;
59
 permits religious education in State funded educational institutions if so required 
by the founding documents of such institutions;
60
 and even permits the levy of religious 
taxes as long as its proceeds are not appropriated for the benefit of any particular religion.
61
 
 
From the manner in which liberty, equality and neutrality find application in the Indian 
Constitution, it would seem that reform seriously compromises a liberal constitutional 
conception of a secular State. As Quentin Skinner has pointed out, the test of whether a 
concept has acquired a new meaning is to be ascertained not when efforts to apply it to a 
new context succeed but when arguments for such expansion of the concept fail.
62
 
Following this kind of argument Chatterjee seems to argue that the Indian constitutional 
practice makes for a new conception of the secular State.
63
 
 
I do not directly address the status of the term secularism in this chapter and whether a new 
conception of secularism has been instanced in Indian constitutional practice. However, it is 
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important to note that the inconsistency that reform produces is manifested in the Indian 
Constitutional practice precisely because it seeks to be secular and institute liberal values. 
An inconsistency I will argue is produced by the attempt to render Indian religious 
traditions in a manner that is intelligible to the secular State. Thus it is my case that the 
project of religious reform in India is continuous with the liberal conception of the secular 
State. However, the more important question is the extent to which this reforming project 
would take root in the Indian context. 
 
Over the course of this thesis I try to argue that reform is primarily a semantic project that 
has overlaid Indian social and religious experience. Thus instead of searching for a new 
concept of secularism I attempt to uncover the effect of constitutional reform on religious 
freedom and especially the freedom of Indian religious traditions. To do so I will outline the 
manner in which the norms of the secular State are discursively instituted though a project 
of religious reform. However, I must stress that my efforts do not amount to a normative 
analysis of the secular State. 
 
As I suggested in the introductory chapter I am particularly concerned about the practices 
that institute and constitute the Indian secular State. As an example of what I suggest, 
consider the manner in which Winnifred Sullivan introduces her remarkable book on the 
impossibility of religious freedom in modern secular democracies: 
Stories of the conflict between the demands of religion and the demands of law are 
daily news items all over the world, and take a familiar patterned form. School girls 
in France seek permission to wear the hijab to school. Sikhs in Britain seek 
exemption from motor-cycle helmet laws. Muslim women in India seek civil 
divorces on the same grounds as their Hindu and Christian neighbours. The 
Jehovah's witnesses seek the right to be a recognized religious organisation in 
Russia and to be exempt from Patriotic excesses in Greece. Native Americans seek 
repatriations of religious items in US museums. In each of these cases a court or a 
legislature or an administrative official must make a determination as to whether the 
religious practice in question is legally religious. In other words, in order to enforce 
36 
 
laws guaranteeing religious freedom you must have religion
64
 (emphasis added) 
The range of Sullivan‘s examples, drawn from various secular States, clearly demonstrates 
that the secular State is a form of governing religion, and one in which the State, law and 
politics are significantly implicated. 
 
As a form of government, the secular State has much to do with the regulation of religion, 
and as Sullivan points out, it has much to do with the very determination of what is to count 
as religious and how it is to be separated from the non-religious. If this is so, then, as Pratap 
Mehta points out, there is perhaps something quite misleading in the invocation of phrases 
like the separation of ‗church from state‘ because 
(n)o secular state, as is now familiar, can be neutral or impartial among religions 
because the state determines the boundaries within which neutrality must operate. 
… all states extensively regulate religion; one might say that they define the 
normatively permissible boundaries of religion. Particular aspects of religion are 
given protection, recognition, and support; others are the subjects of indifference, 
and many aspects are curtailed and proscribed. But the most crucial point is that the 
boundaries between the permissible and impermissible will be set by the state. It is 
therefore a little misleading to argue that the point of normative theory is to figure 
out the balance between ―two realms,‖ where religion does not encroach upon 
politics, or politics does not encroach upon religion. There is no such thing as ―two 
realms‖ independent of where politics draws the lines.65 
In this chapter I draw on the insights from both Sullivan and Mehta to elaborate what I will 
argue is the reforming structure of the Indian constitution and the manner in which it makes 
certain conceptions of religion the normative standard for advancing claims to religious 
freedom. 
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The specific form that State led reform of religion assumes in the Indian Constitution traces 
its immediate history to concerns of Indian nationalism, and the adoption of its concerns 
into the Indian secular constitutional culture. Thus the present and the subsequent chapters 
will elaborate the manner in which the contours of the secular State have taken shape in the 
Indian context. However, it is perhaps useful at the outset to outline the concerns that 
permitted the constitution makers to consider reform as compatible with or as a necessary 
pre-requisite to institute the secular State in India. As suggestive examples, consider the 
following excerpts from two leading figures in the Indian constitution making process. 
 
Talking about the need to reform Hindu personal law in the Indian Constituent Assembly 
B.R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, comments that  
(t)he religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they cover every aspect of 
life, from birth to death. There is nothing which is not religion and if personal law is 
to be saved, I am sure about it that in social matters we will come to a standstill. ... 
There is nothing extraordinary in saying that we ought to strive hereafter to limit the 
definition of religion in such a manner that we shall not extend beyond beliefs and 
such rituals as may be connected with ceremonials which are essentially religious. It 
is not necessary that the sort of laws, for instance, laws relating to tenancy or laws 
relating to succession, should be governed by religion. ... I personally do not 
understand why religion should be given this vast, expansive jurisdiction so as to 
cover the whole of life and to prevent the legislature from encroaching upon that 
field.
66
 (emphasis added) 
The Indian national movement was rife with similar opinions on the reform of Indian 
religion. For instance, supporting a clause on reform and the progressive realisation of a 
uniform civil code, K.M. Munshi argues that 
(w)e want to divorce religion from personal law, from what may be called social 
relations or from the rights of parties as regards inheritance or succession. What 
have these things to do with religion I fail to understand. ... after all we are an 
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advancing society. We are in a stage where we must unify and consolidate the nation 
by every means without interfering with religious practices. If however the religious 
practices in the past have been so construed as to cover the whole field of life, we 
have reached a point when we must put our foot down and say that these matters are 
not religion, they are purely matters for secular legislation. ... Religion must be 
restricted to spheres which legitimately appertain to religion, and the rest of life 
must be regulated, unified and modified in such a manner that we may evolve, as 
early as possible, a strong and consolidated nation.
67
 (emphasis added) 
To both Ambedkar and Munshi Indian religions occupied too much public space and could 
not be accommodated within the nationalist and secular positions that they were 
advocating. That is, they did not view Indian religious traditions as legitimate candidates 
for religious freedom and only their reform into what Ambedkar calls their essential 
elements could make them such candidates. In other words, reform is a pre-requisite for the 
protection of religious freedom understood in terms of the essential aspects of religion. In 
this chapter I will elaborate the manner in which reform identifies the essential aspects of a 
religious tradition in the practice of Indian constitutional law. 
 
Before I conclude this section I would like to clarify my claims about the norms of the 
secular State being consistent with Indian constitutional practice. I have not claimed that 
the reforming aspect of Indian constitutional practice can be logically reconciled with the 
liberal democratic norms of religious liberty, equality and neutrality. Instead, drawing on 
the insights of scholars like Mehta, Sullivan and Talal Asad, I argue that reform is 
consistent with the secular State because it is the specific form that the liberal secular State 
assumes as it takes institutional shape in the Indian Constitution. 
 
Therefore as with Ambedkar and Munshi, the question that requires answering in the Indian 
constitutional scheme is ‗how to determine the essential core of a religious tradition?‘ The 
clearest expression of this dynamic of socio-religious reform is found in Indian 
constitutional practice on the right to religious freedom. However before proceeding to 
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describe the centrality of essential religious truth in the contemporary constitutional 
practice on religious freedom, I first outline the debates in the Indian Constituent Assembly 
which instituted the present constitutional scheme on religious freedom. 
 
1.3. Shaping Religious Liberty in the Indian Constituent Assembly 
The right to religious freedom took its earliest form in the Constituent Assembly when the 
Fundamental Rights Committee
68
 adopted K.M. Munshi‘s draft clause 16, granting all 
persons equal rights to freedom of conscience and the right to freely practice religion, 
subject to the maintenance of public order, morality or health. Munshi‘s clause was further 
qualified by a regulatory clause which stated that ―the right to profess and practice religion 
shall not include economic, financial, political or other secular activities associated with 
religious worship.‖69 The nationalist reformers in the assembly found this clause inadequate 
because it was not clear whether this regulatory clause would empower the State to steward 
social reform. In this section I outline the manner in which this clause providing religious 
freedom was reworked as it moved through the Assembly to reflect the ambitions of the 
nationalist reformers. 
 
Speaking for the reformist position, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur expressed apprehensions about 
Munshi‘s clause ―inasmuch as it might invalidate legislation against anti-social customs 
which might have the sanction of religion.‖70 To facilitate social reform legislation 
Rajkumari Amrit Kaur thought it appropriate to limit religious freedom by conceiving of it 
narrowly to include only the right to conscience and worship and not the right to religious 
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practice.
71
 Thus when the Minorities' Committee suggested that clause 16 of the draft 
fundamental rights submitted by the Fundamental Rights Committee substitute the word 
‗religious worship‘ with ‗religious practice‘, it was opposed by Amrit Kaur who feared that 
... they would not only be a bar to future social legislation but would even invalidate 
past legislation such as the Widow Remarriage Act, the Sarda Act or even the law 
abolishing Sati. Everyone is aware how many evil practices, which one would like 
to abolish, are carried on in the name of religion, e.g., purdah, polygamy, caste 
disabilities, animal sacrifice, dedication of girls to temples, to mention a few.
72
 
Amrit Kaur‘s concerns were not unusual and many other powerful voices in the assembly 
expressed similar positions.
73
 In a slightly altered manner, the concern over whether 
religious freedom should include the right to practices continues to be at the heart of the 
debate on the scope of religious freedom in contemporary constitutional practice. 
 
The reform project of those like Amrit Kaur ostensibly sought to eradicate unethical 
practices that were understood to be associated with the Hindu religion. However, as 
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Shyama Prasad Mookherjee and others pointed out, a reform agenda that sought to target 
and restrict religious practices would impose potentially unjustifiable burdens on the Indian 
religious traditions which as a matter of fact emphasised practices over worship. 
Consequently Mookherjee suggested that the assembly provide a significantly greater 
leeway for practices, permitting reform of religious practices only in exceptional 
circumstances. It was accordingly decided that a more comprehensive provision would be 
drafted in which practices would be included as part of the right to freedom but one that 
also empowered the legislature to reform religious practices as a separate proviso.
74
 An 
appropriately re-drafted clause was presented to the assembly for final consideration on the 
3
rd
 of December 1948 as Art 19 of the draft constitution. 
 
Mookherjee‘s case about the distinctness of Indian religions was not interrogated by the 
constitution makers at any length. Perhaps the only related intervention was that of Loknath 
Mishra, who objected to the inclusion of the right to propagation as part of the right to 
religion freedom. According to him propagation would ultimately lead to the 
marginalisation of the Hindu religious and cultural traditions by Christianity and Islam, 
which unlike the latter were not motivated by the need to proselytise.
75
 This view was 
forcefully rebutted by numerous other members of the house, even though there was some 
concern in the Assembly about challenges such as mass conversion and religious 
propaganda on impressionable minds in institutional contexts.
76
 The object of this chapter 
is to clarify the stakes involved in the disagreements between those like Mishra and the 
more dominant reformist opinion in the Assembly. However, since the right to propagate 
one‘s religion did not directly deal with the question of reform, I restrict myself to the 
manner in which the Assembly addressed religious freedom and the scope of reform to 
qualify that right. 
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The dominant position in the assembly on the question of reform was that the State should 
have the power to reform religious practices. In a particularly fascinating statement of this 
reforming ambition, K.T. Shah moved an amendment seeking to empower the State to 
prohibit economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated 
with religious practice.
77
 Arguing his position he stated that 
I should like the State also to have the power positively and absolutely ―to prohibit‖ 
any such practice. Such practices in my opinion, only degrade the very name of 
religion. Nothing has caused more the popular disfavour of some of the most well-
known and most widely spread religions in the world than the association of those 
religions with secular activities, and with excesses that are connected with those 
activities. Material possessions, worldly wealth and worldly grandeur are things 
which have been the doom of many an established Church. Many a well-known 
Religion, which has ceased to follow the original spirit or the precepts of its 
founders, has, nevertheless, carried on, in the popular eye, business, trade, and 
political activity of a most reprehensible character. The State in India, if it claims to 
be secular, if it claims to have an open mind, should have, in my opinion, a right not 
merely to regulate and restrict such practices but also absolutely to prohibit them.
78
 
(emphasis added) 
Shah‘s amendment was rejected but a reformist position not entirely dissimilar to his was 
adopted as Art 25 of the Indian Constitution. In what follows in this chapter I focus on the 
peculiar manner in which the Indian constitutional scheme on the social reform of religious 
traditions qualifies the rights of communities to their religious practices. 
 
1.4. Reform and the Scope of Religious Liberty in the Indian Constitution 
In this section I detail the manner in which the Indian Supreme Court has read Art 25 and 
26 to determine the scope of religious freedom within the Indian constitutional scheme. 
Since I draw out my case about the nature of socio-religious reform in the Indian 
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Constitution from the decisions of the Indian Supreme Court it is perhaps useful to begin 
my enquiry by locating the role and place of the Supreme Court in the framework of the 
Indian constitutional order. 
 
1.4.1. The Supreme Court as a Guardian of Constitutional Rights 
A rash of contemporary scholarship has emphasized the enormous significance of judicially 
managed constitutionalism in respect of contemporary moral and political problems.
79
 India 
is no exception with its unelected judges coming to occupy a very important role in the 
management of its constitutional democracy. Indian appellate Judges and especially those 
of its Supreme Court have therefore been deeply involved with all kinds of governance 
issues ranging from regulating air quality, education policy, forest policy, waste 
management as well as deciding questions about the fundamental rights of citizens. The 
governance of religious liberty is therefore one part of the vast powers that the Indian 
Supreme Court has come to acquire over the last sixty odd years. 
 
India‘s court system is organised into a unitary three tiered system with the Supreme Court 
at the apex. Most provinces or states have their respective High Courts, with other 
subordinate courts below it. Established in 1950 the Supreme Court currently has 29 judges 
who have both original and appellate jurisdiction in a wide range of causes.
80
 The most 
significant of their powers is that of judicial review which is derived from a reading of Arts 
13, 32, and 142. Art 13 disallows the State from abridging fundamental rights granted by 
Part III of the constitution, Art. 32 grants give any person the right to move the Supreme 
Court, for the enforcement of the guaranteed fundamental rights,
81
 and Art. 142 permits the 
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Supreme Court to pass such orders or decrees ―as is necessary for doing complete justice in 
any cause or matter‖. Collectively these articles have allowed the court to acquire a 
creeping power which extends to large parts of Indian social, cultural and political life that 
even extends to the power to review a duly enacted amendment to the Constitution.
82
  
 
Most of the cases that I will study in this chapter are petitions that have found their way to 
the Supreme Court as writ petitions under Art. 32 of the constitution and are therefore 
complaints regarding infringements of the fundamental right to religious freedom. In turn, 
these complaints regard the demand that courts determine the scope of religious freedom 
through reading three constitutional clauses – Art 25(1),83 which grants religious liberty, 
Art. 26,
84
 which grants religious communities the right to manage their religious affairs, 
and Art. 25(2),
85
 which empowers the State to reform and regulate these religious liberties. 
 
From the logic of these three constitutional articles it is obvious that religious freedom in 
the Indian constitution is qualified by the power of the State to socially reform religious 
practice; however, the power to reform religion is certainly not intended to extinguish 
religious freedom. This implies that some aspect of religious freedom must necessarily 
survive the State‘s exercise of religious reform. That is, the Constitutional provisions on 
religious freedom would always protect core or essential aspects of a religious tradition 
though incidental aspects of it could be subjected to reform. Thus the key challenge for 
courts (especially the Supreme Court as the last word on this question) charged with 
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determining the essential core of a religious tradition has been the criteria by which they 
would arrive at such a determination. Following the manner in which the Indian Supreme 
Court has pronounced on ‗essential practices‘ of a religious tradition, I advance the 
hypothesis that the constitutional conception of religious freedom semantically dislocates 
the conception of Indian religious traditions as they are traditionally practiced and 
experienced. 
 
1.4.2. Determining Essential Religious Practices 
The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Laxmindra Thirtha 
Swamiar of Shirur Mutt
86
 is arguably the most authoritative and the earliest of the Indian 
Supreme Court decisions outlining a test to determine the essential aspects of a religious 
denomination. In this case the Mathadhipati, or head of the Shirur Mutt
87
, challenged the 
constitutionality of various provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable 
Endowments Act 1951 on the grounds that a scheme framed for the Mutt under the statute 
violated the petitioner‘s right to manage its institutions according to its religious traditions 
as permitted by Art 25(1) and Art 26 of the Constitution. 
88
  
 
Under the Hindu Religious Endowments Act a duly appointed Commissioner sat at the 
head of a department of government which dealt with the administration and governance of 
Hindu religious and charitable institutions, and had considerable powers to pass orders 
deemed necessary to ensure that religious endowments were properly administered and 
their income duly appropriated for the purposes towards which they were founded. 
Countering the claims of the petitioners, the State contended that it had the broadest powers 
of regulating ‗secular‘ aspects related to a religious tradition under Art. 25(2)(a) and that the 
petitioner's right to religious freedom did not extend beyond the relationship between a 
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believer and his deity.
89
 In resolving these competing claims, the court made its first 
detailed consideration of the manner in which the essential core of a religious tradition was 
to be determined. 
 
A technical reading of Art 25 and 26 would suggest that the State could reform various 
aspects of a religious tradition as long as it did not completely extinguish the right to 
religious freedom. However the court categorically refused to accept the State‘s contention 
that the right to religious freedom extended only to the relationship between believers and 
their deities, holding that 
... what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with 
reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of 
the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular 
hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at 
certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or 
oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the 
mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests and 
servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular 
activities partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of them are religious 
practices and should be regarded as matters of religion ...(emphasis added)
90
 
In other words the court stressed that the essential core of a religion was to be determined 
by taking into account those doctrines and practices that a community subjectively viewed 
to be essential to their religion. However it was unclear how a court would arrive at a 
subjective account of a religious tradition. 
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It is important to note that a subjective determination of a religion is primarily a method 
with which the court takes a sympathetic stance in relation to the claims of a community 
when determining the core of its religious tradition. One way of doing this would be to 
grant the ‗assertion test‘ by which the court would simply enquire into the existence of a 
practice asserted by a practitioner to be part of his religious tradition. However, in an 
explicitly reforming constitutional scheme it is obvious that such a conception of religion 
would not be tenable.
91
 That is, it is understood that the court must make substantive 
judgments balancing the State‘s reforming claims with those of the concerned religious 
tradition asserting religious freedom. Thus a subjective approach to religion only implies 
that this balancing of competing claims would have to be done in a manner sympathetic to 
the religious tradition concerned. 
 
As I have already mentioned, my analysis of the Indian secular State is entirely at ease with 
the exegetical role that the Indian secular State assumes in relation to its religions. That is, 
my analysis assumes that the secular State in India will take on a quasi theological role in 
relation to religions, and make substantive decisions on what counts as religion and what 
will not. Consequently my concerns centre on what the secular State does to Indian 
religious traditions and especially to those traditions that are understood to be ‗Hindu‘ when 
the determinations of the essential features of a religion are made. Thus in analysing the 
Shirur Mutt decision I am particularly concerned with the criteria that the court employs to 
determine the essential character of a religion and the potential sociological effects of this 
constitutional determination on Indian religious traditions. 
 
It is my case that the Shirur Mutt court offers two options to arrive at the essential aspects 
of a religious tradition. However, they are intertwined with each other in Justice 
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Mukherjea‘s decision. The first of these draws on an intuitive sociology of Indian religions. 
That is, in refusing to accept the State‘s contention that religion is merely a relationship 
between man and god the court drew on the sociological distinctness of Indian religions and 
argued that the State‘s conception of religion was inappropriate for Indian conditions 
because 
(t)here are well known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not 
believe in God or in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis 
in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that 
religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say 
that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay 
down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and 
observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts 
of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food 
and dress.
92
 
Though Justice Mukherjea places considerable emphasis on practice and ritual as the 
distinctive markers of religion in India, his account of religion is one in which religious 
practice ‗undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines‘. That is, practices are 
subordinated to, and amalgamated into religious doctrine and the beliefs that are said to 
flow out of them. Thus doctrines, and a conception of religion as practices grounded in, and 
flowing out of, doctrine, is the second option that Justice Mukherjea offers to determine the 
essential practices of a religious tradition. 
 
It is undoubtedly true that the Supreme Court in the Shirur Mutt case has emphasised 
practices as a key aspect of a religious traditions. A standard legal authority that courts draw 
on to establish the significance of religious practices is the Australian judgment Adelaide 
Company of Jehovah‘s Witnesses Inc. v.Commonwealth in which that court states that 
(t)here are those who regard religion as constituting principally a system of beliefs 
or statements of doctrine. So viewed religion may either be true or false. Others are 
more inclined to regard religion as prescribing a mode of conduct. So viewed 
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religion may be good or bad. There are others who pay greater attention to religion 
as involving some prescribed form of ritual or religious observance.
 93
 
Drawing on this decision scholars have gone on to presume that the dominant conception of 
religion endorsed by the Court is one that emphasises practices. While this decision has 
perhaps been useful for Indian courts to distinguish between the protection of belief and 
conscience from that of religious practice,
94
 I think it is still tenable to argue that the 
Supreme Court has amalgamated practice and doctrine in its conception of religion. 
 
The distinction that I have drawn between doctrine and practice is not one that is readily 
evident or perhaps even intended by Justice Mukherjea in his judgment. In his decision, 
religion is clearly a phenomenon in which religious practices are understood to be founded 
in, or flowing out of, religious doctrine. However this is an assertion he makes in relation to 
Indian religious traditions, in which this link between practice and doctrine is anything but 
certain. That is, religions like Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism are not known to 
emphasise a conception of doctrinal truth in the same manner as Semitic religions like 
Christianity and Islam. It is for this reason that I argue that Justice Mukherjea has 
amalgamated two very different ways of identifying and determining a religious tradition. 
However, this latter claim needs more elaboration. 
 
In an essay on the challenge posed by religious commitment in contemporary plural and 
liberal societies, Pratap Bhanu Mehta outlines what could be at stake when religion and 
religious freedom is invoked. Mehta answers the question through analogies from two 
important figures in Roman antiquity. The first is drawn from Cicero's De Natura Deorum 
where he asserts that 
... religion has been dissociated from superstition not only by philosophers but by 
our own ancestors as well. I may mention as to these two terms that men who used 
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to spend whole days in prayer and sacrifice in order that their children might survive 
them (essent superstites), were called superstitiosus, a title which afterwards 
extended more widely, while such as heedfully repeated and, as it were, 
―regathered‖ (relegerent) everything that formed a part of divine worship, were 
named religiosus from relegere, in the same way that elegans is derived from 
eligere, diligens from diligere, and intellegens from intellegere, for in all these 
words the force of legere is the same as in religiosus. It was in this way that with the 
words superstitiosus and religiosus, the one became the designation of a fault, the 
other of an excellence.
95
 
Mehta contrasts Cicero with Lactantius, a Christian who took issue with this 
characterisation of religion three centuries later. According to Lactantius religion is a bond 
of piety that ties man to God. In addition, he counters Cicero‘s account of religion by 
arguing that  
(t)he word is not as Cicero interpreted it from ―re-reading,‖ or ―choosing again‖ 
(relegendo). ... We can know from the matter itself how inept this interpretation is. 
For if superstition and religion are engaged in worshipping the same gods, there is 
light or rather no difference ... because religion is a worship of the true; superstition 
of the false. And it is important, really, why you worship, not how you worship, or 
what you pray for. ... We have said that the name of religion is taken from the bond 
of piety, because God has bound and fastened man to Himself of piety, since it is 
necessary for us to serve Him as Lord and obey Him as father. ... They are 
superstitious who worship many and false gods; but we, who supplicate the one true 
God, are religious.
96
 (emphasis in original) 
It is my case that these excerpts from Cicero and Lactantius are extremely useful to 
disaggregate Justice Mukherjea‘s discussion of doctrine and practice in the Shirur Mutt 
case.
97
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Mehta contrasts three conceptions of being religious. These are: religion as devotion to all 
that is excellent in a tradition; religion as superstitious, excessive or absurd practice; and 
religion as commitment to the true theology. Thus for Cicero, religion is a way of life or a 
set of inherited and excellent practices. The manner of its practice is what makes it 
valuable, with superstition or excessiveness being the contrasting value against which it 
acquires salience. Significantly, the truth or falsity of belief or doctrine is unimportant to 
Cicero's conception of religion while it is the basis of Lactantius‘ conception of his religion. 
 
It has been argued that the difference that Mehta identifies between Cicero and Lactantius 
are also the broad differences between the Semitic religions and non-Semitic religions like 
Hinduism.
98
 Thus non-Semitic religions are less interested in the question of theological 
truth, often uninterested in proselytisation, and as a consequence do not see other traditions 
as theological or doctrinal rivals. This of course should not be taken to imply that a lack of 
concern with a true theology makes either the Roman religion or the Hindu traditions any 
more benign than the Semitic religions founded on theological truths. Like the Semitic 
religions, these religious traditions have identified rivals in other traditions, and even 
persecuted other traditions. However it can perhaps be said that the grounds of conflict in 
these cases was not the theological truth of doctrine. Similarly it is not that Non-Semitic 
traditions were uninterested in the question of the truth, except that their conceptions of 
truth were not necessarily linked to proving the error of their rivals. That is, their 
conception of truth is self contained in a manner unlike the Semitic traditions. I cannot 
follow these truth conceptions of the Non-Semitic and specifically of the Hindu Buddhist or 
Jaina traditions any further in this chapter. However I trust I have emphasised the point that 
the Semitic and the Non-Semitic traditions pick out very different ways of being religious. 
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It is my case that the differences between these different kinds of religion are of little 
significance to the manner in which the Indian secular State views religion. That is, the 
Indian Constitutional framework on essential religious practices deals with Indian religious 
traditions as though they were Semitic religious traditions with essential doctrinal truths. 
Thus in the Shirur Mutt decision, it is my case that Justice Mukherjea's is unable to 
disaggregate customary religious traditions from doctrinal religions because he presumes 
that all religions are founded in doctrine. Since the distinction that I draw between Semitic 
and non-Semitic religions is not explicitly stated in the Shirur Mutt case itself, I draw on 
other decisions of the Indian Supreme Court to further clarify my case. 
 
1.4.3. Entrenching the Conceptual Reach of Essential Religious Practices 
The Shirur Mutt case is undoubtedly the most significant decision of the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on religious freedom and numerous subsequent decisions have determined 
the bounds of religious freedom by referring to this case. However, Rajeev Dhavan 
comments that 
Indian judges have not been discerning in dealing with the many difficulties raised 
in employing the ‗essential practice‘ test. Mechanically citing the Shirur Math case, 
they have assumed that so long as some kind of inquiry into religious tradition takes 
place, the manner and form in which these inquiries are to be conducted have not 
been elaborated by even the highest court of the land. There are no indicators as to 
what kind of evidence should be considered authoritative, no rules of interpretation, 
no emphasis on detailed research, and no requirement to consult authoritative 
exponents and material.
99
 
Dhavan's charge that the Shirur Mutt case has produced an ad hoc re-formulation of the 
essential practices test would contradict my case that this decision makes normative a 
doctrinal conception of religion. Therefore in this section I defend my reading of Shirur 
Mutt against Dhavan‘s charge that the essential practices test formulated in this case is 
given to a whimsical and ad hoc formulation of the essential practices of a religion. 
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A good example of the ‗mechanical citation‘ of the Shirur Mutt case to which Dhavan 
refers, is the Supreme Court decision in Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore.
100
 In 
this case the trustees of a temple dedicated to the deity Venkataramana, and controlled by 
Gaud Saraswath Brahmins, challenged provisions of the Madras Temple Entry 
Authorisation Act 1947. The statute barred Hindu temples of a public character from 
refusing entry to any class or section of Hindus on the ground that they belonged to an 
untouchable caste or community. Temple entry laws are understood to be closely connected 
to the constitutionally provided fundamental right against untouchability, and at the time of 
Indian Independence many of India‘s federating States enacted such statutes. As the 
specific Madras statute permitted all classes and sections of Hindus access to temples 
dedicated to any section of the Hindu public, the case had to address the Gaud Saraswath 
claim that the statute violated their constitutional right to manage their religious institutions 
as they deemed fit. That is, they contended that the right to manage their religious 
institutions included the right to regulate entry and the performance of appropriate 
traditionally sanctioned rituals. 
 
Deciding the Gaud Saraswath claims turned on the manner in which their rights to manage 
their affairs according to their religious traditions under Art. 26(b) would be qualified by, or 
subject to, the reformist temple entry statute which drew its validity from Art. 25(2)(b). The 
court could have taken the position that the State‘s power to regulate temple entry under Art 
25(2)(b) would entirely eclipse the rights of the communities to manage their religious 
institutions according to their religious traditions. However, following the Shirur Mutt 
formulation, the court proceeded to determine whether the temple exclusion of the 
Saraswaths was an essential aspect of their religious tradition. Deciding this question, the 
court raised both the options offered in the Shirur Mutt case, and perhaps with considerably 
greater sharpness. That is, the court raised the possibility of determining the essential core 
of the Saraswath religion both as a historically and sociologically identifiable religious 
tradition as well as one founded in doctrine. 
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The sociological option was however considered only in passing when the Court described 
the manner in which the case was decided by the subordinate court at South Kanara. The 
subordinate judge determined the Gaud Saraswath religious tradition sociologically by 
ascertaining that the temple was as a matter of fact resorted to by all members of the 
general public even if the temple was dedicated only for the benefit of the Gaud Saraswath 
Brahmins. Using this factual account of the practices at the Gaud Saraswath temple, the 
subordinate judge gave effect to the provisions of the temple entry statute, while at the 
same time granting the Gaud Saraswath community the right to exclude the public from the 
performance of certain ceremonies. The Supreme Court did not determine the essential 
features of the Saraswath tradition in this manner. However, by mentioning the lower court 
judgment in its decision the Supreme Court highlighted the difficulty of making a purely 
traditional or sociological determination of the essential features of a religious tradition 
within the Indian constitutional framework. 
 
That is, in the absence of a criterion like doctrine which would identify the essential core of 
a religion, sociological accounts of religious traditions would only be a set of enumerated 
and valued practices. Consequently, identifying religion in manner would fundamentally 
undermine the power that the Constitution grants the State to socially reform religious 
traditions, as it would be extremely difficult to determine which aspects are core or 
essential to that religious tradition and therefore immune from reform. I will return to this 
issue towards the end of this chapter, when I attempt to clarify what reform does in the 
Indian constitutional framework, and focus presently on the seemingly inconsistent manner 
in which the essential practices of the Saraswaths were determined in this case. 
 
The essential core of Saraswath tradition was determined with the aid of what was 
supposedly ‗Hindu‘ religious doctrine. Drawing from the agamas, a set of texts which were 
identified as ‗Hindu‘ ceremonial law, Aiyar J. held that different castes were meant to 
access and worship in a temple according to different rules of worship,
101
 that an idol was 
made impure by the violation of these rules, and further, that appropriate purificatory rituals 
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had to be performed in such instances. In support, the court cited a pre-Constitutional 
decision of the Privy Council in Sankaralinga Nadan v. Raja Rajeswara Dorai
102
, which 
held that a temple trustee would be in breach of trust if he permitted entry and worship in a 
temple contrary to the rules stipulated in the agamas. Accordingly the court concluded that 
exclusion of certain people or groups of people from a temple was an essential aspect of the 
Hindu religion. However, the court did not explain the status of the agama texts in the 
Hindu religion, whether these texts were obligatory to the Hindu religion, and most 
importantly how these texts bound the practices of the Gaud Saraswath Brahmins. Thus, 
although the agamas were treated as Hindu religious doctrine, it was not clear why it was 
essential to the Saraswath religious tradition. 
 
A far more troubling aspect of the Venkataramana case was the manner in which the 
Court‘s reasoning undermined the very significance of essential practices. That is, having 
determined that the Saraswaths were bound by Hindu doctrines of temple exclusion, it was 
these very practices that were then subjected to reform as mandated by the Madras Temple 
Entry Act. However, the subjective view of religion demanded by the Shirur Mutt case 
made it difficult to subject the essential aspects of the Saraswath religion to reform. Thus 
the case got framed as one involving a conflict between two constitutional provisions and 
as a result the court had to work out a pragmatic compromise between the conflicting 
demands of the Gaud Saraswath religious freedoms and the State‘s power to reform their 
religious practices. 
 
Justice Aiyar did so by arguing that empowering the Saraswaths to manage their temple 
according to their religious traditions under Art 26(b) would have rendered the State‘s 
power to socially reform religious traditions under Art 25(2)(b) inoperative. However, the 
inverse would not render Art 26(b) entirely inoperative. Therefore the court pragmatically 
resolved the problem by permitting the Saraswaths to perform some ceremonies and rituals 
at the temple to the total exclusion of all other communities, though the temple could be not 
be made entirely inaccessible to non Saraswath Hindus. 
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By permitting reform of practices deemed to be essential to the Saraswaths, the 
Venkataramana court suggests that the relationship between ‗reform‘ and ‗essential 
practices‘ is ad hoc and pragmatically determined. However, drawing on my earlier 
discussion on the different kinds of religion, I believe it is possible to save important 
aspects of the decision in these cases from the charge of being decided ad hoc. This is best 
explained with another decision of the Supreme Court. 
 
In The Durgah Committee, Ajmer And Another v. Syed Hussain Ali And Others,
103
 the court 
heard challenges to the Dargah Kwaja Saheb Act 1955, a statute dealing with issues related 
to the governance and administration of the 13
th
 century Dargah or tomb of Kwaja Moin-
ud-Din Chisti of Ajmer, one of the holiest figures in Sufi Islam. This decision primarily 
sought to address the claims of the Khadims and Sajjadnashins or traditional custodians of 
the Dargah who claimed that various provisions of the statute violated their long standing 
traditional rights to manage the shrine, receive devotees, and receive Nazars or offerings in 
return. These customary rights were altered by the Kwaja Saheb Act on the basis of a 
committee of Enquiry conducted in 1949 which alleged that an unholy alliance between the 
Sajjadanashins and the Khadims exploited superstitious and ignorant believers by using the 
name of the holy saint.
104
 
 
Justice Gajendragadkar, who decided the case, was one of the most aggressively reforming 
judges of the Indian Supreme Court and this case typifies his impatience for traditional 
practices. Tracing the history of the Dargah from 13
th
 century he pointed out that it was 
subject to secular control of rulers throughout its history and that its custodians had on 
occasion even been non Muslim. Therefore he felt that the traditional rights being claimed 
could be altered by the secular authority of the Indian government. Denying the claims of 
the Khadims, Gajendragadkar observed: 
Whilst we are dealing with this point it may not be out of place incidentally to strike 
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a note of caution and observe that in order that the practises in question should be 
treated as a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential 
and integral part; otherwise even purely secular practises which are not an essential 
or an integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may 
make a claim for being treated as religious practises within the meaning of Art. 26. 
Similarly, even practises though religious may have sprung from merely 
superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions 
to religion itself. Unless such practices are found to constitute an essential and 
integral part of a religion their claim for the protection under Art. 26 may have to be 
carefully scrutinised; in other words, the protection must be confined to such 
religious practises as are an essential and integral part of it and no other.
105
 
(emphasis added) 
This invasive exegetical approach to religious traditions has gained currency in the Indian 
Supreme Court's approach to religious traditions. Thus in other cases the Supreme Court 
has held that the sacrifice of cows did not constitute an essential part of the Islamic faith;
106
 
overruled Muslim claims that prayer in a mosque was crucial to the Islamic faith;
107
 refused 
to accept traditional rights of the Tilkayats of the Shrinathji temple at Nathdwara which was 
taken from them by the Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959;
108
 stipulated that the tandava dance 
was not a significant part of the Anand Margi community;
109
 declared that the followers of 
Aurobindo did not constitute a distinct religion
110
, and so on. 
 
Commenting on this towering role that the courts have assumed in relation to Indian 
religious traditions, Dhavan notes: 
After the preliminary years of ‗balancing‘, the Court has generally allowed the 
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executive and legislative branches to do whatever they like. The nub of the issues in 
the religious freedom cases has devolved away from religious freedom to a 
disorganized discussion of the legitimate areas of operation of a modern State. And 
the courts‘ answer to the question, ―How modern is the modern State?‖ appears to 
be, ―As modern as it wants to be!‖ By resolving these questions mechanically, the 
Court has not really evolved a theory about the permissible limits of social reform. 
It has left it to other agencies of the State to assume broad powers to regulate 
religious freedom and has provided supportive constitutional protection so long as 
some nexus is deemed to exist between the power exercised and the broad 
undefined categories of control. By enlarging, but not defining, notions of secular 
management, public order, morality and health, almost any part of religious activity 
is subject to control.
111
 
From this account it would seem that the essential practices of religious tradition are 
determined only by political contexts and judicial pragmatism. As Dhavan notes, courts 
have steadily and arbitrarily expanded their power over large parts of religious life and their 
facilitation of the exercise of State power over religious traditions is perhaps uneven and 
arbitrary. However I argue that even if the content of religion is arbitrarily determined in 
these cases, a doctrinal conception of religion is made normative in all the ad hoc 
invocations of essential practices. Perhaps the best way of exploring this claim is by 
demonstrating the peculiar yet consistent effect of refracting Indian religious traditions 
through the doctrinal or true conception of religion that is made normative by the Shirur 
Mutt case. 
 
As my earlier discussion of the different conceptions of being religious has shown
112
, it 
would not be possible for Justice Gajendragadkar to speak of ‗superstitious beliefs‘ giving 
rise to practices that are ‗unessential accretions‘ unless he was referring to religious practice 
as embodying or being founded in the ‗true‘ religion.113 The Khadims and the Sajjadnashins 
were however making traditional claims which could perhaps be judged to be superstitious 
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in the sense of being excessive but certainly not superstitious in the sense of entertaining 
false beliefs. However, this is precisely what Gajendragadkar does by reading traditional 
religious practices as founded in a true doctrinal conception of religion that excludes all 
superstitious practices. That is, Gajendragadkar is either oblivious to, or entirely 
misunderstands the nature of traditional claims and provides legal support for a 
foundationalist doctrinal reading of traditional practices. At this stage of my argument this 
is only a suggestion of a constitutional disposition towards entrenching a doctrinal 
conception of religion. I will therefore support this claim in much greater detail in the next 
chapter; but before I do so I first clarify an important issue related to my case about the 
constitutional disposition driving the determination of religious freedom in the Indian 
Constitution. 
 
The Dargah Committee case and the other cases which rely on the reasoning in this 
decision, reorient the subjective aspect of essential practices as it was laid down in the 
Shirur Mutt case. That is, though they do not dispense with the Shirur Mutt formulation, 
these decisions de-emphasise the idea that religion ought to be determined according to the 
tenets as they are understood by the adherents of the tradition in question. In place of a 
subjective determination, the court emphasised the State‘s power to reform religions as 
dictated by the demands of public policy. This was reflected in the court‘s insistence in the 
Dargah Committee case that essential religious practices be separated from superstitious 
accretions and restricted to what was strictly essential. However, even if the Shirur Mutt 
case gestured towards subjective determination of essential practices, its subordination of 
religious practices to religious doctrines meant that it was not able to clearly and fairly 
consider the subjective claims of traditional religions. The formulation in the Dargah 
Committee case solves this shortcoming in the Shirur Mutt case, by de-emphasising, if not 
dispensing with, the subjective element in the determination of essential aspects of a 
religion. Therefore it could be argued that the essential aspects of a religion perhaps cannot 
be subjectively determined within the Indian constitutional scheme. Nonetheless the 
subjective requirement, as stated in the Shirur Mutt case, makes salient the limits of what 
can and cannot be successfully argued within the framework of the Indian constitution, and 
indeed the effect of re-reading traditional religions in terms or a doctrinal or true religion. 
In the next section I illustrate the peculiar effects of this re-reading of traditional practices 
60 
 
in greater detail. 
 
1.4.4. On The Peculiar Ontology of Religion in the Indian Constitution 
In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay
114
 the court considered the 
constitutional challenge brought by the Dai-ul-Mutlaq or the religious head of the Dawoodi 
Bohra community against the validity of the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act 
1949. The statute was a reformist initiative of the Bombay legislature and was passed on 
the back of a judgment of the Privy Council in Hasanali v. Mansoorali
115
 which had 
decided that the Dai was the head of the Dawoodi Bohra community and had the right to 
excommunicate any member of the community after calling for a fair hearing. The statute 
penalised acts of excommunication and defined it as acts of expulsion which deprive 
members of a community of rights and privileges that they could enforce through a civil 
suit
116
. The Court therefore had to decide the claims of the Dai, on behalf of the Dawoodi 
Bohra community, that the statute violated various aspects of their right to religious 
freedom. 
 
The Bohras were a tight knit Shia Muslim community and the Dai-ul-Mutlaq or the Dai 
was the spiritual head of the community with wide powers over the community, including 
that of excommunicating members who had fallen out of line with the beliefs and traditions 
of the community. Excommunication gave the Dai power to exclude members of the 
community from the right to worship in the community‘s mosques, the right to be buried 
according to the rites of the community, exclusion from property held in trust for the 
community and other similar rights and privileges. The Bombay statute sought to reform 
this practice and was therefore challenged by the Dai on grounds that it violated the 
community‘s rights to religious freedom as granted by Art. 25(1) and 26(b) of the 
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Constitution. 
 
Delivering the decision of the majority, Justice Dasgupta recounts the claims of the 
petitioners regarding excommunication in the following manner: 
According to the petitioner it is ―an integral part of the religion and religious faith 
and belief of the Dawoodi Bohra community‖ that excommunication should be 
pronounced by him in suitable cases. It was urged that even if this right to 
excommunicate is considered to be a religious practice as distinct from religious 
faith such religious practice is also a part of the religion of the Dawoodi Bohra 
community.(emphasis added)
117
 
That is, the Bohra's made a traditional defence of their religious practices. The status of the 
Dai in the Bohra community was not seriously contested by any of the parties to the 
litigation. It was more or less accepted across the board that the Dai was the head of the 
community and, that as a matter of historical and sociological convention he had wide 
regulatory powers over the community which included the power to excommunicate 
members in certain circumstances. In these circumstances the question raised was the 
constitutionality of the ban on excommunication and whether it violated the right to 
religious freedom of the Dai as a representative of the Bohra community. 
 
The mere acceptance by all parties that the Dai was the head of the Bohra community and 
that he had the powers to excommunicate members would not be sufficient to determine 
whether the statute was a violation of religious freedom. In addition, and in accordance 
with the Shirur Mutt formulation, it would also have to be demonstrated that this practice 
constituted an essential aspect of the Bohra tradition. As in my discussion of the Dargah 
Committee case, I am not particularly concerned whether the prohibition of 
excommunication was legitimate or not and focus on the manner in which it was defended 
and justified by the Court. 
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Justice Dasgupta considered the question of excommunication to be indispensable to the 
sustenance of a religious community in general and noted that it was a practice common to 
Muslim communities from the earliest histories of the faith. As mentioned in his decision – 
―the Prophet and the Imam had this right; and it is not disputed that the Dais have also in 
the past exercised it on a number of occasions. There can be little doubt that heresy or 
apostasy was a crime for which excommunication was in force among the Dawoodi Bohras 
also.‖118 Accordingly he held that the Bombay statute abridged rights of a community to 
manage its affairs as granted under Art. 26(b) and was therefore unconstitutional. It is 
important to notice that though Dasgupta J. defended the rights of the Bohras, he did so by 
affirming the centrality of excommunication to religion in general and to Islam in 
particular. However, this is not quite how the Dai argued his right to excommunicate errant 
members. As I have already pointed out, the Dai defended excommunication as a 
traditional practice that was to be considered as part of the Bohra tradition even if such 
practice was distinct from ‗religious faith‘. This distinction is not considered in much detail 
in Dasgupta‘s judgment; however, it is made particularly salient in the dissenting decision 
of Justice Sinha. 
 
Recounting the facts and circumstances of the case, Justice Sinha mentions the submission 
of Kurbanhussein Sanchawala, a dissenting member of the Bohra community and an 
intervener in the case, who said that ―the Holy Koran does not permit excommunication, 
which is against the spirit of Islam.‖ Justice Sinha drew on this foundational doctrinal 
conception of the Islamic faith to characterise the Bohra religious tradition. Drawing on the 
Supreme Court's decision in Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain,
119
 Justice Sinha 
reiterated that constitutional protection extends only to essential features of a religion and 
not to incidental and superstitious accretions to religion. Thus he argued that the Bombay 
statute only affected civil rights and consequently had no bearing on the rights of the Dai to 
manage the religious affairs of the Bohras. In other words Justice Sinha argued that 
excommunication was not part of the Islamic faith and that it was incidental to the Bohra 
tradition. Thus in both Justice Dasgupta‘s majority and Sinha‘s minority decisions, the 
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traditional claims of the Bohra community were re-framed in terms of a foundationalist 
doctrinal Islam. In other words the re-framing or founding of traditional practices in 
theological or doctrinal truth once again highlights the distinction I have made in this 
chapter between Semitic and non-Semitic religions. 
 
In my discussion of the Shirur Mutt case, I argued that the Indian constitutional scheme 
made normative a Semitic and doctrinal conception of religion. However, as my discussion 
of the Dargah Committee and the Syedna cases suggests, traditional practices associated 
with Islam and perhaps any religious tradition are equally affected and compelled to re-
frame their practices in terms of the doctrinal frame made normative by the Indian secular 
State. Nonetheless, as I will suggest in the next and last Supreme Court decision that I will 
discuss in this chapter, the problem is particularly acute in the case of traditional and non 
Semitic religions like Hinduism, Buddhism and, Jainism. I demonstrate this through a 
widely discussed decision of the Indian Supreme Court, and through it sharpen my 
hypothesis on the constitutional disposition towards reform or effect of the commitment to 
the secular State. 
 
In Sastri Yagnapurshdasji v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya,
120
 the Satsangis or followers of 
Swaminarayan, a 19th century social reformer, claimed immunity from the provisions of a 
temple entry statute, the Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship (Entry-Authorisation) 
Act 1956. This statute barred Hindu temples of a public character from refusing entry to 
any class or section of Hindus on the ground that they belonged to an untouchable caste or 
community. As I have already mentioned in my discussion of the Venkataramana case, 
temple entry laws sought to address a specific manifestation of the constitutionally 
prohibited practice of untouchability and, at the time of Indian Independence, many of 
India‘s federating States enacted similar statutes. 
 
Arguing for their traditional and perhaps essential freedoms, the Satsangis claimed they 
were not bound by the temple entry statute because they were a religious sect entirely 
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distinct from the Hindu religion. They argued that though they could perhaps be considered 
socially and culturally Hindu, they were not part of the Hindu ‗religion‘ because 
Swaminarayan, the founder of the sect, considered himself as the Supreme God, and 
as such, the sect that believes in the divinity of Swaminarayan cannot be assimilated 
with the followers of Hindu religion. It was also urged that the temples in suit had 
been established for the worship of Swaminarayan himself and not for the worship 
of the traditional Hindu idols .... It was further contended that the sect propagated 
the ideal that worship of any God other than Swaminarayan would be a betrayal of 
his faith, and lastly, that the Acharyas who had been appointed by Swaminarayan 
adopted a procedure of ―Initiation‖ (diksha) which showed that on initiation, the 
devotee became a Satsangi and assumed a distinct and separate character as a 
follower of the sect.
121
 
That is, the Satsangis offered a subjective, sociological and traditional account of what 
made them into a distinct religious community with practices they viewed as distinct from 
the Hindu ‗religion‘. However it was not clear whether and how this description of their 
practices set them apart from the Hindu ‗religion‘. This question was considered at length 
by Justice Gajendragadkar and it formed the basis on which he made his decision. 
 
Delivering the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Gajendragadkar 
disallowed the Satsangi claims, pronounced them ‗Hindu‘ and subjected them to the 
demands of the temple entry statute. However, there was an irresolvable contradiction in 
Justice Gajendragadkar‘s account of the Hindu religion. On the one hand he argued that the 
Hindu religion 
... does not claim any one prophet; it does not worship any one God; it does not 
subscribe to any one dogma; it does not believe in any one philosophic concept; it 
does not follow any one set of religious rites or performances; in fact, it does not 
appear to satisfy the narrow traditional features of any religion or creed. It may 
broadly be described as a way of life and nothing more.
122
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This account of the Hindu religion might perhaps seem far too vague and broad to refer to 
any well defined or discrete entity. However, despite its fuzziness, this is not an uncommon 
way to describe an important way of being religious in the Indian subcontinent. 
Significantly it is also important to note how this account characterises the Hindu religion. 
That is, it is an account that attempts a sociological or empirical description of a religious 
tradition as part of a larger cultural way of navigating the Indian religio-cultural milieu. 
 
On the other hand, drawing on the writing of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, a renowned Indologist 
and former Indian Vice-President, and other modern commentators on the Hindu tradition, 
the court held that the wide variety of practices and religious reflections found in the Hindu 
tradition was underwritten by a philosophy of monistic idealism. That is 
(b)eneath the diversity of philosophic thoughts, concepts and ideas expressed by 
Hindu philosophers ... lie certain broad concepts which can be treated as basic. The 
first amongst these basic concepts is the acceptance of the Veda as the highest 
authority in religious and philosophic matters ... The other basic concept which is 
common to the six systems of Hindu philosophy is that all of them accept the view 
of the great world rhythm... It may also be said that all the systems of Hindu 
philosophy believe in rebirth and pre-existence ...
123
 
It is not clear if any of these latter comments on the Hindu religion actually rule out the 
claims that the Satsangis make about their religious traditions. Perhaps this is what the 
Satsangis mean when they assert that they could be considered to be socially and culturally 
Hindu though not part of the Hindu religion. However, as in the Dargah Committee case, 
Gajendragadkar drew on Radhakrishnan to declare that the Satsangi claims were ―founded 
on superstition, ignorance and complete misunderstanding of the true teachings of Hindu 
religion and of the real significance of the tenets and philosophy taught by Swaminarayan 
himself.‖124 In other words he treats the criteria that he has identified as though they are the 
true doctrinal foundations of the Hindu religion and pronounces the Satsangis to be Hindu 
despite their protest. 
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Justice Gajendragadkar therefore grounds his decision on a doctrinal conception of religion 
which I have argued was made normative in the Shirur Mutt case. However in doing so he 
identifies the very same object – the Hindu religion – in two very different and 
incompatible ways. On the one hand he asserts that the term Hindu denotes the diverse sets 
of social and cultural traditions that are empirically extant in India which, by and large, 
have not and do not assert any particular conception of doctrinal truth. On the other hand, 
he also argues that these Hindu practices and traditions are founded in essential doctrinal 
truth, from which its superstitious accretions can be separated and reformed if deemed 
necessary. Logically these positions are mutually exclusive. That is, either the essential core 
of the Hindu religion is grounded in true doctrines, or the Hindu religion is a term that 
denotes and encapsulates a range of diverse social and cultural traditions to be found in 
India, which have been decidedly uninterested in the question of doctrinal truth. However, 
the normative constitutional conception of religion leaves him with no option but to 
endorse a conception of the Hindu religion in terms of practices tied to an essential 
doctrinal truth. Oddly, Gajendragadkar J. does not seem to notice the obvious contradiction 
in his inconsistent assertions on the nature of the Hindu religion.
125
 Why is this so? By 
answering this question, I believe it is possible to make salient what is at stake in the 
misunderstanding or the re-framing of traditional practices as religions founded on 
doctrinal truth. 
 
As a heuristic it is useful to look at both Gajendragadkar‘s assertions as true, though truths 
valid under different conditions. As a matter of intuitive sociology as Gajendragadkar 
points out, and in scholarly accounts as well, there has always been good reason to contend 
that ‗Hinduism‘ is not a religion that can be conventionally defined in terms of essential 
doctrinal truths.
126
 That is, empirically or sociologically, it has been and continues to be 
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possible to argue that Hinduism is not a religion with doctrines, dogmas, religious authority, 
theology and so on. In other words, it is entirely plausible to think of Hinduism as a 
traditional religion as I have outlined in S. 1.4.2. However, these Hindu traditions are 
interpellated or drawn into the Indian Constitutional scheme only as religions structured by 
essential or core doctrinal truths, and can claim their traditional freedoms only if they 
present themselves as such. That is, the Constitutional scheme compels the semantic reform 
or re-framing of religions as they are sociologically and empirically extant into religions 
underwritten by essential doctrines. 
 
Thus Gajendragadkar J. does not see the contradiction in his incompatible assertions about 
Hinduism because his empirical and traditional assertions about the Hindu religion fall in 
the blind spot of his legal appreciation of the very same entity. In other words the legal 
appreciation of the term Hindu is unable to reflect the sociologically and culturally existing 
manner of being Hindu as argued by the Satsangis. Recasting the Satsangi case in this 
manner also allows me to sharpen the hypothesis I advanced in the Shirur Mutt case that the 
determination of religious freedom in the Indian Constitution entailed the semantic reform 
of traditional religions into religions founded in truth and doctrine. That is, the reform of 
religious traditions demanded by the Indian constitutional scheme makes normative a 
conception of religion as truth and doctrine, which is unable to recognise different kinds of 
traditional Indian religions as they sociologically exist and which do not fit this normative 
mould. I argue that this normativised conception of religion is extremely peculiar and 
counterintuitive because it compels courts and litigants to deny their sociological and 
cultural experience if they are to make successful legal claims to religious freedom. 
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Reframing the present discussion of the Satsangi case in terms of the earlier distinction I 
drew between different kinds of religion, I claim that the differences between the different 
kinds of religion are of little significance to the manner in which the secular State views 
religion. As my discussion in this chapter demonstrates, the constitutional scheme of the 
Indian secular State compels all traditional religious practices and especially those 
associated with the Hindu religious traditions to behave as though they were Semitic 
religious traditions with essential doctrinal truths. That is, non Semitic religious traditions 
like the Hindu are made intelligible to the secular State only when they are reformed into 
the normative doctrinal form demanded by the Indian Constitution. Thus the Satsangi case 
makes explicit the structural disposition of the Indian Constitution to deny traditional 
freedoms of Indian religions as they are sociologically extant and experienced. It is this 
counterintuitive stance of the secular State towards Indian religious traditions that drives 
the concerns of this thesis. In what follows I try to account for the constitutional disposition 
or orientation that permits this stance. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
In a recent book on the Indian Supreme Court‘s decisions on religious freedom, Ronojoy 
Sen summarises his claims on the essential practices doctrine by saying that 
...the Court‘s use of the essential practices doctrine has served as a vehicle for 
legitimizing a rationalized form of high Hinduism, and delegitimizing usages of 
popular Hinduism as superstition. In doing so, the court has gone beyond the 
regulation of religion and social reform envisaged by Article 25. This has resulted in 
the sanction for an extensive regulatory regime for Hindu religious institutions, and 
substantial limits on the independence of religious denominations.
127
 
In this chapter I have made substantially similar claims, differing only with Sen‘s claim that 
courts have gone beyond the bounds of regulation envisaged by Art. 25. On the contrary I 
argue that the Indian Constitution is structurally disposed to reform traditional religions into 
religions founded on essence and doctrine. 
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Therefore this chapter has sought to study the effects or the implications of a commitment 
to the secular State. It is has attempted to explore what it means to say, like Sen, that the 
application of the essential practices test has resulted in the legitimisation of a rationalised 
‗high Hinduism‘. As I have pointed out through the Satsangi case, the legitimisation of 
‗high Hinduism‘ is made possible by a counterintuitive constitutional logic that is premised 
on the denial of religion as it exists sociologically and empirically, in favour of a ‗high 
Hinduism‘ or a constitutional conception of the Hindu religion that is founded on doctrine. 
As a perspective on religious freedom in the Indian Constitution, this is only a hypothesis 
on what is at stake in the constitutional practice of religious freedom. However, in the next 
chapter I demonstrate that this is a hypothesis with considerable merit, by tracing the 
manner in which a doctrinally determined Hinduism fundamentally determines the shape of 
Indian constitutional debates on equality. 
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2. Sacralising Constitutional Practice: The Case of Indian Equality 
Jurisprudence 
 
In the previous chapter I detailed the manner in which religious liberty in the Indian 
Constitution carried with it a mandate for the reform of religious traditions. I argued that 
the reformist structure of the Indian Constitution was incapable of recognizing and 
representing ‗traditional religious‘ claims because it made normative a conception of 
religion based on doctrine and transcendental truth. It is in this context that the very task of 
reform acquires salience – that is, reform is the process or project that re-frames ‗traditional 
religious‘ claims into those intelligible to the Indian constitutional framework on religious 
freedom. Through cases decided by the Indian Supreme Court, and especially the Satsangi 
case, I had also argued that the reform project is counterintuitive because of its disposition 
to semantically overlay Indian sociological experience, and especially the experience of 
traditional religions. In other words, the reforming disposition of the Indian Constitution 
sanctions a constitutional conception of religion which is founded or premised on the denial 
of ‗religious‘ experience as it is experienced as a sociological entity. 
 
In this chapter I carry forward the discussion of the doctrinal reformulation of Indian 
religious traditions by demonstrating the manner in which Indian equality jurisprudence has 
‗normalised‘ a reformed conception of religion. That is, I argue that a reformed conception 
of religion embeds itself in the Indian legal and constitutional debates on equality and 
fairness, and thereby masks the manner in which it overlays traditional religious practices 
in particular as well as Indian constitutional practice generally. The commitment to equality 
in the Indian Constitution takes the form of a formal commitment to equal citizenship. 
However, the Constitution also elaborates a differentiated conception of citizenship that 
grants group rights to various groups constitutionally designated as the ‗scheduled castes‘, 
‗scheduled tribes‘, ‗other backward classes‘ and ‗minorities‘ who are granted various rights 
on grounds of historic disadvantages they are said to have suffered. 
 
In this chapter I emphasise the rights granted to these constitutional groups and demonstrate 
the significance of a reformed doctrinal conception of religion, and especially the Hindu 
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religion, to maintain the intelligibility of each of these categories. However, before I 
demonstrate the influence of a doctrinal Hinduism on each of these categories, I first 
outline aspects of the transition to the present constitutional scheme of differentiated group 
rights by drawing on the debates in the Indian Constituent Assembly. 
 
2.1 Minority Rights in the Constituent Assembly 
In the Indian Constitution, the rights granted to groups designated as ‗scheduled castes‘, 
scheduled tribes‘, ‗other backward classes‘ and ‗minorities‘ are seemingly unrelated to each 
other. However, these rights derive from a common source in the political structure of the 
British colonial State in which they were all considered minorities.
128
 In fact this was the 
case even up to the point when the Indian Constituent Assembly considered the rights to be 
granted to all these minority groups.
129
 The Assembly resolved the question of minorities 
differently from the colonial State and the Constitution as it stands today does not consider 
scheduled castes, tribes or other backward classes to be minorities, though all these groups 
continue to be entitled to different sets of group rights. 
 
Moving a resolution in the Constituent Assembly to set up an Advisory Committee on 
Fundamental Rights, Govind Ballabh Pant outlines the challenge of fundamental rights in 
terms of being able to successfully resolve the issue of minority rights. As he noted 
(t)he question of minorities everywhere looms large in constitutional discussions. 
Many a constitution has foundered on this rock. A satisfactory solution of questions 
pertaining to minorities will ensure the health, vitality and strength of the free State 
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of India that will come into existence as a result of our discussions here. The 
question of minorities cannot possibly be overrated. It has been used so far for 
creating strife, distrust and cleavage between the different sections of the Indian 
nation. Imperialism thrives on such strife. It is interested in fomenting such 
tendencies. So far, the minorities have been incited and have been influenced in a 
manner which has hampered the growth of cohesion and unity.
130
 (emphasis added) 
These comments are quite representative of the challenge that minority rights posed for the 
Assembly. That is, the manner in which the nationally divisive or ‗communal‘ scheme of 
government administered by the colonial State would be rejected by the independent Indian 
nation. 
 
Pant‘s target in this address was a peculiar form of colonial government in which legally 
designated minorities were entitled to be represented in government (especially in the 
legislative assemblies and government jobs) in proportion to their size in the general 
population. Equally intriguingly, elections to colonial legislatures were also conducted 
through separate electorates consisting only of members of the designated minority 
community. Most strands of the Indian nationalist movement were consistently opposed to 
this scheme of government and viewed this scheme of government as being communally 
divisive.
131
 These sentiments were carried into the Constituent Assembly where the drafters 
of the Indian constitution paid considerable attention to the task of dispensing with the 
‗communal‘ scheme of government that applied to minority communities in colonial India. 
 
Consideration of the minority question in the Constituent Assembly commenced in the sub-
ommittee on minorities, a sub-committee of the Advisory Committee on Fundamental 
Rights, Minorities and Tribal and Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (hereafter the 
Advisory Committee on Fundamental rights). The sub-committee considered two kinds of 
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rights for minorities – a) cultural and educational rights granting minorities the rights to 
protect their language script and culture as well as the right to establish education 
institutions; b) economic and political rights which sought to grant minorities the rights to 
quotas in legislatures and in government services.
132
 There was relatively little controversy 
over the grant of cultural and educational rights to minorities. But nationalist opinion was 
not favourably disposed to political and economic rights, on the grounds that these had the 
potential to reinforce the communal form of government associated with the colonial State. 
The present section scrutinises this nationalist concern in some detail, especially because 
economic and political rights were the major fault-line across which the assembly granted 
different group rights to different communities. 
 
The Constituent Assembly‘s discussion of economic and political rights was guided by a 
report first prepared by the Sub-Committee on Minorities, which was duly forwarded for 
consideration to the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights on the 8
th
 August 1947. 
Among other things, the report recommended the following – first, quotas in legislatures 
for all minorities proportionate to their size in the population, though ruling out separate 
electorates and preferring instead a system of joint electorates. Second, it recommended 
that no cabinet positions be reserved for minorities, though it suggested a schedule to the 
Constitution outlining a convention through which minorities ought to be represented in the 
Cabinet. Third, it recommended that positions in public services be reserved to minorities 
subject to considerations of efficiency, and finally, that a commission be established that 
would periodically monitor and report to parliament on the status of the rights granted by 
the Constitution to the recognised minorities. 
 
In their discussion of the various aspects of political and economic rights that were to be 
granted to minorities, the Constituent Assembly and its committees viewed the system of 
separate electorates to be most decidedly communal and nationally divisive. Discussing 
communally separated electorates, the report of the minorities subcommittee states that 
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...the system of separate electorates must be abolished in the new Constitution. In 
our judgment, this system has in the past sharpened communal differences to a 
dangerous extent and has proved one of the main stumbling blocks to the 
development of a healthy national life. It seems specially necessary to avoid these 
dangers in the new political conditions that have developed in the country and from 
this point of view the arguments against separate electorates seem to us absolutely 
decisive.
133
 
Despite the overwhelming consensus against separate electorates, there were contrary 
opinions that included, among others, a figure no less than B R Ambedkar, who 
enthusiastically supported separate electorates as the best protection for the interests of 
minorities.
134
 However, these voices were drowned out by the political weight that the 
Congress party threw behind the abolition of separate electorates. Thus on the 27
th
 and 28
th
 
August 1947 the Constituent Assembly adopted almost in its entirety the report of the 
Advisory Committee on the issue of minority rights, and in February 1948 these 
recommendations were incorporated into Part XIV of the Draft Constitution.
135
 
 
In the aftermath of partition and the violence that followed it, the Assembly‘s earlier 
consensus on the political rights of minorities began to come undone. On 11 May 1949 
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel wrote a letter to the President of the Assembly about the changing 
views on the question of minorities. According to him some members of the Committee felt 
that 
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... conditions having vastly changed since the Advisory Committee made their 
recommendations in 1947, it was no longer appropriate in the context of free India 
and of present conditions that there should be reservation of seats for Muslims 
Christians, Sikhs or any other religious minority. Although the abolition of separate 
electorates had removed much of the poison from the body politic, the reservation 
of seats for religious communities, it was felt, did lead to a certain degree of 
separatism and was to that extent contrary to the conception of a secular democratic 
state.
136
 
These changing sentiments on the question of minority rights were echoed in the Assembly 
when it discussed the minority rights of Sikh refugees who had come over to India from 
Pakistan. 
 
Debate on the rights due to the Sikhs had been deferred in the Assembly until the full 
implications of partition had become clear. Therefore, while considering the case of the 
Sikhs, the house got an opportunity to rework its earlier position on the question of 
minority rights. The records show that the reworked position was first formulated in the 
Advisory Committee by H C Mookerji on 11 May 1949 stating ―that the system of 
reservation for minorities other than Scheduled Castes in Legislatures be abolished.‖137 
This position was later ratified by the Assembly on the 26
th
 of May 1949, though it granted 
group rights to some Sikhs castes by identifying them as Scheduled Castes.
138
 
 
It was not only reservations in legislatures that came up for review. On 14
th
 October 1949 
Draft Articles 296 and 299, permitting minority quotas in public employment subject to the 
interests of efficiency in administration, was modified to exclude ‗minorities‘ other than the 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Though this encountered opposition, predominantly 
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from the Sikh members of the house, the Assembly held its ground and permitted quotas in 
the public services of the state and the central government only for the scheduled castes and 
tribes.
139
 With these provisions Iqbal Ansari argues the Assembly significantly reworked 
Congress policy on the issue of ‗minorities‘ that had remained more or less unchanged at 
least since the Nehru report of 1928.
140
 In the new scheme envisaged by the Assembly, the 
issue of minority rights was resolved by granting scheduled castes and tribes political and 
economic rights while all other minorities were denied these rights though they remained 
eligible for cultural and educational rights. 
 
The Constitutional resolution of the minority question just outlined is particularly 
significant because, in the dominant nationalist opinion, it is a widely held belief that this 
resolution cleansed the body politic of the poison of communal politics, and contributed to 
the building of a secular democratic State. However, I will argue in this chapter that these 
claims need further interrogation because Indian constitutional practice continues to be 
defined by reformed religiosity though less explicitly than in the colonial regime. That is, I 
will argue that the grant of constitutional rights to the scheduled castes, other backward 
classes, and minorities are either directly or indirectly dependent on a reformed conception 
of the Hindu religion. The debate on the rights of these constitutional groups is believed to 
be part of a constitutional attempt to secure substantive equality for its citizens. Though I 
do not comment on this larger normative goal of substantive equality in this chapter, I will 
argue that the practice of equality jurisprudence subtly sacralises Indian constitutionalism. 
 
2.2. The Rights of a Reformed Community: The Case of the Scheduled Castes 
The Indian Constitution grants Scheduled Castes a set of group rights on the grounds that 
they were subject to historic injustice, most notably the practice of untouchability which is 
understood to be an integral aspect of the Indian social structure and especially of the 
‗Hindu‘ caste system.141 At the most general level, these rights are fore-grounded by Art 14 
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which requires the State to treat all citizens equally irrespective of caste, class, and gender. 
However, precisely because of practices like untouchability, it is argued that a general right 
to equality cannot have significance without a revolution or reform or structural 
transformation of those aspects of Indian society which produce practices like 
untouchability.
142
 The rights granted to the Scheduled Castes are therefore part of this 
agenda for social transformation which Marc Galanter calls ‗compensatory‘ discrimination 
measures in their favour.
143
 
 
The term ‗compensatory discrimination‘ perhaps does not apply to all the rights granted to 
the Scheduled Castes, but it does capture the reformist and transforming orientation of these 
rights. These rights include Art 15(2), disallowing government or private persons from 
discrimination on the basis of caste in public places, Art 15(4), permitting government to 
make positive discrimination measures for the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other 
backward classes,
144
 Art 15(5), permitting positive discrimination measures regarding 
admission to both government and even private educational institutions, Art 16(4), 
permitting compensatory discrimination in government jobs for backward classes of 
                                                 
142
 As I have already mentioned earlier, in his defining book on the history of the Indian Constitution, Austin 
suggests that it was animated by a conception of revolutionary reworking of the economic, social and 
cultural foundations of Indian society. Austin, The Indian constitution. 
143
 As Galanter mentions these preferences are of three basic types: First, reservations in legislatures, posts in 
government service, and places in academic institutions. To a lesser extent, the reservation device is also 
used in the distribution of land allotments, housing, and other scarce resources. Second, provision of 
services like scholarships, grants, loans, land allotments, health care, legal aid to a beneficiary group 
beyond similar expenditures for others. Third, special protections that include efforts to protect the 
backward classes from being exploited and victimized which include constitutional provisions against 
forced labour, governmental efforts to release the Scheduled Caste and Tribes victims of debt bondage, 
legislation regulating money lending, protecting SC and ST from the economic oppression of their more 
sophisticated neighbours by restricting land transfers and various constitutional and legal provisions 
addressing the issue of untouchability. Marc Galanter‘s work in this field has been pioneering and I have 
used him extensively throughout this chapter. Mark Galanter, Competing Equality: Law and the Backword 
Classes in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), 1-3, 42-43. 
144
 Among the measures undertaken by the state under Art 15(4), quotas in institutions of higher learning have 
produced disputes involving the highest stakes in contemporary India. 
78 
 
citizens, Art 17, abolishing untouchability, Art 23, abolishing forced labour of any kind. Art 
25(2), which I discussed in the previous chapter, can also be viewed as permitting the State 
to make social reform and temple entry provisions for the Scheduled Castes. Besides the 
rights enumerated in the Fundamental Rights chapter of the Constitution, the Scheduled 
Castes are also granted reserved seats in Parliament and in the provincial state legislatures 
under Art 330 and 332. Though these reservations were initially granted for a period of ten 
years they have been repeatedly extended by Parliament up to the present day. In addition, 
Art 338 establishes the National Commission for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes, which is a standing body that monitors and advises government on the various 
rights and schemes for the benefit of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Lastly, it is perhaps 
also possible to argue that the entire scheme of rights for scheduled castes is guided by Art 
46, a directive principle requiring the State to protect the interests of scheduled castes 
among other weaker sections. 
 
The elaborate set of rights that the Constitution grants to the Scheduled Castes clearly 
marks out a substantive conception of equality and justice to which the Indian Constitution 
stands committed. However in this section I will be less concerned about the conceptions of 
equality endorsed by the Indian constitution, and highlight the manner in which Scheduled 
Castes are identified through the lens of a reformed doctrinal ‗Hinduism‘ if they are to be 
eligible to avail these rights. Consequently, drawing on my discussion of the reformed 
nature of the Hindu religion in chapter 1 I will argue that the constitutional framework as it 
is currently organised is unable to formulate the problem of inequality and untouchability 
as empirically located problems of injustice which sociologically obtain in Indian society. 
 
2.2.1. Outlining the Problem 
The identification of the scheduled castes is a problem shot through with various 
challenges. At one level the problem seems disarmingly simple because the Constitution 
explicitly specifies that Scheduled Castes are those groups duly notified by the President of 
India as specified in Art 341.
145
 Accordingly the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 
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1950 states that ―no person professing a religion different from Hinduism shall be deemed 
to be a member of the Scheduled Castes.‖146 It is rather odd that the Constitution identifies 
Scheduled Castes with the Hindu persuasion, because this would be a patent case of 
religious discrimination. However, instead of emphasising the departure of this Presidential 
Order from the normative demands of equality, I emphasise the peculiar manner in which 
the identification of Scheduled Castes disconnects this legal category (i.e, the Scheduled 
Castes) from the underlying social objects for which the categorisation and the ensuing 
rights were presumably devised – the sociological practice of untouchability.  
 
As an instance of the cleavage between the practice of untouchability and identification of 
the scheduled castes, it is useful to consider an intervention of K.M. Munshi during the 
early debate on the minority question in the Constituent Assembly. Moving an amendment 
that Scheduled Castes were not to be considered apiece with other minorities but as part of 
the Hindu community, he argued that 
... so far as the Scheduled Castes are concerned, they are not minorities in the strict 
meaning of the term; that the Harijans are part and parcel of Hindu community, and 
the safeguards are given to them to protect their rights only till they are completely 
absorbed in the Hindu Community. 
Another reason is this, and I might mention that reason is based on the decisions 
which have already been taken by this House. The distinction between Hindu 
Community other than Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Castes is the barrier of 
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untouchability. Now, by the Fundamental Rights which we have accepted, 
untouchability is prohibited by law and its practice is made a criminal offence under 
the law of the Federation. We have also accepted in the Fundamental Rights that no 
public place should be prohibited to anyone by reason of his birth. So far as the 
Federation is concerned, we have removed the artificial barrier between one section 
of the Hindu Community and the other
147
 
Through this intervention, Munshi makes a rather peculiar claim that the scheduled castes 
were provided with rights by the Indian Constitution so that they could be absorbed within 
the Hindu community. Even the abolition of untouchability is phrased as the removal of 
barriers between one section of the Hindu community and the other. 
 
Munshi‘s comments were however not particularly anomalous either for nationalist opinion 
or for the Constituent Assembly. For instance even a towering figure in the Indian National 
Congress like Vallabhbhai Patel makes a rather similar statement when intervening in a 
Constituent Assembly debate considering the inclusion of some sections of the Sikh 
community in the list of Scheduled Castes. Expressing dismay at the Sikh demand, he 
states that 
...it was against our conviction to recognise a separate Sikh caste as untouchables or 
Scheduled Castes, because untouchability is not recognised in the Sikh religion. A 
Scheduled Caste Sikh community has never been in the past recognised. But as the 
Sikhs began to make a grievance continuously against the Congress – and against 
us, I persuaded the Scheduled Caste people with great difficulty to agree to this for 
the sake of peace.
148
 (emphasis added) 
Though Patel caved in to the Sikh demands, his comments are extremely illuminating of his 
conviction that the Sikh demand was not legitimate because untouchability was not 
recognised in their religion. In Patel's view untouchability was a religious practice of the 
Hindus and therefore other religious communities could not legitimately claim inclusion in 
the list of scheduled castes because the practice had no religious support. 
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However, Sardar Hukam Singh, whose statements in the Constituent Assembly prompted 
Patel‘s intervention, demanded that sections of his community be included in the list of 
scheduled castes because they suffered from the disabilities that accrued from 
untouchability as an existing social practice.
149
 These were therefore very different claims 
on the practice of untouchability and the identification of Scheduled Castes, leading to the 
question – what does it mean to identify the Scheduled Castes as Hindu? And, how does 
this vary from the identification of untouchability through empirical sociology as proposed 
by the likes of Sardar Hukam Singh? 
 
2.2.2. Scheduled Castes as Reformed Hindu Communities 
It is my contention that the constitutional conception and identification of the Scheduled 
Castes is based on a reformed or doctrinal conception of the ‗Hindu‘ religion. Consequently 
the constitutional conception of the Scheduled Castes is only obliquely related to castes as 
socially and empirically existing entities. To establish my case I rely on an analytical 
scheme on castes in India as drawn up by Marc Galanter. 
 
According to Galanter, the dilemma about conceptualising Caste in India centres on the 
issue of the very religious nature of caste. To some scholars castes are the building blocks 
of Hinduism while to others they are merely sociological entities that obtain in India. To 
clarify these different positions Galanter suggests three models through which castes have 
been legally conceptualised. These are (1) the Sacral Model, (2) the Sectarian Model and 
(3) the Associational Model. The sacral model posits caste groups as a constituent part of 
the sacral order of Hindu society. In this model, Hindu society is seen as a differentiated but 
integrated order in which the different parts may enjoy different rights, duties, privileges 
and disabilities, which are determined by the position of the caste group in relation to the 
whole. The sectarian model posits caste as an independent religious community demarcated 
by doctrine, ritual or culture. This model conceives of caste as a religious unit but one that 
is self contained and disassociated from a larger religious order. The rights and duties of the 
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group and its members follow from its own rules and regulations and not from its place in a 
larger sacral order. Lastly in the associational model, caste is understood as a self governing 
group with its own set of rules and regulations, which are marked neither by a fixed place 
in a larger religious order nor by distinctive religious beliefs or practices. The bonds of 
association in this model might include religion but this is to be understood as one among 
many other aspects of group life.
150
 
 
In Galanter's scheme these three models are not presented as a theory of what castes are, 
but as three models that colonial courts have employed to organise the issues and problems 
involving caste. As self-governing entities with powers of internal self government 
recognised by the colonial government, they were organised as sectarian and associational 
entities. As constituent elements of the governance of religious personal laws castes were 
viewed through the lens of the sacral model. Despite the different functional role these 
models of caste played in the colonial courts which devised them, it is important to note the 
contending assumptions that give these models intelligibility. The sectarian and 
associational models are sociological models of caste while the sacral model as the name 
suggests is a doctrinal or foundational Hindu religious model of caste.
151
 However, what 
does this latter claim entail? 
 
Caste groups are a ubiquitous feature of the Indian social terrain. Variously termed jatis, 
sampradayas, or jamats, they are sociological entities within which the life of collectives is 
transacted. However, a sacral or ‗Hindu‘ conception of caste is a specific account of the 
entity that is informed by the category of varna from the classical Hindu texts. In classical 
Hindu law, the multitude of Indian castes are organised into four hierarchically organised 
groups or varnas – the Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras. This account was 
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implanted into Indian law by the British colonial governments who made it the basis of 
personal laws for all persons designated as Hindu. 
 
Galanter argues that one of the most crucial distinctions within this varna based account of 
Hindu personal law was its division of the four varnas into two groups – the Brahmin, 
Kshatriya and Vaisya groups who were considered ritually superior were governed by a 
different set of personal law rules from the Sudra groups who were deemed ritually inferior. 
There was considerable difficulty in slotting the multitude of Indian castes into appropriate 
varnas and courts had to device ways in which they could distinguish between the 
Brahmin, Kshatriya or Vaisya varnas from the Sudra varna. In some cases the test to 
identify a group was the customary practices said to be typical of the Sudras. In others the 
identification of varna took place by evaluation of the caste group‘s own consciousness of 
its status and the acceptance of this estimate by other castes in the locality, with estimations 
of status being tied to notions of purity and pollution practices between caste groups.
152
 
However, in all these cases castes are seen as religious entities who ―occupy their 
respective places in the sacral order of ranks which embraces all groups within 
Hinduism.‖153 
 
This treatment of caste as in colonial personal law underwent dramatic transformation with 
the coming of Indian independence. Two developments are of particular significance. First, 
the passage of the Hindu Code Acts which established a uniform Hindu law for all Hindus 
thereby rendering varna largely insignificant as a legal category. Second, the constitutional 
abolition of untouchability as laid out in Art 17. That is, the legislature attempted to render 
varna as a legal category irrelevant to the practice of law in contemporary India. According 
to Galanter, these developments have resulted in the decreasing significance of the sacral 
model of caste.
 154
 This is undoubtedly true at the functional level where the use of the 
sacral category of varna has significantly reduced in the Constitutional scheme of 
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independent India. However, at the structural level it is this model of caste that shapes the 
very intelligibility of the constitutional approach to the problem of identifying the 
Scheduled Castes in contemporary India. That is, despite its functional decline, Galanter‘s 
sacral, textual, or doctrinal model is crucial to the way Scheduled Castes are conceived in 
the present constitutional framework. 
 
As the threshold identification standard for the scheduled castes, the sacral model has 
subordinated both the sectarian and the associational models of caste to the level of sub-
classifications. That is, in the present constitutional scheme these other classifications 
continue to be important in addressing issues related to the scheduled castes but only within 
the boundaries set by the sacral model.
155
 However, in Galanter‘s castes schema the 
sectarian and the associational models of caste were presented as equally plausible ways of 
representing caste where one model was not dependent on the other. Quoting from a case 
decided in colonial Madras he notes that ―a caste is a combination of a number of persons 
governed by a body of usages which differentiate them from others. The usages may refer 
to social or religious observances, to drink, food, ceremonies, pollution, occupation, or 
marriage.‖ In other words caste need not be solely identified with religion, and it could just 
as well be understood as a way of living together. As autonomous social groups, castes 
could even be collections of Non Hindu groups, and, as Galanter shows, courts have 
recognised castes among Muslims, Parsis, Jains, Sikhs and Christians.
156
 
 
The sectarian and associational forms of modelling of caste therefore had a salience in 
colonial India which they do not have in contemporary constitutional identification of the 
scheduled castes. That is, though castes could potentially be of any religious persuasion in 
the colonial scheme, the present constitutional scheme under Art 341 identifies scheduled 
castes only as untouchable groups within the varna hierarchy of the sacral model, thereby 
excluding all non-Hindu groups. This is borne out in the manner in which Indian courts 
have held non-Hindu groups ineligible to be identified as Scheduled Castes. I elaborate this 
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by drawing on a couple of decisions of the Indian Supreme Court. 
 
S. Rajagopal v. C. M. Armugam
157
 was an early Supreme Court decision
158
 that commented 
on the reasons that made non Hindu or non Sikh religions
159
 ineligible to claim inclusion in 
the list of Scheduled Castes. In this case the parliamentary election of the appellant S. 
Rajgopal, a candidate claiming to belong to the Adi Dravida Scheduled Caste community, 
from a reserved constituency in the erstwhile State of Mysore, was challenged on the 
grounds that he had converted to Christianity. It was alleged that his conversion in 1949 
made him ineligible to fight the disputed election which was held in 1967. Rajgopal 
claimed that he never converted to Christianity and even if it were proved that he had 
converted, he claimed that he had reconverted before the relevant election date in 1967. 
 
The court held that he had converted to Christianity and was therefore ineligible to contest 
the election from the Scheduled Caste constituency. Interestingly, the reasons supporting 
this decision were entirely based on the doctrinal status of untouchability in Christianity. 
Thus, finding that he had converted to Christianity, the court stated that  
... when the appellant embraced Christianity in 1949, he lost the membership of the 
Adi Dravida Hindu caste. The Christian religion does not recognise any caste 
classifications. All Christians are treated as equals and there is no distinction 
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between one Christian and another of the type that is recognised between members 
of different castes belonging to Hindu religion. In fact, caste system prevails only 
amongst Hindus or possibly in some religions closely allied to the Hindu religion 
like Sikhism. Christianity is prevalent not only in India but almost all over the world 
and nowhere does Christianity recognise caste division. The tenets of Christianity 
militate against persons professing Christian faith being divided or discriminated on 
the basis of any such classification as the caste system. It must, therefore, be held 
that, when the appellant got converted to Christianity in 1949, he ceased to belong 
to the Adi Dradiva caste. (emphasis added)
160
 
By speaking of the caste system as entirely Hindu it is clear that the court does not refer to 
the associational and sectarian form in which groups of persons could be sociologically or 
empirically tied together as a matter of fact. On the contrary it seems that the court has 
understood caste as a phenomenon deriving from a doctrinal Hinduism conceived in terms 
of varna based hierarchies. 
 
The difficulties and peculiarities of thinking about the Scheduled Castes in terms of a 
doctrinal Hinduism are illustrated with far greater clarity in Soosai v. Union Of India.
161
 In 
this case, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Scheduled Caste Order 
1950 which excluded non Hindu and non Sikh religions from being identified as Scheduled 
Castes. Soosai, the petitioner in this case, was a cobbler belonging to the adi dravida 
scheduled caste community but had converted to Christianity. His constitutional challenge 
related to certain welfare schemes of the Government of India intended for adi dravida 
cobblers for which he was not eligible solely because of his conversion.  
 
The Government Order granting these welfare measures clearly stated that members of the 
scheduled castes who had converted to Christianity would not be eligible for the assistance 
envisaged by the scheme. As this government order was framed in accordance with the 
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950, he challenged its validity on the ground that it 
                                                 
160
 Ibid., 107 
161
 MANU/SC/0045/1985 
87 
 
violated the constitutional guarantees of equality and freedom to practise religion. Stating 
his case Soosai argued that despite his conversion he remained an adi dravida as a matter of 
fact and that being treated differently only because of his conversion would result in the 
violation of the Constitution‘s equality provisions as well as his right to religious freedom. I 
will not discuss the constitutional merits of Soosai‘s case which are undoubtedly quite 
strong and emphasise the contending sociologies of caste which came to a head in the case. 
 
In favour of the Scheduled Caste order it was argued that 
... the caste system is a feature of the Hindu social structure. It is a social 
phenomenon peculiar to Hindu society. The division of the Hindu social order by 
reference at one time to professional or vocational occupation was moulded into a 
structural hierarchy which over the centuries crystallised into a stratification where 
the place of the individual was determined by birth. Those who occupied the lowest 
rung of the social ladder were treated as existing beyond the periphery of civilised 
society, and were indeed not even ―touchable‖. This social attitude committed those 
castes to severe social and economic disabilities and cultural and educational 
backwardness.
162
 
Soosai however responded to this contention with an empirical claim that he continued to 
be an adi dravida as a matter of fact  
 
The court dismissed Soosai‘s claim on contradictory grounds – on the one hand it suggested 
that caste was prima facie a Hindu institution and on the other it also held that Soosai had 
not conclusively established that he retained caste on conversion. Thus though the court 
refused to accept Soosai‘s claims, it nonetheless flirted with both the contending arguments 
in the case. The main thrust of Soosai‘s empirical contention that he retained his caste 
despite conversion was dismissed by the court on the doctrinal grounds that caste was an 
exclusively Hindu institution and that conversion generally implied loss of caste. However, 
the court also considered the contention that Soosai could retain caste, but dismissed it on 
grounds that he had not advanced credible evidence to support this claim. That is, the court 
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arrived at the conclusion that Soosai could not demonstrate that he was subjected to the 
same set of caste disabilities within the Christian community as a Hindu adi dravida was 
within the Hindu community. The burden of proving caste discrimination within the 
Christian community is a rather odd demand because it does not fully appreciate Soosai's 
claim. It might well have been possible to establish that he suffered caste disabilities within 
the Christian community.
163
 However, his claim was that he suffered caste disability as an 
adi dravida and not as a Christian or a Hindu. That is, his contentions turned on the 
sociological fact of belonging to a caste group that was subjected to historical disadvantage. 
 
The court was unable to appreciate Soosai‘s claims because its conception of caste was 
based on a textual or varna account of the phenomenon. Within this framework, Soosai‘s or 
indeed any claim about castes as social groups would be intelligible only if it were 
reformed or refracted through the sacral and doctrinal prism of varna. However, Soosai was 
making an empirical case for untouchability and caste discrimination by arguing that he 
suffered from untouchability as a matter of fact. When dealing with instances of social and 
historical disadvantage one would logically expect that rights granted to redress these 
disadvantages would be founded on empirical social science reasoning that would elaborate 
the problem of social disadvantage for which redress is given in terms of various rights. 
Strangely this methodological approach has not found much legal traction over the last 
sixty years especially in the case of Christians and Muslims. That is, the identification of 
the scheduled castes has been founded on a sacralised form of argumentation. 
 
It could perhaps be argued that the sacral or doctrinal model of caste is a reflection of the 
empirical problem of caste. However, as I have suggested in chapter 1, it was extremely 
difficult to establish a definitive relationship between Indian textual or doctrinal traditions 
and Indian social practices.
164
 Thus on the basis of the Indian textual tradition it is not 
possible to make the further claim that caste practice is a phenomenon restricted only to the 
Hindu religious traditions. 
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On the other hand it is also possible to argue that there has been a progressive expansion of 
the definition of the scheduled castes to include other communities as well. Thus all Sikh 
untouchables were included in 1956 and Buddhists were included in 1990. Muslims and 
Christians continue to be barred from being identified as Scheduled Castes. However, the 
Ranganath Mishra Commission on minority rights has recommended that Art 341 be 
expanded to include Muslims and Christians as well.
165
 Therefore it could be argued that 
the extension of the Scheduled Caste order to include all religious persuasions could erode 
the significance of the sacral account of caste. However, I want to argue that this is not 
likely because of the resonance that the sacral account of caste has acquired in the 
identification of the ‗other backward classes‘, the other major beneficiary of differentiated 
citizenship in India. 
 
2.3. A Sacralised Conception of Backwardness: The Case of the ‘Backward Classes’ 
The rights granted to the ‗other backward classes‘ (OBC) are primarily contained in three 
constitutional articles – Art 15(4), Art 15(5) and Art 16(4). The term OBC is used to 
describe two groups – ‗socially and educationally backward classes of citizens‘ and 
‗backward class of citizens‘ who are the recipients of the rights granted in Art 15(4)&(5) 
and in Art 16(4) respectively. These constitutional provisions permit governments to 
undertake measures for the advancement of OBCs. Historically these measures have 
primarily though not exclusively included the facilitation of quotas for the OBCs in State 
funded educational institutions, and in government jobs. These governmental measures 
have been a fertile ground for litigation, especially with regard to the administration of 
opportunities provided by these government measures. The principal legal challenge that 
these rights pose is the distribution of opportunity in government jobs and in State funded 
educational institutions in a manner that does not entirely derogate from the Constitution‘s 
stated commitment to equality. As in the case of the scheduled castes I will be less 
concerned with the judicial treatment of the substantive rights granted to the OBCs, and 
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emphasise the manner in which the OBCs are identified. 
 
In the Constituent Assembly the discussion on the backward classes was limited to what 
eventually became Art 16(4), because Art 15(4) and 15(5) were subsequent amendments to 
the constitution. The debate on the draft constitutional article which sought to permit the 
government to reserve jobs for ‗backward classes‘ of citizens was divided between 
members from the southern states who argued in its favour while those from the northern 
states were cautious about wording the provision in terms that they considered too broad. 
The term backward class had a technical legal meaning in parts of British India like Madras 
and Bombay but was less common in other provinces.
166
 In Madras, for instance, at the 
time of independence there was a scheme of quotas in government services that included 
many castes that were considered socially above the untouchables but yet backward enough 
to be considered eligible for these measures.
167
 With the constitution makers having 
resolved in favour of an elaborate scheme of rights for the advancement of the Scheduled 
Castes, the question was whether similar measures were envisaged for other groups who 
were considered to be backward in various parts of British India. 
 
The debates of the Constituent Assembly and the adoption of Art 16 permitting reservation 
of quotas for the ‗backward classes of citizens‘ in government employment, suggest that 
such measures were indeed intended for the OBCs. The case for quotas in educational 
institutions funded by the State was however less certain. In one of its first decisions on the 
question of government measures for the OBCs, the Supreme Court struck down an 
executive order of the Madras government that reserved available seats in government 
funded professional colleges through a system of quotas for the major communities in the 
province.
168
 The court held that this measure granted benefits to various communities solely 
on the grounds of caste and community, which violated the constitutional commitment to 
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equality.
169
 This decision however upset the government distribution of educational 
opportunity as it was commonly practised in many south Indian states, resulting in first 
constitutional amendment that added Art 15(4) to the constitution. The amendment 
permitted the government to undertake steps for the advancement of socially and 
educationally backward classes of citizens. Though Art 15(4) and 16(4) draw from the 
historical legacy of similar policies of the provincial governments in colonial India, the 
terms ‗socially and educationally backward classes‘ and ‗backward classes‘ were by no 
means settled. The content of the rights granted to these groups has also had to be read in 
accordance with the broader constitutional commitment to equality and has therefore 
required considerable judicial oversight. 
 
The phrasing of articles Art 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) permits the government to confer special 
measures or rights on ‗backward classes of citizens‘ and to ‗socially and educationally 
backward classes of citizens‘. Phrased in this broad manner the beneficiaries of these rights 
can potentially include any class of citizens who successfully demonstrate a case of their 
backwardness according to the designated government tests and standards. Constitutional 
practice has identified backward groups through identity based criteria like caste and 
religion, as well as criteria like income, education levels, and geographic location. Even so, 
caste has historically been, and remains, the most significant criterion to determine and 
establish backwardness in Indian constitutional practice. I will therefore focus on the 
manner in which courts have deployed caste to designate backwardness, and argue that to 
the extent that they rely on caste, they have found it difficult to escape a sacral conception 
of the Hindu religion. 
 
Despite the centrality of caste in designating backwardness, there have always been doubts 
on whether and how caste was a permissible form of constitutional classification for the 
delivery of ameliorative government schemes under Art 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4). M.R.Balaji 
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v. State of Mysore
170
 was an early and defining judgment of the Supreme Court that decided 
the extent to which caste could be legitimately deployed in government schemes reserving 
seats in educational institutions for certain designated communities who were identified as 
socially and educationally backward. Any such measure would be constrained by Art 15 (2) 
and Art 29(2) which prevents discrimination on (among others) grounds of caste alone. 
Thus constitutional limitations would force any classification of backwardness on grounds 
of caste to demonstrate that the classification in question was not founded on caste alone. 
However, the manner in which caste would determine backwardness was still an open 
question that required judicial consideration. 
 
In the Balaji case the court held that caste could be an indicator of social backwardness, but 
could not be the sole determining consideration. Caste could not be the sole determining 
factor of backwardness because 
... if the caste of the group of citizens was made the sole basis for determining the 
social backwardness of the said group, that test would inevitably break down in 
relation to many sections of Indian society which do not recognise castes in the 
conventional sense known to Hindu society. How is one going to decide whether 
Muslims, Christians or Jains, or even Lingayats are socially backward or not? The 
test of castes would be inapplicable to those groups, but that would hardly justify 
the exclusion of these groups in toto from the operation of Art. 15(4). ... That is why 
we think that though castes in relation to Hindus may be a relevant factor to 
consider in determining the social backwardness of groups or classes of citizens, it 
cannot be made the sole or the dominant test in that behalf.(emphasis added)
171
 
This intriguing statement of the court seems to contain two conceptions of a backward 
class. When referring to castes in ‗conventional sense known to Hindu society‘ the court 
was in all likelihood referring to castes as sacral Hindu entities. On the other hand the court 
also seems to suggest that a sacral conception of caste would not apply to Christians, 
Muslims, Jains and Lingayats in whose case backwardness would have to be established by 
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objective criteria like income, occupation and so on. 
 
Referring to this ambiguity in the courts‘ sociology of backwardness Marc Galanter 
suggests that the Balaji decision has not been able to make clear the distinction between 
caste as a unit to measure backwardness as opposed to caste rank itself as a measure of 
backwardness.
172
 He claims this lack of clarity arises repeatedly in subsequent judicial 
decisions on the role of caste in the determination of the backward classes. In this section I 
elaborate on the usefulness of this distinction drawn by Galanter to demonstrate the manner 
in which a sacral conception of the backwardness of a caste intersects with a more socio-
scientific determination of the backwardness of castes. 
 
In one of the first decisions after the Balaji case, the Supreme Court in Chitralekha v. State 
of Mysore held that the former case did not oblige it to consider caste as a necessary 
ingredient for the determination of backwardness. Responding to a government scheme 
which marked backwardness on the grounds of income and occupation but not caste, the 
court clarified that 
… caste is only a relevant circumstance in ascertaining the backwardness of a class 
and there is nothing in the judgment of this Court which precludes the authority 
concerned from determining the social backwardness of a group of citizens if it can 
do so without reference to caste. While this court has not excluded caste from 
ascertaining the backwardness of a class of citizens, it has not made it one of the 
compelling circumstances affording a basis for the ascertainment of backwardness 
of a class. To put it differently, the authority concerned may take caste into 
consideration in ascertaining the backwardness of a group of persons; but, if it does 
not, its order will not be bad on that account …173 
Justice Suba Rao‘s decision in this case suggests that castes were intended to have a limited 
role in the determination of backward classes. He also went on to add that the over-reliance 
on caste to determine backwardness would result in the frustration of constitutional 
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objectives. 
 
However, in other cases the court has also held that Caste can be the sole ground to 
determine held to be a backward class. Thus in Rajendran v. State of Tamil Nadu the 
Supreme Court held that 
…if the reservation in question had been based only on caste and had not taken into 
account the social and educational backwardness of the castes in question, it would 
be violative of Article 15 (1). But it must not be forgotten that a caste is also a class 
of citizens and if the caste as a whole is socially and educationally backward, 
reservation can be made in favor of such a caste on the ground that it is a socially 
and educationally backward class within the meaning of Article 15(4).
174
 
In the Rajendran case the court clearly suggests that caste as such could be a unit whose 
backwardness was to be determined. Across these positions the court signals that the 
identification of backwardness could be determined on the basis of caste as long as caste 
was not the sole criterion for the determination of backwardness. But how was the 
backwardness of a caste to be identified and established? 
 
Identification of backwardness has acquired a considerable degree of sophistication since 
the Balaji case in the early 1960s. As a result of demands made by the courts that 
backwardness cannot be determined solely on the grounds of caste, various State 
commissions as well as two centrally appointed backward classes commissions
175
 have 
probed and identified the status of the backward classes. Of the two backward classes 
commissions established by the central government, the first Commission's report was 
rejected by the government. However the second Commission's report, popularly called the 
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Mandal report after its chairperson, was accepted by the central government in 1990. 
Accordingly the government sought to implement aspects of the report and issued an 
official memorandum reserving 27 percent of the vacancies in central government services 
and public sector companies and undertakings for the socially and educationally backward 
classes. This notification was subjected to a constitutional challenge in the Indra 
Sawhney
176
 judgment which is currently the definitive decision on the manner in which 
backward classes are to be identified. 
 
The Indra Sawhney decision was decided by a nine judge constitution bench of the Indian 
Supreme Court, and consisted of five separate decisions. Here I only focus on the manner 
in which the court identifies backwardness. In particular I draw on the majority decision of 
Justice Jeevan Reddy, and the manner in which he ties caste to the identification of 
backwardness. One of the objections raised against the Mandal commission report, on 
which the government memorandum reserving positions was based, was that it used caste 
alone as a measure of determining backwardness. Responding to this charge Justice 
Reddy‘s judgment begins with a consideration of the significance of caste for the 
measurement of backwardness in the Indian constitutional scheme. 
 
According to Justice Reddy the challenge caste posed to the egalitarian ethos of the Indian 
constitution was its role in the Hindu religion which was 
... not known for its egalitarian ethos. It divided its adherents into four watertight 
compartments. Those outside this four tier system (chaturvarna) were the outcastes 
(Panchamas), the lowliest. They did not even believe all the caste system – ugly as 
its face was. The fourth, shudras, were no better, though certainly better than the 
Panchamas. The lowliness attached to them (Shudras and Panchamas) by virtue of 
their birth in these castes, unconnected with their deeds. …. Poverty there has been 
... in every country. But none had the misfortune of having this social division – or 
as some call it, degradation – super-imposed on poverty. Poverty, low social status 
in Hindu caste system and the lowly occupation constituted – and do still constitute 
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– a vicious circle.177 
That is, caste is treated as a backward class within a sacralised varna based conception of 
the Hindu religion. Justice Reddy paints this varna based organisation of Indian society as 
the ―stark reality notwithstanding all our protestations and abhorrence and all attempts at 
weeding out this phenomenon‖.178 Therefore the sacral order of Hindu society is the 
sociology that Justice Reddy employs to justify the inclusion of castes as a valid form of 
identifying and classifying the backward classes in Art 15(4) and 16(4). 
 
However, the line of cases from Balaji has also held that a caste by itself would not qualify 
to be a constitutionally recognised backward class unless it was also established that the 
caste concerned was socially and educationally backward. This identification however 
proceeds on almost entirely non sacral lines. Thus, as Justice Reddy suggests, once a caste 
has been identified as potentially backward then the authority concerned with the 
determination of backwardness ―can take caste ‗A‘, apply the criteria of backwardness 
evolved by it to that caste and determine whether it qualifies as a backward class or not. If 
it does qualify, what emerges is a backward class, for the purposes of Clause (4) of Article 
16.‖179 That is, castes would be seen primarily as sectarian or associational entities and their 
backwardness measured by a set of largely objective criteria developed for the purpose of 
running a reservation program.
180
 
 
The interesting aspect of Justice Reddy‘s decision is that his justification for the inclusion 
of caste as a backward class is tied so thinly to the actual identification of backward classes 
in Art 15(4) and 16(4). That is, the measurement of the backwardness of a caste as a unit is 
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a self standing and self justifying form of identifying backwardness making unclear the 
actual role that the varna account of caste plays in the determination of backwardness. In 
other words the varna account of caste seems incidental to the actual determination of the 
backwardness of particular caste groups. Nonetheless as Galanter has noted, different 
courts from the Balaji decision onwards have repeatedly invoked the role of caste in 
determining backwardness in this dual manner. 
 
I do not have an explanation for the gratuitous invocation of a varna conception of caste, 
except to note that it forms the background to what is otherwise a socio-scientifically driven 
determination of backwardness. In Reddy J‘s decision it is perhaps possible to argue that 
the invocation of a reformed account of the Hindu religion was not really part of the ratio of 
the decision. Even if this were the case, all the other judges in Indra Sawhney and indeed 
many other decisions of the Supreme Court also invoke a reformed conception of the Hindu 
religion when identifying the OBCs. Therefore it is of significance to note the invocation 
and perceived significance of this reformed or varna account of caste even though it seems 
to have little obvious relevance to the actual measurement of the backwardness of a caste in 
the Indian constitutional scheme. However the divisibility of these accounts speaks to the 
challenge of minority rights as it was framed by the constituent assembly – that is, how to 
rid the body politic of the poison of communal politics. Framing this problem more 
evocatively in a slightly different context Pratap Mehta comments that ―it would be a 
tragedy if modern India became a project for perpetuating caste than for transcending it.‖181 
In this section I have tried to suggest that, though divisible from more socio-scientific ways 
of determining the backwardness of castes, the varna conception of caste plays an 
important role in the perpetuation of caste in Indian constitutional practice. 
 
2.4. Can a Hindu be in a Minority? Adjudicating Minority Claims in the Indian 
Constitution 
The final group granted rights by the Indian constitution‘s system of differentiated rights 
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are groups designated minorities by Art 29 and Art 30. Both these articles are part of the 
Fundamental Rights chapter and grant what the constitution terms ‗Cultural and 
Educational Rights.‘ Of these, Art. 29(1) grants any class of citizens the right to protect 
their language, script or culture and Art. 29(2) prohibits discrimination in admission to 
educational institutions receiving State funds on grounds ‗only of religion, race, caste, 
language or any of them‘. Art 30 grants minorities based on religion or language the rights 
to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice
182
 and forbids the State 
from discriminating against minority educational institutions when making grants in aid. 
 
Most judicial decisions dealing with various aspects of Art 29 and 30 have dealt with the 
extent to which the State can regulate the functioning of educational institutions run by 
various religious and linguistic minorities. Specifically these decisions have dealt with the 
extent to which Art 29 (1) and Art 29 (2) limit the right granted to minorities in Art 30(1) to 
establish and administer their educational institutions. Commenting on these decisions, two 
senior Indian lawyers have remarked that the Supreme Court was remarkably solicitous of 
the rights of minorities to control their institutions in the early years of the Indian republic 
but over the years have increasingly permitted greater State regulation of these 
institutions.
183
 However my argument is less concerned with the manner in which courts 
have administered minority rights in educational institutions as with the manner in which 
courts have identified the minorities, especially religious minorities, who are eligible to 
avail themselves of the right granted in Articles 29 & 30.
184
 As in the previous section, I 
claim that the intelligibility of the term religious minority in the Indian constitution is tied 
to a sacral conception of the Hindu religion. 
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The primary challenge in identifying a minority is posed by the absence of a constitutional 
definition for the term. Discussing Article 29 in the Constituent Assembly B. R. Ambedkar 
justified the absence of the word ‗minority‘ in the phrasing of that Article in the following 
manner: 
It will be noted that the term minority was used therein not in the technical sense of 
the word ‗minority‘ as we have been accustomed to use it for the purpose of certain 
political safeguards, such as representation in the Legislature, representation in the 
service and so on. The word is used not merely to indicate the minority in the 
technical sense of the word, it is also used to cover minorities which are not 
minorities in the technical sense, but which are nonetheless minorities in the cultural 
and linguistic sense. That is the reason why we dropped the word ―minority‖ 
because we felt that the word might be interpreted in the narrow sense of the term 
when the intention of this House….was to use the word ‗Minority‘ in a much wider 
sense so as to give cultural protection to those who were technically not minorities 
but minorities nonetheless. (emphasis added)
185
 
According to him the right granted in Art 29(1) was to be construed broadly to include all 
kinds of contingent minorities. An instance he discussed was that of a linguistic group who 
moved from one province in which they were a majority to another where they were a 
minority. By contrast the right in Art 30 is explicitly granted to ‗minorities‘, presumably 
implying that Ambedkar viewed the right in Art 30 to vest in minorities identified by what 
he called the ‗technical sense' of the word.‘ 
 
Ambedkar suggests that minority in the technical sense of the word meant those groups 
who were identified as minorities for purposes of providing representation in the 
legislatures and the government services. As I have suggested in Section 2.1 of this chapter, 
this included those groups who were designated minorities by the colonial State and 
eligible to representation in political institutions according to their population. 
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Discussing this scheme of political representation under the ‗communal question‘, the 
Nehru Report of 1928
186
 cast the problem of political representation for communities in the 
following manner: 
The communal problem in India is essentially the Hindu-Muslim problem. Other 
communities have however latterly taken up an aggressive attitude and have 
demanded special rights and privileges. The Sikhs in the Punjab are an important 
and well knit community which cannot be ignored. Amongst the Hindus themselves 
there is occasional friction especially in the south, between non-Brahmans and 
Brahmans. But essentially the problem is how to adjust the differences between 
Hindus and Muslims.
187
 
Thus the technical conception of minorities involves the identification of those minority 
communities who could be distinguished from an integrated conception of a Hindu 
majority. In this section I argue that an integrated and by implication sacralised conception 
of the Hindu religion forms the background against which religious minorities are 
determined in Art 30. 
 
In administering the rights of minorities Indian courts have not emphasised the 
development of a conceptual account of the term minority. Instead their concerns have 
revolved around developing techniques by which education as a public good could best be 
distributed while protecting the rights of minorities to establish and administer educational 
institutions of their choice.
188
 Thus from the earliest decision on rights granted in Art 30, 
courts have focussed on defining an administratively stable conception of the term which 
best protects the rights of minorities to run educational institutions. Thus Indian courts have 
been concerned about questions like whether the term minority in Art 30 should be 
                                                 
186
 The Nehru Report was a response to the Simon Commission which was sent to India by the British 
government to explore the increased constitutional devolution of powers to Indian representatives. The 
commission however did not include any Indian members to which the Indian National Congress and the 
Muslim League responded through a committee led by Motilal Nehru. 
187
 The Nehru Report, 27. 
188
 Politically this is a highly charged issue because many minority institutions are quite substantially funded 
by the State. 
101 
 
determined at the level of the State or the union government. Courts have generally 
answered this question by holding that a minority is a group that comprises less than fifty 
percent of the population of a regional province or State.
189
 This geographical emphasis is 
perhaps also explained by the nature of the right granted in Art 30. That is, until 1976 the 
Union government did not have competence to legislate on matters dealing with education 
though the passage of the 42
nd
 amendment to the Constitution altered this position by 
making education a concurrent subject. 
 
In T.M.A.Pai Foundation & Ors v. State of Karnataka & Ors
190
, currently the authoritative 
decision on the scope of Art 30, the court held that the 42
nd
 amendment would make no 
difference to the manner in which a minority would be identified. Both Justices Kirpal and 
Khare argued that the conception of minority could not change depending on the 
government against whom a right was being claimed. Justice Khare also pointed out if 
minority were to be decided nationally then many linguistic minorities in India's linguistic 
States could claim to be minorities in their own States where they were in a majority, which 
he thought was against the design of the constitution makers. Ruma Pal J. dissented from 
this position by holding that constitutional rights arose in the context in which they were 
claimed. Thus according to her minorities would be decided nationally for rights that were 
to be claimed against the national government and at the level of a State for rights that were 
to be claimed against a State government. None of the judges however dealt with the 
minority rights as a conceptual problem, especially the specific conceptual problem for 
which the Indian constitution granted rights to minorities. 
 
By suggesting that minorities are groups who comprise less than 50 per cent of the 
population of a state, it seems as if courts have taken a particularly flexible pragmatic 
position regarding the designation of minorities. That is, they preferred to determine 
religious and linguistic minorities depending on the demands of contingent circumstances. 
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However, even if one were to accept that this was the suggestion of Indian court decisions 
on this issue, it is not possible to identify Hindu caste groups, like the Saraswath Brahmins 
discussed in the previous chapter, as religious minorities even though they may constitute 
less than 50 percent of the population of a State and can be perhaps be thought of as a 
sectarian caste group. I argue that this is so because caste groups are understood to be part 
of a sacral conception of a Hindu majority and it is against this conception of a majority 
community that the constitutional conception of minority assumes intelligibility. I support 
my claim about the Indian constitutional conception of minority rights by drawing on a 
Supreme Court judgment that decided this issue in relation to the identification of 
minorities in the Minorities Commission Act 1992. 
 
In Bal Patil & Anr. v. Union Of India,
191
 the Supreme Court dismissed the petition of the 
Jain community challenging the Minorities Commission Act 1992. Providing inter alia for 
the welfare of Indian minorities, the minorities statute defines minorities as communities 
duly notified by the central government. Accordingly the Muslim, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis 
and Buddhists were notified as national minorities. The Jains who were left out of this list 
challenged this notification and petitioned the court to direct the government that they also 
be included in this list of minorities. 
 
The court responded to the Jain petition by arguing that the Jaina tradition was born of the 
larger Hindu religion. According to Justice Dharmadhikari permitting the Jaina religion to 
be recognised as a minority was similar to construing Hindu castes as minorities, which he 
argued would be fatal for national unity. It is quite likely that Justice Dharmadhikari was 
wrong in considering the Jains to be Hindus. However, his observations on caste reflect the 
significance of an integrated doctrinal conception of the Hindu religion for the 
identification of a religious minority. Thus, the court‘s own definition of a minority as a 
social group (including castes) constituting less than 50 percent of the population of a State 
could not apply to Hindu sub groups because it would destroy the very intelligibility of a 
religious minority in the constitutional scheme. That is, the term minority acquires 
intelligibility only when it is set against an integrated and (by implication) foundationalist 
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conception of the Hindu religion. 
 
The Bal Patil case is not an isolated instance and the Supreme Court has dealt with the 
question of religious minorities similarly in many other cases.
192
 In these cases the 
constitutional conception of a religious minority assumes intelligibility only against an 
integrated and doctrinal conception of the Hindu religion. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have demonstrated the manner in which the practice of Indian equality 
jurisprudence has ‗normalised‘ the significance of a sacralised conception of the Hindu 
religion. That is, a doctrinal conception of the Hindu religion has embedded itself in Indian 
equality jurisprudence and especially in identifying the beneficiaries of the rights the 
constitution grants to the scheduled castes, other backward classes and minorities. This in 
turn has had important implications for the affirmative action programs envisioned by the 
Indian Constitution. Any program for affirmative action or compensatory discrimination is 
critically dependent on socio-scientific data that validates a particular course of 
ameliorative action. However, I have argued that the constitutional groups to whom the 
constitution grants ameliorative rights are tied either directly or indirectly to a sacral 
conception of the Hindu religion, which is only thinly and unsatisfactorily tied to the 
underlying sociological problems for which the scheduled castes, the other backward 
classes, and the minorities are granted constitutional rights. 
 
Considered along with the previous chapter, the present chapter has sought to demonstrate 
the manner in which a doctrinal conception of the Hindu religion semantically transforms 
traditional Indian religious identities and sacralises them as they are drawn into the 
constitutional practice of equality jurisprudence. That is, these chapters have demonstrated 
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the manner in which the sacralising disposition of the Indian constitutional framework has 
screened off Indian social experience from Indian institutional problems. In the next 
chapter the thesis begins the task of explaining this constitutional disposition by situating 
the sacralising hypothesis in the context of the scholarship on the Indian secular State. 
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3. Defenders and Critics of Indian Secularism 
 
The state of the secular State has been a matter of considerable concern in contemporary 
India, especially because it is viewed by many as a bulwark against the forces of tradition 
and obscurantism. In tangible terms this means that the secular State is viewed as a critical 
resource, perhaps the only one, when facing problems like mass violence, one of the most 
troubling challenges of government in contemporary India.
193
 There has therefore been 
considerable scholarly reflection on the conceptual and practical challenges faced by the 
secular State in India, especially its ability to defend pluralism in the face of sectarian 
challenges. Against this background the present chapter situates the hypothesis developed 
in the previous two chapters in the context of the considerable literature debating the nature 
and significance of the Indian secular State. 
 
It must be emphasised that the present chapter is not merely a literature review but an 
attempt to situate my hypothesis on the doctrinalisation of religious traditions and the 
sacralisation of constitutional practice produced by Indian secularism amongst the scholarly 
reflection on the subject. I do so by outlining some of the broad strands of scholarly opinion 
on the character of the secular State in India and advance reasons for pursuing some of 
these scholarly approaches as potential explanations for doctrinalising and sacralising 
disposition of the Indian secular State while rejecting others as inappropriate and unsuited 
for the task.  
 
Since the literature in the field is unmanageably large I will re-describe the larger field of 
scholarly opinion into four strands. These are (1) Normative Conceptions of the secular 
State; (2) Exceptionalist conceptions of the secular State or arguments that assert that the 
secular State in India is an exception to the liberal European conceptions of the secular 
State; (3) Descriptivist conceptions of the secular State which emphasise the politics and 
practices of government implicit in the commitment to the secular State; and, finally (4) 
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Post colonial conceptions and critiques of the secular State. As an analytical re-description 
cast over existing literature the strands of scholarship that I outline are not strictly self 
contained and could shade into each other. Nonetheless these strands identify key positions 
which all have a bearing on the understanding of the practice of secular constitutionalism in 
the Indian constitution. 
 
3.1. Normative defences of the Indian Secular State 
As I have already outlined in the introductory chapter liberal secular States have generally 
been identified in terms of normative goals or propositions of the following type – States 
ought to promote religious liberty, States ought to treat citizens equally irrespective of 
religious affiliation, and States ought to be neutral in their dealing with affairs of religion. 
This is not to say that States follow these norms as a matter of fact but that they ought to be 
bound by them as far as possible, and it has been the task of Constitutional government to 
ensure that States are organised on the basis of these norms. To these norms the Indian 
Constitution as I have shown in chapter 1 adds another norm – Indian society ought to be 
reformed if it is to be secular. The strands of argument that I term a ‗normative‘ defence of 
the secular State fully accept these normative goals and are either explicit or implicit 
defences of these goals. In this section, I will argue that normative defences of the Indian 
secular State obstruct the study and comprehension of the constitutional practices that make 
up the Indian secular State.
194
 
 
There is a considerable and large literature defending the Indian secular State on normative 
grounds. Of these I will focus in this section on the essays of Rajeev Bhargava,
195
 and Gary 
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Jacobsohn‘s detailed comparative analysis of constitutional secularism in India.196 Though I 
also discuss other texts, I will deploy these two authors as my principal interlocutors to 
demonstrate the manner in which the normative defence of the Indian secular State 
obstructs the comprehension, analysis and evaluation of Indian constitutional practice. 
 
3.1.1. Defending Secular Norms: A social science perspective on a secular India 
To illustrate the problem with the normative defence of the secular State I start by 
considering Rajeev Bhargava‘s account of the secular State. This is particularly interesting 
because he claims to have drawn up a theoretical model of the secular State that is 
committed to a separation of religion from politics but is stripped of any particular 
normative ideal. His essay seeks to defend secularism from three kinds of objections that 
Indian scholars have mounted against it. First, that the secular State is Western and 
Christian and therefore unsuited to Indian conditions. Second, that the secular State is 
hostile to religious persons. Third, that the claims of the secular State to be neutral are 
overstated and that it in fact favours the unbeliever or minority communities. Responding to 
these objections Bhargava defends secularism and the secular State from its critics. 
 
In Bhargava‘s account, the task of the secular State is the separation of religion from 
politics. Assuming the centrality of the separation of religion from politics to the task of 
building a secular State, he states various grounds on which this separation could be 
justified. These include - (a) separation fosters autonomy, (b) it fosters equality, (c) it 
prevents the concentration of power, fosters democracy and prevents religious and political 
despotism, (d) separation is a necessity that results from instrumental rationality because 
religion as a matter of deepest conviction can never be transformed by coercive methods, 
(e) finally, that separation is necessary because it is the only way in which competing 
ultimate ideals are removed from politics to prevent an inevitable clash of these ideals 
which in turn will ensure a minimally decent existence in a given society. The first three 
reasons for separation are perfectionist justifications of the secular State producing what 
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Bhargava calls ethical secularisms, while the latter two reasons are what Bhargava calls 
political justifications or arguments for political secularism. The term ethical secularism 
derives from the attempt to seek ―separation of religion from politics by virtue of the 
contribution it makes to the realisation of some ultimate ideal.‖ Political secularism on the 
other hand is not as concerned with ultimate values but is interested in the separation of 
religion from politics because it holds that this makes for a more liveable polity.
197
 
 
The different kinds of justification for the separation of religion from politics lead to his 
conception of the kinds of separation of religion from politics. Bhargava posits two broad 
kinds of separation. First, a separation that is based on the exclusion of religion from 
politics and second, a separation grounded on an attempt to fashion a political neutrality or 
an attempt to assign religion and politics to their appropriate spheres. This analytical 
exercise eventually permits Bhargava to posit four types of secularism: (a) Ethical 
Secularism that excludes all religions from the affairs of the State; (b) Ethical Secularism 
which maintains principled distance from religion; (c) Political Secularism that excludes all 
religion from affairs of State; (d) Political Secularism that demands that the State maintain 
a principled distance from all religions.
198
 It is with this typology that he proceeds to 
address the various objections raised against the secular State. 
 
Bhargava claims that it is only a political secularism which demands that the State 
maintains a principled distance from all religions is capable of answering all the major 
objections that Indian scholars have raised against the secular State. These objections are 
that the secular State discriminates against religious people, that it is Western and therefore 
inapplicable in India, and that it favours minorities and non religious people. However, by 
unravelling Bhargava‘s response to the charge that the secular State is hostile to religious 
persons, I argue that his political conception of the secular State can be sustained only with 
an impoverished conception of religion. This in turn substantially weakens his claim that a 
political conception of the secular State can be defended independent of any ultimate ideals 
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or norms. 
 
Responding to the charge that a secular State is biased against persons holding deep 
religious convictions, he agrees that ethical secularism will indeed favour a normative 
public value over those of religious people and especially so in the case of an ethical 
secularism that is committed to the exclusion of religion from politics. However, he 
maintains that secularism is compatible with religious convictions because one can still 
hold on to a political secularism which is only committed to the exclusion of ultimate 
values from the public sphere. 
 
Recognising that secularism makes claims on identity, he argues that political secularism 
has the prospect of gaining the allegiance of persons with religious convictions because 
...excessive demands are not made on any group, and such modifications as are 
required do not threaten its identity or existence. Ethical secularism requires that the 
believer give up everything of significance. Political secularism demands only that 
everyone – believer, non believer – gives up a little bit of what is of exclusive 
importance in order to sustain that which is generally valuable. If everyone is 
assured that politics will not be invaded by any one particular ultimate ideal then all 
are likely to restrict the scope of their respective ideals.
199
 (emphasis added) 
Political secularism therefore turns on protection both of and from ‗ultimate ideals.‘ As he 
elaborates: 
At no point in the history of humankind has any society existed with one and only 
one set of ultimate ideals. Moreover, many of these ultimate ideals or particular 
formulations of these have conflicted with one another. In such times, humanity has 
either got caught in an escalating spiral of violence and cruelty or come to the 
realisation that even ultimate ideals need to be delimited. In short it has recurrently 
stumbled upon something resembling political secularism. Political secularism must 
then be seen as part of the family of views that arises in response to a fundamental 
human predicament. It is neither purely Christian not peculiarly Western. It grows 
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wherever there is a persistent clash of ultimate ideals perceived to be 
incompatible.
200
 (emphasis added) 
However, to reduce political secularism to the response to the persistent clash of 
incompatible ultimate ideals, he flattens out his conception of the secular State into one 
committed to resolving any persisting law and order problem.
201
 However, the more 
significant aspect of this argument for secularism is its conception of religion as an ultimate 
ideal. 
 
It is entirely unclear what Bhargava considers an ultimate ideal. To the extent that he 
elaborates the term, it is presented as a dogmatic belief that is likely to produce conflict 
when it is met with other similar ultimate ideals or beliefs. However it is not clear on what 
basis this conception of an ultimate ideal is presented as a general feature of all religions. 
For instance, in the light of my discussion in the previous two chapters it is just as plausible 
to argue that Indian religious traditions are marked by an indifference to ultimate ideals, 
and that foundational doctrines are irrelevant to Indian religious tradition. However, doing 
so would undercut the foundation of Bhargava's conception of the secular State as a form of 
government that separates religion from politics. That is, if religion is indifferent to the 
question of ultimate ideals then the purpose of separating it from politics loses significance. 
As separation is at the core of Bhargava‘s account of the secular State, it would be 
untenable to admit Indian religious traditions into his theoretical framework. Consequently 
Bhargava‘s account of the secular State will be blind to the doctrinalisation of Indian 
traditions demanded by Indian constitutional practice. 
 
Bhargava‘s model is one that has been derived from first principles assuming that the 
problem of the secular State is one of separating religion from politics. However, the model 
of political secularism with which he has ended up has resolved into a frame of government 
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devoted to the management of ‗ultimate values.‘ Bhargava has of course claimed that his 
model is not tied to any normative value; however, the management of ultimate values is 
clearly the liberal problem that I have outlined in the introductory chapter. That is, his 
model is not entirely free from commitments to normative values. Therefore his model 
cannot escape some form of commitment to the defence of liberal values like liberty and 
equality.
202
 More importantly, by resolving the problem of the secular State as the scheme 
to manage ultimate values, Bhargava is blind to the constitutional process that converts 
Indian religious traditions into ‗ultimate values‘.203 I elaborate on this blindness to 
constitutional practice through an essay by Amartya Sen. 
 
Having defined the secular State as an institutional form that is charged with the task of 
symmetrical treatment of all religious traditions in a polity Sen considers various objections 
raised against the secular State. One of these is what Sen calls the critique of prior 
identities. That is, the critique of the position that religious identities, which in most cases 
exist prior to the nation State in countries like India, ought to determine the character of 
politics. Interrogating this position and making a case that the prior identities ought not to 
matter to the shape of secular politics, Sen is able to show that identities like Hinduism are 
remarkably diverse and that it is their politicisation, often by non-believing modern 
nationalists, that go on to make sectarian political claims.
204
 
 
However, while discussing the impact of modern citizen identities he is almost blind to the 
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predatory effects of the modern nation State form on religious and traditional identities. 
Thus responding to arguments about the violence of modernity he says that  
... the nation state is under great suspicion these days as a constant perpetrator of 
violence, and indeed the state does manage to do many violent things. What is not 
clear is why taking a symmetric attitude to different communities would encourage 
or add to, such state violence. To invoke some concepts much favoured in 
contemporary theory, it is not, of course, difficult to conceive that a state might 
‗homogenise‘ to ‗hegemonise‘, but it seems, at best, intensely abstract to see this 
happening whenever the state stops favouring one religious community over another 
(as secularism requires).
205
 
It is perhaps true that if States act symmetrically between religions, the problem of the 
State‘s ‗violent‘ influence on religious and political identities can be neutralised. However, 
Sen does not ask whether this is in fact how States have acted, or whether the normative 
demands and orientation of secular States permit them to act in this manner.
206
 
 
By dismissing the ‗homogenising‘ and ‗hegemonising‘ effects of modern nationalist-
citizenship as ‗intensely abstract‘, Sen is unable to see that the framework of the secular 
State is deeply implicated in the process of shaping contemporary religious identities. It is 
this blindness to the practices of secular constitutionalism that allows Sen to make this 
blithe assertion about the secular State and it is my case that this blindness is tied to the 
normative approach to the secular State. That is, the normative defence of the secular State 
is structurally unable to make explicit the sociological and practical assumptions implicit in 
a commitment to secular constitutionalism. However, neither Sen nor Bhargava directly 
address the constitutional practices of the secular State as does Gary Jacobsohn whose book 
on the subject I address in the next section. 
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3.1.2. Normativity in the Legal debates on Indian Secularism 
Gary Jacobsohn‘s book on the secularism in India is a good example of the normative 
defence of Indian secularism made through a detailed discussion of Indian Constitutional 
practice. Like Bhargava, Jacobsohn‘s work is particularly interesting because he claims he 
is advancing a socially and politically located explanation of the secular State and explicitly 
denies that his account is a normative defence of the Indian secular State. Jacobsohn begins 
his inquiry with the assumption that constitutions vary depending on the contours of the 
body politic, and therefore that secular States are also dependent on the actual conditions of 
a polity. Consequently Jacobsohn insists that the student of law and religion should be 
sensitive to the facts on the ground and the ―manner in which religious life is experienced 
within any given society and how this experience affects the achievement of historically 
determined constitutional ends.‖207 
 
Jacobsohn's attention to context leads him to posit three types of the secular State. Each of 
these types is determined by the extent to which religion is constitutive of the society under 
consideration and the extent to which the State is associated with religion. As exemplars of 
his three types of the secular State, the United States of America stands for an assimilative 
secularism in which the State is envisioned to be strictly impartial in an assimilating or 
uniform political culture, in which religion is thinly constituted. India stands for an 
ameliorative secular model where the State tries to be impartial in a society where religion 
constitutes social life very thickly. Thus as a result of the deep social imprint of religion in 
India, the State was of necessity vested with the task of undertaking a reforming role in 
relation to religion. Lastly Israel stands for a visionary secularism where religion defines 
the conception of the Israeli nation and consequently of the Israeli State though its social 
presence is not definitive and is only of peripheral significance. 
 
My concern in this chapter does not extend to the comparative element and typology of 
secular States that Jacobsohn outlines. Instead I am primarily concerned with the manner in 
which he casts the ameliorative model through which the Indian quest for a secular State is 
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shaped. Significantly, he claims that secularisation, by which he means a separation of 
religion from politics, cannot form the model by which secular States are assessed and 
studied. Instead he argues that 
(t)he great challenge in pursuing the elusive goal of Indian secularism is bound up 
in what is distinctive about the Indian case, namely that critical elements of the 
social structure are inextricably entwined with religion in a way that renders the 
possibilities for any meaningful social reform unimaginable without the direct 
intervention of the State in the spiritual domain.
208
 (emphasis added) 
As he summarises his work ―the project of defending religious liberty and secular 
aspiration in a deeply religious society – India – is the subject of this book.‖ (emphasis 
added)
209 
Jacobsohn recognises that there is something distinct about Indian religious 
traditions as I have pointed out in chapter 1.
210
 However, his account of the secular State 
presents the process of the reform of Indian religious traditions normatively desirable. 
 
Jacobsohn is therefore acutely aware of the reforming disposition of the Indian constitution. 
However, he responds to it by recasting reform as necessitated by the ethical deficiencies in 
the Indian social structure. As he phrases it 
I use the term ameliorative secularism to describe a model of the secular 
constitution as a conceptual projection of the multifaceted character of Indian 
nationhood. It is a term broad enough to encompass the layered meanings of Indian 
nationalism, including both its commitment to social reform and its mooring in rival 
and contentious religious/cultural traditions. Thus the constitution seeks an 
amelioration of the social conditions of people long burdened by the inequities of 
religiously based hierarchies, but also embodies a vision of intergroup comity 
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whose fulfilment necessitates cautious deliberation in pursuit of abstract justice.
211
 
(emphasis added) 
As Jacobsohn suggests, reform is only one aspect of the Indian project of building a nation 
state. However, to the extent that he accepted that reform was a part of the nationalist 
project, it is presented as a normative project that sought to redress historic injustices of an 
integrated and unified socio-sacral order.
212
 In other words Jacobsohn's account restates the 
Indian constitutional consensus on religion and reform. However, this account is neither 
able to elaborate how this scheme of governing religious traditions assumed its current 
form, nor illuminate what the constitutional practice of the secular State entails for Indian 
religious traditions. 
 
It is not that Jacobsohn does not recognise what is at stake in the practice of the Indian 
secular State. Jacobsohn‘s account does provide an oblique account of what the practice of 
the secular State entails. Thus commenting on the nature of Art 25 of the Constitution he 
says that 
… this constitutional strand underscores the transformational dimension of Indian 
nationalism and the commitment to Nehruvian scientific rationalism with which it is 
frequently associated … For this experiment to succeed, popular religion had to be 
down played, constituting as it did the principal impediment in the path of 
integrating different classes and peoples into the modern national state.
213
 (emphasis 
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added) 
However this sociological observation is absorbed in the normative account of this process 
where it is ethically desirable that popular religion is absorbed within a larger constitutional 
project. Therefore it is not possible in his account to examine the process by which Indian 
religious traditions are reformed into doctrinally founded categories because it is ethically 
desirable that such reform take place. 
 
I must stress that my reading of Jacobsohn does not imply that I seek to gloss over any 
form of unjust practice that obtains in the Indian social fabric. Instead I wish to point out 
how injustice is invoked to render invisible the social transformation entailed by a 
commitment to the secular State. That is, the reforming disposition of the Indian secular 
State is unable to reflect or represent the social dynamic entailed by the practice of the 
Indian secular State because the ontology of the secular State normatively conceived does 
not permit traditional religions. 
 
Normative arguments have however not been the only way in which the secular State has 
been understood in India. The other strands of scholarly argument that I will outline make a 
more explicit attempt to account for the dynamic of the Secular State as it obtains in the 
Indian Constitution. These are the strands of argument that suggests that the secular State in 
India is a form that is an exception to that found in Western liberal democracies, and yet 
other strands that are elaborated by scholars like Ashish Nandy, T.N. Madan, Partha 
Chatterjee, Pratap Mehta and Marc Galanter, whose work deals with the origins and 
practice of the secular State in India. I outline these positions in the following sections and 
make a case for extending and elaborating some of these arguments to provide an 
explanation of the doctrinalising and sacralising disposition of the Indian secular State. 
 
3.2. An Exceptional Form of Indian Secularism 
Prefacing a little known book on secularism in India, B.N. Puri speaks of secularism in the 
following manner: 
In a pluralist society like India, with a number of religions flourishing in the spirit 
117 
 
of unity in diversity, Secularism is nothing new. Its genesis could be traced to the 
Vedic times, as is evident from the Rig-Vedic hymn proclaiming ‗Sages name 
variously that which is One‘. This concept of the Supreme and Ultimate Spirit 
infused a sense of eclecticism...
214
 
Similarly elaborating on the types of reflection on Secularism in India, G.S. Sharma 
identifies a strand of thinking about secularism in India as being closely tied to the 
―pluralist view held by Hindus, which accepts all religions...‖215 I will refer to these 
perspectives that draw their inspiration from the Indian civilisational ethos as exceptional 
arguments in favour of the secular State. 
 
As I will show, this class of arguments draws on the reforming legal form that the secular 
State takes in the Indian constitutional scheme and infers from it the exceptional character 
of the secular State in India. That is, it is a way of accounting for the reformist character of 
the Indian secular State in a manner that is entirely free of liberal normative demands. 
However, it must be stressed that the ‗exception argument‘ is often rolled together with 
other ways of arguing for the secular State and is not clearly demarcated as an independent 
strand of thinking about the character of the secular State in India. Thus by identifying an 
exceptional form of thinking about the secular State in India I only try to isolate for 
analytical purposes a strand of argument which otherwise often accompanies the more 
standard normative and liberal democratic forms of justifying the secular State. The 
exceptional argument is best elaborated by Indian judicial opinion and therefore I will 
illustrate and assess this strand of thinking about the secular State through examples from 
Indian case law. 
 
Secularism has been declared by the Indian Supreme Court to be part of the basic structure 
of the Indian constitution and numerous decisions have stressed the centrality of secularism 
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to the Indian constitutional scheme.
216
 Of these decisions Ismail Faruqui v. Union of 
India
217
 makes a distinct case for what I term the exceptional argument for Indian 
secularism. This case dealt with a constitutional challenge to the Acquisition of Certain 
Areas at Ayodhya Act, 1993 which was enacted following the demolition of the Babri 
Masjid in 1992. The demolition of the Babri Masjid was tied to a property dispute between 
different groups of Hindus and Muslims about the ownership of a piece of land in the 
temple town of Ayodhya in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The dispute produced unprecedented 
popular mobilisation, eventually resulting in the destruction of a Mosque that stood at the 
disputed site by a large Hindu mob. The wave of communal violence that followed the 
destruction resulted in the statute of 1993 through which the central government acquired 
the disputed property and abated all pending suits regarding the property pending a 
Presidential reference made to the Supreme Court asking if the site was of religious 
significance to the Hindu community. The Ismail Faruqui case arose as a challenge to the 
acquisition of the disputed property claiming that it violated the rights of the Muslims to 
establish claims to the disputed property. More importantly for my argument in this section, 
it was also claimed that the circumstances in which the property was acquired by the central 
government legitimised the demolition of the mosque and violated the constitutional 
commitment to secularism. 
 
In my discussion of this case I outline the manner in which Justice Verma‘s majority 
decision addressed the question of secularism through civilisational arguments. Justice 
Verma suggests that the word secular refers to different concepts in India and the West. 
Though the contrast between the Western and Indian conceptions of secularism are not 
elaborated clearly in his judgment, he asserts that the Indian conception is contained in the 
phrase ‗Sarva Dharma Sambhaav‘ which is a philosophical approach of understanding, 
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coexistence and tolerance that undergirds ancient Indian thought.
218
 
 
Drawing cursorily and perhaps even randomly on Indian metaphysical and philosophical 
texts, he asserts that ―a philosophical and ethnological composite is provided by ancient 
Indian thought for developing Sarva Dharma Samabhaav or secular thought and outlook. 
This enlightenment is the true nucleus of what is now known as Hinduism.‖219 The 
association of ‗Hinduism‘ with Indian traditions of toleration is then tied to the manner in 
which traditions like Islam and Christianity were integrated into this philosophical horizon 
of Indian tolerance. Speaking of the relationship of the non Hindu traditions with the 
‗Indian ethos‘ he notes that these religions were accommodated without great difficulty by 
local authorities and that ―Christianity, Islam and Zoroastrianism brought with them 
spiritual and humanistic thought harmonious and, in fact, identical to the core ideas of the 
established religious thought in India as exemplified by the basic beliefs of Vedic, Vedantic, 
Buddhist and Jain philosophy.‖220 From this discussion he concludes that ―The Constitution 
of India specifically articulated the commitment of secularism on the basis of a clear 
understanding of the desirable relationships between the Individual and Religion, between 
Religion and Religion, Religion and the State, and the State and the Individual.‖221 
 
It is significant to note that Justice Verma‘s, case for an Indian form of secularism draws on 
a traditional conception of religion and its ability to devise a tolerant civilisational horizon. 
However, if the doctrinalising and sacralising disposition of the Indian secular State is 
assumed, then it will not be possible to defend such a conception of religion within the 
Indian constitutional scheme. That is, Justice Verma‘s scheme of toleration drawing on 
phrases like Sarva Dharma Sambhaav is not compatible with the practice of the liberal 
secular State in Indian Constitution, especially its disposition to reformulate traditional 
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religions into religions underwritten by essential or foundational truth. Therefore, even 
though it is socially plausible to argue in terms of Indian traditions of toleration, they do not 
sit easily with the Constitutional framework in relation to religion and religious freedom. 
 
In the Ismail Faruqui case the court‘s decision did not turn on the exceptional form of 
defending the secular State. However, this exceptional or civilisational form of defending 
an Indian model of toleration has been at the heart of deciding an important set of cases on 
religious speech popularly referred to as the Hindutva judgments. Perhaps ironically, in 
defending the civilisational conception of Indian secularism in this set of cases the court 
even appeared to become an apologist for extreme nationalist political organisations 
claiming to represent ‗Hindu‘ interests. 
 
The Hindutva judgments
222
 decided a set of election petitions that sought to invalidate the 
elections of many candidates belonging to a Maharashtra based party called the Shiv Sena 
for indulging in ‗corrupt practices‘ under the Representation of Peoples Act 1951 while 
canvassing votes for elections to the Maharashtra State assembly. The Act defines ‗corrupt 
practices‘ as electoral appeals to vote or to refrain from voting for any person on the ground 
of religion, or the promotion of feelings of enmity or hatred between different communities 
in the process of canvassing votes
223
. That is, the Act sought to promote secular values by 
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proscribing religion from unduly influencing the electoral process and especially in a 
manner that could produce strife among communities. In these cases the courts had to 
pronounce upon the legal status of the extreme nationalist platform of Hindutva, which the 
Shiv Sena had adopted to fight the election. That is, the court had to decide whether explicit 
appeals to voters in the name of Hindutva by candidates or their agents amounted to a 
corrupt practice under the Representation of Peoples Act? 
 
The court decided this question in a manner quite similar to the Satsangi case I discussed in 
chapter 1. That is, they dealt with Hindutva as a phenomenon that represented an extremely 
diverse set of practices that could not be reduced to ‗religion‘ as it was conventionally or 
doctrinally understood. Referring to judgments like the Satsangi case and scholarly writing 
on Hinduism the court equated Hindutva with Hinduism and asserted that it had no one 
holy book, no one prophet, no unified church etc, which they saw to be conventional 
markers of religion. Thus by pointing to the diversity and plurality of Hinduism they called 
it a ‗way of life‘ of the people of India. 
 
However, this exposition of Hinduism produces two kinds of problems for the court. If 
Hinduism was indeed just a way of life, how was it to be subject to the provisions of a 
statute that proscribed an invocation of ‗religion‘ in elections? To get around this problem 
the court asserted that it would police the extreme meanings that fringe elements attributed 
to the essential plurality of Hinduism
.224
 If on the other hand the problem was one of 
extremism and of hate speech why refer to Hinduism at all? That is, the court could have 
dealt with attempts to create discord among communities purely as a law and order problem 
or through s. 123A and by making no reference at all to Hinduism. Thus referring to 
Hinduism in traditional or civilisational terms the court seemed to render the Act and its 
solutions meaningless. In other words deciding that ‗Hindutva‘ was not a corrupt practice 
solved the immediate problem at hand but seemed to render the entire framework to address 
religious speech meaningless. 
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Ironically, in arguing for an exceptional form of Secularism which contained the plurality 
of Hinduism and of Indian traditions, the court condoned a political party whose extreme 
nationalist positions attacked this very conception of plurality.
225
 There are of course good 
pragmatic reasons that could justify the court‘s defence of the electoral campaign of the 
Shiv Sena and especially by using civilisational arguments, which arguments the Shiv Sena 
campaign sought to undermine. Not least among these reasons was the fact that one of the 
candidates that these election petitions sought to disqualify, Manohar Joshi, was the serving 
chief minister of the State of Maharashtra. That is, it could be argued that the court was 
trying to hammer out a modus vivendi which attempted to tie an elected government and its 
representatives to Indian values of toleration without upsetting the very stability of that 
government.  
 
Justifying the agenda of the Shiv Sena as the court has done can therefore be challenged as 
poor or even perverse expositions of existing law because they do not take into 
consideration the extreme nationalism the party stands for.
226
 Alternatively, as I have 
argued, raising the civilisational argument threatened to undermines the very intelligibility 
of supposedly dangerous speech. Exceptional arguments for the secular State are therefore 
set in a context of confusion. While they do point to culturally existing conceptions of 
toleration, these conceptions of toleration are in important ways disconnected with the 
institutional imagination of the Indian secular State. Exceptional arguments for the secular 
State thus point to the disjunction between conceptions of toleration that have cultural 
valence and the liberal democratic secular scheme for toleration and the protection of 
religious liberty. 
 
However, as exceptional arguments are set within the larger liberal democratic framework 
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of the secular State, it is often not possible to offer an explanation for the disjunctions they 
produce. That is, since the exceptional account has not been able to do a ground clearing 
exercise that explains the logic of the Indian secular practice, it is unable to meaningfully 
extend its arguments on distinct or exceptional forms of secularism in India. 
 
How is it then possible to get past this disjunction produced by the dynamic of the secular 
State? Speaking about Secularism in Indian Jurisprudence, Justice S. S. Dhavan, a judge of 
the Allahabad High court, alludes to the task involved in thinking about Indian conceptions 
of secularism.
227
 The problem as he sees it was the misidentification of Indian concepts by 
European thinkers. Through a study of the Sanskrit word dharma he identifies a problem 
with its mistranslation into the Hindu religion or religious faith. He argues that ―this 
misunderstanding of the concept of dharma is responsible for the mistaken view that Indian 
jurisprudence is wrapped in religion ...‖228 The problem as he identifies it is the acceptance 
of frames of knowledge generated by British government in the Indian social sciences as 
typified by Macaulay‘s Minute on education in which all ‗Indian thought in all ages was 
dismissed as dotages of Brahminical superstition.‘ Justice Dhavan claims that the refraction 
of India through Western frames of thought resulted in the dismissal of Indian knowledge 
frames. Thus the attempts at generating an exceptional case for the secular State get re-
framed as a negative question – why do Colonial knowledge frames prevent the possibility 
of a distinctly Indian scheme of toleration?  
 
I address this question in more detail in chapters 4 and 5 and preliminarily address the issue 
in section 3.4 of the present chapter which elaborates a strand of argument that I call the 
post-colonial analysis of Indian secularism and which offers an account of colonialism and 
its impact on Indian society and the structure of its contemporary institutions. However, 
before I proceed to elaborate the colonial and post-colonial accounts of the secular State I 
first outline another important attempt at accounting for the Indian secular State through 
what I call descriptivism or an attempt to characterise the working of secular institutions in 
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terms of a politics of the present. 
 
3.3. Descriptivist Accounts: On the politics of Indian Secularism 
As I mentioned in chapter 1, one way of thinking about the secular State normatively was 
to argue that the reforming orientation of the Indian secular State itself violated secular 
norms. Holding this opinion, scholars like Donald Smith and Ved Prakash Luthera termed 
India an inadequately or partially secularised State.
229
 As I argued in that chapter, accounts 
like those of Smith would clearly be an inadequate response to understanding the 
constitutional practices that sustained the Indian approach to religion and religious freedom. 
Similarly, Gary Jacobsohn‘s account of secularism as described in s. 3.1.2 of this chapter 
accounted for Indian secularism as a product of reform but then unquestioningly accepted 
the nationalist account of the need to reform Indian religious practices. Thus even though 
Jacobsohn‘s account was an account of the practice of the secular State he was not able to 
demonstrate what was at stake in secular reform in India. In this section I recount what I 
understand to be attempts to make explicit the ideology and politics implicit in the practice 
of Indian secular reform. 
 
In an illuminating essay on the nature of the secular State in India Marc Galanter presents 
what I term a descriptivist conception of the Indian secular State. Summarising the various 
ways in which the Indian secular State has been considered, he notes that there was 
disagreement on whether the secular State implied ―... a severe aloofness from religion, a 
benign impartiality toward religion, a corrective oversight of it, or a fond and equal 
indulgence of all religions.‖230 However, there was a general agreement that public life was 
not to be determined by religion and that religious freedom ought to be respected and 
perhaps even supported. The problem however was the manner in which the radical 
reformulation and transformation of Hinduism, still an ongoing national project in 1971 
when Galanter wrote his essay, was to be considered and located within a conception of the 
secular State. As I have done in a part of chapter 1 Galanter also considered the problem of 
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secular reform in India through the the Satsangi case. 
 
Considering the Indian secular State he notes that: 
In assessing the thrust of India‘s secularism it is important that we avoid equating 
secularism with a formal standard of religious neutrality or impartiality on the part 
of the state. No secular state is or can be merely neutral or impartial among 
religions, for the state defines the boundaries within which neutrality must operate. 
... 
A secular state, then, propounds a charter for its religions; it involves a normative 
view of religion. Certain aspects of what is claimed to be religion are given 
recognition, support, and encouragement; others are the subject of indifference; 
finally, some are curtailed and proscribed. Religion, then, is not merely a datum for 
constitutional law, unaffected by it, and independent of it. It is, in part, the product 
of that law.
231
 
In chapter 1 while describing the Indian secular State I had proceeded on this assumption of 
secular control. In this section I pursue Galanter‘s typology of the permissible regulation 
entailed by the reforming disposition of the Indian secular State. 
 
Recognising that the Indian Constitutional framework is premised on a model that 
envisages that the State must play an arbitral role in the regulation of religion, Galanter 
attempts a typology of the manner in which this power is exercised. He suggests that it is 
possible to distinguish between two kinds of legal regulation of religion which he terms the 
mode of limitation and the mode of intervention. These modes are defined in the following 
manner: 
By limitation I refer to the shaping of religion by promulgating public standards and 
by defining the field in which these secular public standards shall prevail, 
overruling conflicting assertions of religious authority. By intervention I refer to 
something beyond this: to an attempt to grasp the levers of religious authority and to 
                                                 
231
 Ibid., 283. 
126 
 
reformulate the religious tradition from within, as it were.
232
 
While the first mode implies a form of regulation by which the State asserts the superiority 
of its legal norms, the second entails that the State asserts the competence or even 
specialisation in the authoritative exposition of religious norms. These are depicted in 
tabular form which I have reproduced as under. 
 
Galanter organises his Alternative modes of Secular Control in tabular form as follows
233
: 
 
External superiority of legal norms Internal competence of legal specialists 
 Low High 
High Mode of Limitation Mode of 
Intervention 
Low ‗Separation of 
powers‘ mode 
Religious State 
 
Galanter‘s tabulation of the different forms of control that the State therefore produces four 
forms of regulation – the mode of limitation, the mode of intervention, the separation of 
powers mode and the mode of the religious State. Arising from his types of regulation the 
key question Galanter raises is whether the Indian constitutional model permits an 
interventionist mode of regulation. That is, of the various modes of regulation in his model, 
the mode of limitation was clearly a permissible form of regulation but it was less certain if 
the constitution mandated a mode of regulation marked by ‗intervention.‘ He explores this 
problem through the Satsangi decision in which the court adopted the mode of intervention 
through the provocative question – ‗Is the Supreme Court a forum for promulgating official 
interpretations of Hinduism?‘234 
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There are two aspects to Galanter‘s response – one of constitutional interpretation, and the 
other which tries to make intelligible the court‘s ‗interventionist‘ approach to the Hindu 
religion in the Satsangi case. At the level of constitutional interpretation Galanter suggests 
that the interventionist approach of the Supreme Court was perhaps avoidable. However, as 
I have shown in chapter 1, the ‗interventionist‘ mode was merely an extension of the mode 
of limitation and the conception of religion adopted in the mode of intervention was already 
contained in the mode of limitation.
235
 On the other hand, Galanter‘s discussions of the 
reasons that impel intervention are particularly important to my discussion in the next 
couple of chapters. 
 
Galanter considers two important reasons why the Indian Supreme Court adopted the mode 
of intervention. First, justifying regulation internally would make it more palatable to the 
various Hindu traditions. Second, the desire of the national elite to reform popular and 
traditional Hinduism whose static and fragmented nature was considered to be an 
obstruction to forging national unity. However, he is sceptical of the strength of both these 
reasons to defend the interventionist mode of the Indian Supreme Court. 
 
On the advisability of using the mode of intervention to made regulation more acceptable, 
he points out the serious questions of competence that could plague judicial decisions 
prescribing the content of Hinduism. Thus in the Satsangi case he points out that the 
authorities employed were not those picked from within the Hindu tradition but glosses on 
Hinduism by Western or Western inspired scholarship – that is, scholars like Monier 
Williams, Max Muller and S. Radhakrishnan. He also raises doubts about whether religious 
justification adds to the effect of interventionist decisions by suggesting that the influence 
of higher courts stem from their ability to rechannel major institutional opportunities and 
controls and by their liberating effect though these were relatively independent of whether 
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the justifications they provided were secular or religious.
236
 
 
Galanter is more critical of the elite desire to modernise the static and traditional aspects of 
Hinduism and to create out of the Hindu traditions a more unified reformed and rational 
religion. He recognises that independent India was presented with the unprecedented 
opportunity to wield the levers of reform over all the various traditions and strands of 
Hinduism. However he cautions against the exercise of such powers on the grounds that the 
success of the project to unify Hinduism might impede its ability to tolerate difference and 
sustain India‘s diverse democracy.  
 
Galanter thinks that the success of this unification project is likely to be partial and local 
and largely fuelled by elite illusions about Indian society. As he puts it  
... the lawyers‘ fallacy that behaviour corresponds to legal rules offers powerful 
reinforcement of the elite‘s fallacy that the masses are following them – a 
coincidence of illusions that can lead to dangerous miscalculation about popular 
sentiment about the efficacy of legally enacted reforms. 
In Galanter‘s account this statement is only a passing observation. However, I think this is 
an important insight on the practice of judicially led reform of the Hindu religion. In the 
course of the next two chapters I will try to account for and explain this ‗elite illusion.‘ 
 
In an account similar to Galanter‘s, Pratap Mehta also argues that the interventionist 
function played by the Supreme Court is a way of overcoming the ills of tradition without 
having to debunk it as a whole. In addition Mehta argues that intervention was part of the 
process by which Indians in general and Hindus in particular made their peace with the 
modern world by trying to reconcile their traditions with democratic ideals. As he mentions, 
the State ―became the vehicle for the democratization of religion. In a sense the democratic 
State was the vehicle through which the community of believers acquired interpretative 
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authority over many of the requirements of their religion.‖237 He therefore argues that 
reform was a process through which the State was given powers to protect and to regulate 
religion. 
 
As Mehta himself mentions, it was not entirely clear that unelected courts could claim 
democratic authority to speak for a community but suggests that in a parliamentary system 
the fact that court rulings were not overruled could be presented as some presumptive 
evidence that they were representative of the views of the larger community. The other way 
of claiming democratic authority was through what Mehta calls the paradoxical 
consolidation of Hindu identity. That is, the reforms were obviously aimed at excising 
undesirable aspects of the ‗Hindu‘ community and raised the possibility of speaking for the 
lower and untouchable castes. However, in asserting this authority courts creates a unified 
authority which had never previously existed – ―one single territorially based community 
welded together to a coherent body of law by a uniformity of laws overriding particular 
customs‖238 
 
Unlike Galanter, Mehta places a greater emphasis on reconstructing the political 
significance of the normative vision of constitutional reform. Thus the consolidation of the 
Hindu religious identity is presented as a paradox within his account. However, the nature 
of this paradox is not entirely clear. It could be that the paradox is produced by the fact that 
reforms in the name of excising unethical aspects of the Hindu religion also produces a 
unified Hindu identity which is capable of being politically mobilised as a force of 
intolerance. Alternatively the paradox could perhaps be posed as the inability of the 
religious model that the Constitution makes normative, to encapsulate the numerous 
customary traditions that constitute the Indian religious landscape. 
 
In the next couple of chapters I will argue that the interpretative mode of the constitution 
does not pose a paradox, especially when it is located in its historical trajectory. The 
                                                 
237
 Mehta, ―Passion and Constraint: Courts and the Regulation of Religious Meaning,‖ 328. 
238
 Ibid., 328-29. 
130 
 
consolidation of religious identities was a historical process that traces back to regimes 
through which religion was regulated in the British colonial State. That is, reform was 
constituted as the reformulation of the Hindu religion when many aspects of the reform 
project could just as well be cast as reforms of unethical practices obtaining in Indian 
society more generally. The case for interrogating the historical origins of what after 
Galanter can be called the ‗interventionist mode‘ for regulating religion is made more 
apparent in the work of anti-modern or Post-colonial scholars whose work I discuss in the 
next section. 
 
3.4. Post-Colonial Accounts of Indian Secularism 
This class of scholarship points to the influence of colonialism or of European intellectual 
models in the formation of the Indian secular State. More importantly, it points to the 
difficulties and challenges faced by the secular State as it has embedded itself as a political 
value in the practice of the Indian Constitution. As I will show, this class of arguments 
about the secular State inevitably entails (though not always explicitly) the consideration of 
historico-sociological accounts of the manner in which the secular State took shape in the 
Indian institutional horizon. In this section I look at the work of three scholars – T.N. 
Madan, Ashish Nandy and Partha Chatterjee, all of whom address the challenges posed by 
India's secular institutional and governmental inheritance in slightly different ways. 
 
Along with the scholarship of the descriptivist scholars, the work of these scholars 
substantially anticipates and forms my hypothesis on the dynamic of the secular State in 
India. Thus it is my case that these sections outline the directions in which existing 
scholarship ought to be extended to explain the challenge posed by the first two chapters. 
That is, why is the Indian secular State disposed to the doctrinalisation of Indian religious 
traditions and the sacralisation of its constitutional practice? 
 
Both Nandy and Madan attack secularism and the secular State as being fundamentally at 
odds with the manner in which Indian society is organised. Commenting on secularism in 
India, Madan states that 
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(s)ecularism is the dream of a minority that wishes to shape the majority in its own 
image but lacks the power to do so under a democratically organised polity. In an 
open society the state will reflect the character of the society. … From the point of 
view of the majority, secularism is a vacuous word, a phantom concept, ... For the 
secularist minority to stigmatize the majority as primordially oriented and to preach 
secularism to the latter as the law of human existence is moral arrogance.... because 
it fails to recognize the immense importance of religion in the lives of the peoples of 
South Asia.
239
 
Madan draws his canvas roughly and broadly but the thrust of his argument asserts that the 
secular State has no cultural resonance with a majority of Indians because ―the great 
majority of the people of South Asia are in their own eyes active adherents of some 
religious faith.‖240 The secular State also has a place for religion but, as Madan argues, one 
that is largely privatised and shaped by the intellectual force of the Protestant Reformation. 
 
As Madan points out, the Lutheran and Calvinist theology which inspired the Protestant 
Reformation saw ‗religion‘ as grounded primarily in individual faith and through the de-
linking of the Church from the jurisdictional powers it previously held in Catholic Europe. 
This kind of privatised religion was at odds with ‗religion‘ as it was practised by most 
Indians. However, when latched onto processes such as the ‗enlightenment‘ and 
‗modernisation‘, Protestant conceptions of religion were imposed on non-Christian and 
non-western societies. Madan emphasises that he is no cultural relativist and that he has no 
objections to ideas that derive from another cultural context purely because of its 
provenance. However, he makes a distinction between the mere transfer of an idea from its 
translation into one that resonates with the context to which it is being transplanted. Thus 
the challenge that secularism poses in a comparative cultural context is that of finding the 
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appropriate means for its expression.
241
 
 
The translation of western ideas in ways that find resonance in India is not the task of the 
present discussion and is perhaps a task that awaits scholarship concerned with outlining 
distinct or exceptional conceptions of toleration in Indian society and in politics.
242
 
However, I suggest that the dissonance that Madan points out between Protestant and 
Indian conceptions of religion maps onto the dynamic of the Indian secular State which 
compels the transformation of religion understood as tradition and ritual into religion 
founded in truth and essence. The implications of this Protestant notion of religion on 
Indian society are less clear in Madan's work and it is here that the work of Nandy assumes 
significance. 
 
Nandy focuses on the manner in which the intellectual dominance of secularism as an idea 
impacts upon Indian traditions.
243
 According to him, secularism is one among a cluster of 
concepts that illustrate the imperialism of knowledge structures in the post-colonial world. 
One of the most telling effects of this colonial structure of knowledge is the manner in 
which the hegemony of Western ideas causes whole domains of knowledge to vanish from 
the awareness of the colonised people. He illustrates this hegemony of knowledge in the 
case of secularism by demonstrating the manner in which the conception of religion as it is 
conceptualised by official discourses of Indian secularism marginalises religion as it is 
associated with the Indian traditions. 
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To explain his case Nandy suggests two ways of thinking about religion in contemporary 
India. First, ‗religion as faith‘ which is associated with the plural ways in which religion is 
practised by most Indians and second, ‗religion as ideology‘ associated with ―one or more 
texts which, rather than the ways of life of the believers, then become the final identifiers of 
the pure forms of the religions.‖244 He argues that ‗religion as ideology‘ has taken historical 
roots in India over the last two centuries by instituting itself into State conceptions of 
religion, besides also being the dominant intellectual prism of the Indian middle classes. As 
a result, he claims, secularism in India has little to say about Indian religious cultures and 
more significantly that religion as ideology is often ―definitionally ethnophobic and 
frequently ethnocidal, unless of course cultures and those living by cultures are willing to 
show total subservience to the modern nation state.‖245 
 
Though Nandy's evidence is often only anecdotal, insofar as he speaks of secularism 
implying the establishment of ‗religion as ideology‘ over ‗religion as faith‘, his analysis 
quite distinctly maps onto my hypothesis in chapters 1 and 2 regarding the disposition to 
reformulate traditional Indian religions as they has been engendered by the Indian secular 
State. In contrast to Madan, who is more sceptical of the ability of the secular State to 
secularise Indian religion, Nandy thinks that the secular State has the capacity to be actively 
destructive of Indian religious traditions and even actively generative of religious discord. 
 
Thus he responds to the secular State by making an unabashed case for the affirmation of 
the traditional ways of life which he claims have 
... over the centuries developed internal principles of tolerance, and these principles 
must have a play in contemporary politics. This response affirms that religious 
communities in traditional societies have known how to live with one another. It is 
not modern India which has tolerated Judaism in India for nearly two thousand 
years, Christianity from before the time it went to Europe, and Zoroastrianism for 
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over twelve hundred years; it is traditional India which has shown such tolerance.
246
 
That is, Nandy responds to the secular State by signalling the significance of forms of 
tolerance that are different from that produced by the secular State. 
 
Nandy‘s account though intuitively appealing is largely based on anecdotal evidence. 
Additionally, he provides no account of what makes for the capacious Indian forms of 
tolerance, or of how it differs from the manner in which the liberal secular State envisions 
toleration. He does of course point out that the mobilisation of identity around conceptions 
of ‗religion as ideology‘ might play a crucial causal role in the large scale instances of 
religious violence witnessed in contemporary India. However, he provides no explanation 
or account for why the secular State is committed to producing ‗religion as ideology.‘ Thus 
in the next couple of chapters I try to extend Nandy‘s account and argue that the disposition 
to reform Indian religious traditions is tied to colonial models of toleration which could 
extend toleration only when a religious tradition and especially the Hindu religious 
traditions were reformulated in terms of foundational doctrines. 
 
The scholarship of Partha Chatterjee acquires significance against the background of the 
work of both Nandy and Madan. Like Madan and Nandy, Chatterjee also agrees that the 
search for appropriate models of toleration in the practices and politics of the secular State 
might be counterproductive and work at cross purposes. Addressing the specific Indian 
problem of extreme nationalist politics, Chatterjee raises the question whether secularism is 
―an adequate, or even appropriate, ground on which to meet the political challenge of 
Hindu Majoritarianism.‖247  
 
Chatterjee‘s essay on secularism is set against the challenge of Hindu majoritarian or 
hindutva politics and suggests that hindutva 
... in its most sophisticated forms …. seeks to mobilize on its behalf the will of an 
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interventionist modernizing state, in order to erase the presence of religious or 
ethnic particularism from the domains of law or public life, and supply, in the name 
of ‗national culture‘, a homogenized content to the notion of citizenship.248  
Chatterjee therefore recognises the modernising or secularising impact of the Indian State 
and points to the manner in which hindutva politics piggybacks on the secular modern 
State.  
 
Thus he is in broad agreement with Nandy‘s thesis that secularism is rolled together with 
modern State practices which promote ‗religion as ideology‘ and do not necessarily 
promote toleration. However he disagrees with Nandy‘s argument that the solution to the 
problems generated by modern religious identities lies in exploring aspects of everyday 
toleration in Indian religious traditions in the hope that the State systems of South Asia 
might learn something from these traditions. Instead he presents his project as one that 
seeks ―political possibilities within the domain of the modern State institutions as they now 
exist in India.‖249 (emphasis in original) 
 
Chatterjee‘s account of the emergence of the modern State in South Asia is far more 
extensive than either Madan or Nandy.
250
 Therefore his work is significant because he is far 
more invested in accounting for the specific form taken by the secular State as it embedded 
itself into Indian constitutional practice. However, unlike both Madan and Nandy, who 
suggest reliance on native forms of toleration in their approach to understanding and 
responding to the secular State in India, Chatterjee suggests that this option is not 
politically available. Instead he argues that the secular State in India be understood in terms 
of a distinct Indian modernity that is shaped by European ideas and that this modernity is 
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the only ground on which a scheme of toleration can be built. 
 
As I have already mentioned in chapter 1, Chatterjee suggests that the Indian constitutional 
practice of the secular State is inconsistent with the liberal democratic scheme on religious 
liberty and the secular State. However, though the normative liberal account cannot come to 
grips with the Indian situation, it can be suitably re-worked to account for the manner in 
which it acquires meaning in India. The burden of recasting the secular State as it acquires 
meaning in Indian political practice is placed on Michel Foucault‘s idea of 
‗governmentality‘. 
 
In the concept of ‗governmentality‘ Chatterjee claims that he has an account of the modern 
State that resists appropriation by the liberal account of the State. That is, this account 
provides an account of modern power that cuts across the liberal divide between State and 
civil society, targets the well-being of populations, and operates through the mode of an 
instrumental notion of economy through the apparatus of an elaborate network of 
surveillance.
251
 Chatterjee reads Foucault as saying that this framework of modern power is 
marked by a process called the ‗governmentalization of the state.‘ That is, modern power is 
marked by the enveloping of juridical sovereign power by technologies of government. 
 
This extensive governmental power allows the State enormous flexibility to deploy 
coercion and to secure consent. However, Chatterjee claims that governmentality does not 
entirely envelop juridical sovereignty and it is at these sites that assertions of minority 
communities for cultural rights are made possible. At these points, Chatterjee argues, liberal 
forms of government reach their limits because various communities are able to assert, on 
the ground of sovereign power, a right not to offer reasons for their difference. The right not 
to offer a reason for cultural difference would seem from the perspective of the liberal 
democratic State a concession to cultural relativism. However, Chatterjee presents this as 
the predicament of engaging with governmental power – that is, resisting governmental 
power invites the claim of being unreasonable. 
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Chatterjee however argues that the charge of cultural relativism can be overcome through 
internal democracy within communities. That is, he argues that a community can claim 
toleration for its own practices from others as a matter of right only if it can demonstrates 
that it tolerates its own members. As he says, ―toleration here would be premised on 
autonomy and respect for persons, but it would be sensitive to the varying political salience 
of the institutional contexts in which reasons are debated.‖252  
 
It is important to recognise that Chatterjee‘s reworked conception of modern power 
attempts to formulate a conception of the secular and tolerant State that can be defended in 
terms of existing constitutional practices but without resorting to liberal justification. 
Therefore the question of toleration is framed in terms of minority and community rights 
because that is how the existing constitutional arrangement understands and defends 
conceptions of Indian citizenship. As I have already mentioned in the previous two chapters 
the Indian State has historically been organised in terms of minority rights for a whole 
range of legally specified communities as well as separate religion based personal laws for 
various religious communities. That is, minorities and others groups are ―an actually 
existing category of Indian citizenship – constitutionally defined, legally administered, and 
politically invoked at every opportunity.‖253 Therefore, through ideas like governmentality 
and internal democracy within communities, Chatterjee attempts to recuperate the existing 
form of the secular State in a way that gets around its formulation in normative liberal 
theory. 
 
Normative liberalism however poses problems for Chatterjee in a manner quite different 
from either Madan or Nandy. While Chatterjee recognises the modernising or reforming 
power of the modern State, he believes that the Indian practice elaborates a different 
conception of the secular State. It is this new conception of secularism that forces him to re-
describe the liberal account of the secular State. Recounting this problem in a recent essay 
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he mentions that ―...while the secular State is a central feature of the constitutional 
structure, its practice has come to mean neither the mutual separation of State and religion 
nor the strict neutrality of the state. Rather, an altogether new norm of the modern secular 
State seems to have emerged…‖254 This assertion however raises questions about the nature 
of this newness in the concept of secularism produced by the practice of secularism in post-
colonial India. 
 
Unlike Chatterjee, I have tried to suggest that there is no new ‗concept‘ of secularism but 
only practices that try to reformulate Indian society so that it can be made intelligible to the 
conceptual universe of modern liberal ideas. Though Chapters 1 and 2 are illustrations of 
my position it is perhaps useful to illustrate this through Chatterjee‘s analytical framework 
itself. According to Chatterjee minority rights are a site where communities resist the 
expanding and enveloping powers of the governmentalising State. However, minorities are 
categories that the Indian State has inherited from the colonial State and are 
governmentalised categories themselves. Further, as I demonstrated in chapter 2, this 
governmentalised categorisation of the minorities excluded the claims of various ‗Hindu‘ 
groups even if they empirically satisfied the criteria of being a minority. Therefore, even if 
Indians have adopted these governmentalised categories, it is not apparent that various 
Indian communities have been able to assert their sovereignty through these categories and 
generate a new conception of the Indian secular State. 
 
In contrast to Chatterjee, the work of Nandy, Madan as well my own description of the 
practice of Indian secularism in chapters 2 and 3 have emphasised the effects of adopting 
the concept clusters associated with the secular State. Though I am not competent to speak 
of the structures of native toleration I will try to extend my argument that the adoption of 
the secular State doctrinalises and distorts Indian traditions. Thus by extending my 
discussion of the Satsangi case I will also argue that the attempt to establish the foundations 
of the Indian and especially the Hindu religious traditions also produces a distortion of 
these social forms. 
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Explaining the distortion of Indian social forms is the scholarly burden undertaken by both 
Nandy and Madan. Thus though their engagement with actual State practice was rather 
thin, they have been able to capture the dynamic of the secular State in a far more accurate 
manner than Chatterjee. Either way, the historical emergence of the secular State is 
significant to both their accounts although in different ways. In the subsequent chapters I 
will attempt to detail this history in order to provide an explanatory account of the 
disposition of the secular State to doctrinalise Indian religious traditions as I have outlined 
it earlier. To do so, the insights of Nandy and Madan will be appropriately extended though 
this cannot be done except in argument with Chatterjee. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
In concluding this chapter it is perhaps useful to summarise the various strands of 
argumentation regarding the secular State that I have outlined in this chapter and the extent 
to which they will be carried into the subsequent chapters. The problem that this chapter 
sought to outline was the manner in which the selected strands of scholarship on the Indian 
secular State were situated in relation to its reforming disposition as I had outlined it in the 
previous chapters. 
 
I began the chapter by describing the normative approaches to the secular State and 
demonstrated the manner in which normative conceptions of the secular State mask the 
historical or the sociological dynamic of the secular State if not actively obstructing the task 
of generating an explanation of the practices of the secular State in India. On the other hand 
the exceptionalist arguments of the Indian secular State suggest that the secular State in 
India was entirely free of the secular State as it developed in Western Europe. However, I 
argue that even if there are culturally distinct and Indian forms of arguing for toleration, the 
exceptionalist form of argument does not explain the secular State as it exists and its 
disposition to reform religion understood as tradition into religion founded on essential 
practices. Thus the normative and the exceptionalist strands of argument are not carried 
forward into the next couple of chapters. 
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I therefore carry forward the task of explaining the dispositions of the secular State through 
the strands of scholarship that I have termed descriptivist and post-colonial. These strands 
of scholarship make salient the task of explaining the secular State as a historical and 
political task. Through the work of scholars like Marc Galanter, Pratap Mehta, T. N. 
Madan, Ashish Nandy and Partha Chatterjee I have outlined important points of arrival and 
departure in this larger task of explaining the emergence of secular constitutionalism in 
India. 
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4. Towards a Genealogy of Liberal Toleration in India 
 
In the present chapter I shift the course of the thesis more explicitly towards an explanatory 
account of the peculiar reforming disposition of the Indian secular State. To do so I will 
outline the genealogy of the Indian secular State. I consciously use the word ‗genealogy‘ as 
opposed to ‗history‘ because I do not trace the origin and evolution of the secular State as 
much as I try to identify the conditions that give ‗reform‘ intelligibility. In an essay on the 
Enlightenment Michel Foucault describes the genealogical approach to the past as one that 
is oriented towards identifying the ―contemporary limits of the necessary.‖255 Following 
this approach I do not narrate the evolution of a historically constituted object – the Indian 
secular State. Instead I try to outline important aspects of the conditions which made it 
possible for the reforming scheme of the secular State to emerge as the constituted object I 
have identified in the previous chapters. 
 
Methodologically I outline the making of the secular State in India by drawing especially 
on the ‗normative‘ and the ‗post-colonial‘ accounts of the secular State which I outlined in 
chapter 4. Through the normative account I identify the reforming secular State as the 
object I study in the present chapter. That is, I proceed on the assumption that the secular 
State in India is a project involving the institutionalisation of liberal norms accompanied by 
the demands for the social reform of Indian religious traditions. The descriptivist and anti-
colonial account on the other hand are significant because of their refusal to accept the 
norms of the secular State as universal values and its insistence on uncovering the manner 
in which the contemporary secular condition is constituted. I believe that these methods of 
studying the secular State will allow me to locate and explain the manner in which the 
reforming liberal framework of the secular State was constituted in contemporary India.  
 
Thus in this chapter and the next I will undertake two tasks – first, provide an account of 
the emergence of normative or liberal toleration as a reforming project in the British 
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colonial State. Second, I will outline the manner in which the reformed religio-legal 
identities produced by the secular State were drawn into the political institutions in British 
India. Through the course of this thesis I have argued that the reforming disposition of the 
Indian secular State operated as a semantic veneer that screened off Indian social 
experience and especially those of Indian traditional religions. Consequently in the next 
two chapters I describe how this process of distancing Indian social experience from the 
discursive structure of the Indian secular State was made possible. 
 
4.1. Toleration as a Moral Imperative for Government 
As I have already argued in the introductory chapter and in chapter 3, it is not tenable to 
speak of the liberal secular State as having multiple meanings or as referring to a 
fundamentally different kind of object. Instead I suggested that reference to the secular 
State refers to the same object that manifested differently in different contexts. The only 
possibility of speaking about a different kind of secular State arose in the context of the 
exceptional accounts grounded in ‗Indian‘ traditions of toleration. However, these accounts 
of toleration are entirely distinct from the Indian secular State as it is organised around the 
project of religious reform as I had identified it in the previous chapters. Thus the object 
whose reforming disposition I will explain in this chapter is the secular State committed to 
the political values of liberty, equality and neutrality and to that of religious reform. 
 
As both Nandy and Madan point out, the normative scheme of the secular State grew out of 
the complex religious and political changes that came over Western Europe in the aftermath 
of the Protestant reformation. In a fascinating article on the manner in which these changes 
are significant for the making of secularism in India, DeRoover and Balagangadhara note 
the emergence of tolerance as a moral value in post-reformation Europe. Their claim is 
important in the context of my argument because they demonstrate their case by showing 
that similar value based claims about toleration emerged in the colonies under the 
administration of the British East India Company (hereafter the Company). I attribute the 
reformist disposition of the Indian secular State to this form of toleration that was brought 
to bear on the early administration of the Company in India. However I must first clarify 
what is implied in the assertion that toleration emerged as a moral value. 
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DeRoover and Balagangadhara present the case of toleration emerging as a moral value in 
the following manner: 
Right up to the sixteenth century, toleration of heretics was a temporary expedience 
at best. Catholic theologians and canon lawyers conceived tolerantia as non-
interference in certain immoral acts (like prostitution) and with the Judaic worship 
in order to prevent greater evils: adultery, rape and forceful conversion. During the 
Reformation, irenic thinkers like Erasmus considered that granting civil tolerance to 
the different Christian ‗sects‘ was a judicious step in avoiding civil war. This was to 
be a transient phase in the restoration of Christian unity. The Politiques in France 
and elsewhere provided an independent temporal purpose to the state, which should 
not be subordinated to the demands of religious unity. None of these groups 
perceived toleration as a moral ideal. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
century, however, several thinkers began to argue that religious toleration was the 
duty of all states, and that the liberty of conscience was the right of all individuals... 
256
 (emphasis added) 
I do not attempt to assess their claim that toleration emerged as a moral value in Western 
Europe in the 16
th
 century. However, my claims in this chapter are indebted to their further 
and supporting claim that toleration as a moral value emerged as a principle guiding the 
administration of the Company. 
 
The earliest European powers in India like the Portuguese (in Goa) and the Dutch (in Sri 
Lanka) were known to have engaged in forcible conversions and actively limited native 
religious activity in the 15th and early 16th centuries.
257
 By contrast a significant aspect of 
Company governance in India was its stated policy of tolerance for the religious traditions 
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of the people they governed. Large sections of the early Company administration argued for 
the toleration of Indian religious practices and even made the religious laws of these 
communities the basis for colonial jurisdiction over their Indian possessions. In this chapter 
I provide a synoptic account of colonial tolerance for different religious or personal laws 
and demonstrate that this toleration is part of a scheme of toleration as norm or as a moral 
value. Most importantly I also suggest that it has played an important role in the reforming 
structure assumed by the contemporary Indian secular State. 
 
An important aspect of British colonial government in India was the fact that it legitimated 
its legal authority by governing the ‗native‘ through his very own laws and customs. This 
attitude to local laws and customs traces back to the earliest legal institutions of the 
Company. Well before the company had any significant governmental power in India, 
Company officials expressed their opposition to provisions of the Charter of 1726 which 
seemed to permit the Mayors‘ courts258 to adjudicate disputes between natives through 
English common law.
259
 As a result of this opposition the subsequent charter issued in 1753 
explicitly stated that the Mayors‘ courts were not permitted to try cases between Indians 
without the consent of both parties to a dispute. Rankin presents this as the first instance of 
the ―reservation of their own laws and customs to Indians.‖260 This policy of deference to 
the native laws continued through the years of company rule and was a defining feature of 
British colonial rule even after the Crown assumed direct charge after the revolt of 1857. I 
argue that normative toleration was a crucial component of the British policy of deferring to 
indigenous religio-legal forms. 
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Explicit government deference to, and tolerance for, native laws is however generally dated 
from Warren Hastings‘ attempts to consolidate the Company‘s judicial government of its 
Indian subjects. In Hastings‘ judicial plan for Bengal in 1772 it was stated that  
... in suits regarding Inheritance, Marriage, Cast, and other religious usages or 
institutions, the laws of the Koran with respect to the Mahometans, and those of the 
Shaster with respect to Gentoos, shall be invariably adhered to: on all such 
Occassions, the Moulavies or Brahmins shall respectively attend to expound the 
Law, and they shall sign the Report and assist in passing the Decree.
261
 
As I have mentioned, this policy was continually reaffirmed through the course of colonial 
rule in India. Thus after the revolt of 1857 when the British Crown assumed direct rule of 
India, it was proclaimed that all Indian subjects could practise their religious traditions free 
from interference and that laws for India would be made having due regard to the ‗rights, 
usages and customs of India‘.262 Elaborating the toleration accorded to Indian religio-legal 
forms I demonstrate that this regime of governing Indian religions was committed to 
normative toleration. However, before I do so I first distinguish my account from some 
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standard accounts of colonial toleration. 
 
First, prefacing a popular introduction to the study of the colonial legal system in British 
India, George Rankin, one time Chief Justice of the High Court at Calcutta wrote that ―Not 
many people in this country have any settled notion of what we are doing in India 
administering law to Indians, nor have means of readily acquiring a well-founded notion of 
how we came to be doing so or of the principles which we apply.‖263 Writing at the close of 
two centuries of British rule in India, Rankin seems to suggest that expedience, pragmatism 
and the demands of specific contexts drove British government in India. John Seeley 
expresses this sentiment more elegantly in his famous quote that the colonial project was 
put together in ‗a fit of absence of mind‘.264 
 
Colonial arguments for toleration were interspersed with both normative and pragmatic 
arguments. For instance there was a strong belief that toleration and the respect for local 
customs would further the commercial interests of the East India Company by maintaining 
social stability. Expressing one such opinion Nathaniel Halhed, the compiler of the first 
Hindu legal code in colonial India, observes that the interest in commerce  
... awakened the attention of the British Legislature to every circumstance that may 
conciliate the affections of the natives, or ensure the stability to the acquisition. 
Nothing can so favourably conduce to these two points as a well timed toleration in 
matters of religion, and an adoption of such original institutes of the country, as do 
not immediately clash with the Laws or interests of the Conquerers.
265
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Similarly William Bolts distinguishes British colonial government from that of the 
Portuguese by suggesting that  
...the Portugueze had enthusiastically demolished the Idols of the Gentoos, and by 
persecutions endeavoured to abolish their customs, nay, and even to force them to 
the profession of the Christian religion, which could not but be destructive of all 
commercial intercourse
266
 
However, I will demonstrate that normative arguments accompanied these pragmatic and 
expedient defences of toleration. That is, I argue that colonial law and government were 
also framed by normative principles and the historical legacy of such principles. 
 
Second, I also distinguish my case about normative toleration from an influential strand of 
post-colonial scholarship which argues that the colonialism or colonial government was a 
knowledge project tied to colonial power. The work of Bernard Cohn is perhaps the best 
exemplar of this argument. Speaking of colonialism as a framework of knowledge, Cohn‘s 
work suggests the exciting and useful possibility of understanding colonialism as a 
‗structured‘ framework of knowledge.267 However, in accounting for the relationship 
between colonial domination and colonial knowledge, Cohn claims ―the conquest of India 
was a conquest of knowledge. ... knowledge which the conquerors defined as useful for 
their own ends.‖ (emphasis added) I argue that this account fails because of its inability to 
make a sufficiently sharp distinction between knowledge and power, and its inability to 
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explain the manner in which the exercise of power is itself shaped by forms of knowledge. 
Like Cohn I also argue that colonialism is a framework of knowledge adopted by the 
colonising power to characterise the colonised. However, my account is distinct from 
Cohn‘s in that I try to interrogate the manner in which colonial knowledge determines the 
conceptual frames within which colonial interests are pursued. In other words I do not deny 
the significance of power but emphasise and flag the significance of the discursive and 
theoretical bounds within which the exercise of power was made possible. 
 
In the following sections I demonstrate that colonial toleration was normatively driven and 
explore the effects of this policy at two levels. First, through the archetypal example of Sati 
(wife burning), I demonstrate the manner in which the eventual proscription of this practice 
in 1829 was born out of the colonial policy of normative toleration. That is, I show that 
colonial toleration intersected with this social practice to transform its representation as the 
religious truth embodied in the religious laws of the Hindus. Second, through debates on 
the making of Anglo-Hindu law I demonstrate that specific practices like Sati were set in 
the broader framework in which the ethical framework of the Dharma Shastra tradition 
(science of right action) was mistranslated or reformed in colonial discourse as the religious 
laws of the Hindus. 
 
4.2. Founding Practice: The Colonial Reformulation of Sati 
The colonial debate on the practice of Sati or widow immolation is a particularly instructive 
example illustrating the colonial policy of normative toleration on India as well as its 
effects on Indian religious traditions. Until the practice was legally banned in 1829 it was 
consistently tolerated by colonial policy despite the unanimous belief of almost all colonial 
officials that the practice was morally repugnant. In this section I am concerned with a 
particular question that structured the colonial discourse on Sati. That is, did the practice of 
Sati constitute a part of the true religious laws of the Hindu religion? 
 
While expressing his horror about the practice of Sati the District Collector of Shahabad in 
1789 noted that ―the rites and superstitions of the Hindoo religion should be allowed with 
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the most unqualified tolerance‖ according to existing government policy. The collector had 
restrained practice of Sati but was unsure of the course of action that he had pursued and 
therefore asked for government approval of his order. In response the government at 
Calcutta instructed him that  
... they are desirous he should exert all his private influence to dissuade the natives 
from a practice so repugnant to humanity and the first principles of religion, they do 
not deem it advisable to authorize him to prevent the observance of it by coercive 
measures, or by any exertions of his official powers; as the public prohibition of a 
ceremony, authorized by the tenets of the religion of the Hindoos,...
268
 (emphasis 
added) 
The exhortation to persuade the natives was reiterated again by the Governor General when 
they signalled approval of the actions of James Rattray, the acting magistrate of Midnapore 
who dissuaded a widow from committing Sati. Thus the moral repugnance that the practice 
evoked in the colonial administration was tempered by the belief that Sati was a part of the 
religious laws of the Hindus and therefore worthy of toleration. 
 
However, there was a degree of ambivalence about whether a practice they held to be so 
barbarous could indeed be part of the religion of the Hindus. Thus in 1805 the Nizamat 
Adalat or provincial criminal court was asked by the Governor General in Council to 
ascertain through the Hindu pundits attached to the Diwani Adalat (the civil disputes court) 
whether Sati was founded in the religious laws of the Hindus.
269
 In response the court 
expressed the opinion that ―the practice of widows burning themselves with the bodies of 
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their deceased husbands is founded on the religious notions of the Hindoos, and is 
expressly stated with approbation, in their law.‖270 Thus though there were some early 
debates among colonial officials on whether Sati was a religious practice of the Hindus, by 
the early years of the 19th century most of the debate on Sati proceeded on the assumption 
that it was religiously sanctioned.
271
 
 
It is odd however, that colonial legal practice should have tolerated Sati on the grounds that 
it was permitted in the religious laws of the Hindus. This is because the act could have been 
penalised as a homicide under the Anglo-Islamic criminal law which governed crime in 
colonial India until the enactment of the Indian Penal Code in 1860. According to section 3, 
Regulation 8 of 1799, it was stated that ―it shall not justify any prisoner convicted of wilful 
homicide, that he or she was desired by the party slain to put him or her to death‖. 
However, the Nizamat Adalat (the criminal court) clarified that this section did not apply to 
Sati or to the suicide of lepers because these acts had the sanction of the shastras.
272
 This 
seems to suggest that an exception to the applicable criminal law was made out through 
judicial practice, clearly pointing to the weight attached to the toleration of recognised 
religious practices like Sati. However, my concerns centre on the manner in which the 
colonial government tolerated Sati. 
 
Following the opinion of the pundits that Sati was part of the religious laws of the Hindus, 
the Nizamat Adalat in concord with the Governor General in council issued a set of 
directions to the police which were the guiding principles regulating the practice until it 
was banned in 1829. According to those directions 
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(t)he ceremony denominated suttee (at which Hindu women burn themselves) 
certain acts have been occasionally committed in direct opposition to the rules laid 
down in the religious institutes of the Hindoos, by which that practice is authorized 
and forbidden in particular cases; as for instance, at several places pregnant women 
and girls not yet arrived at their full age, have been burnt alive; and people after 
having intoxicated women, by administering intoxicating substances, have burnt 
them without their assent, whilst insensible; and as much as this conduct is contrary 
to the Shaster, and perfectly inconsistent with every principle of humanity ... , the 
police darogahs are hereby accordingly under the sanction of government, strictly 
enjoined to use the utmost care, and make every effort to prevent the forbidden 
practices above mentioned ...
273
 (emphasis added) 
That is, the practice ought to be tolerated because it was enjoined by the Hindu scripture 
though it had to be regulated strictly in accordance with the ‗truths‘ of the Hindu Shaster or 
religious law. In other words the practice was divided by the colonial establishment into the 
tolerated or the legally and scripturally permitted Satis and those that were not scripturally 
permitted and therefore illegal or liable to be treated as a criminal offence. 
 
Drawing on the expositions of the pundits attached to the courts the government decided 
that the most important criteria that constituted a valid Sati were that the practice be 
performed voluntarily and with the assent of the woman being committed to the flame.
274
 In 
this regard it is extremely important to note that the opinion the pundits attached to the 
court often spoke of Sati in highly localised and qualified terms. However, their qualified 
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responses to the questions of colonial officials were interpreted to mean that Sati was 
mandatorily enjoined by the Shastras.
275
 Lata Mani's pioneering work on Sati demonstrates 
the manner in which official assumptions on Sati shaped the responses of the pundits to the 
questions that were posed to them. That is, the pundits were coaxed and compelled to 
validate colonial scriptural assumptions about the practice. Thus colonial practice initiated a 
particular manner of interpreting Sati by privileging texts over customs, older texts over 
more recent ones, organising a hierarchy of the textual sources and so on. 
 
Mani demonstrates that the official assumption of the scriptural truth of the practice 
determined the manner in which the practice was considered and debated by the entire 
spectrum of intellectual opinion until it was eventually banned in 1829. Thus the official 
colonial position on the practice was therefore less interested in the social reality of the 
practice as it was in the status of the practice as a Hindu religious truth. Even the various 
strands of colonial opinion that opposed the practice for its barbarity argued against it not 
on grounds of cruelty but by demonstrating that the practice was invariably or inevitably 
performed involuntarily in contravention of scriptural rules. 
 
Mani however goes on to argue the standard thesis that colonial discourse was a product of 
colonial domination. In this respect this chapter differs from her account by positing that it 
was normative toleration that produced the specifically colonial discourse as witnessed in 
the case of the Sati debates of the early 19
th
 century. That is, normative toleration shaped 
the manner in which colonial domination was exercised over the practice of Sati. At the 
level of the broader debate Mani identifies three significant positions in the discussion 
leading to the abolition of Sati. These are the official position, the indigenous reformist 
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position and the indigenous opponents of reform, each of which I outline in what follows. 
 
Mani takes Walter Ewer‘s (the acting superintendent of police of the Lower Provinces) 
letter to W.B. Bayley, secretary to the government in the Judicial Department, written in 
November 1818, to be a good example that summed up the official position.
276
 Ewer, 
argued that ―… such an event, as a voluntary suttee, very rarely occurs;‖ that she was often 
a victim of ―the surrounding crowd of Hungry Brahmins and interested relations.‖277 In 
other words, an involuntary Sati had nothing to do with religious liberty but in fact 
contravened the Hindu religious law as it was known to the British. In addition Ewer also 
undertook a reading of classical Hindu jurists like Manu to argue that the religious texts of 
the Hindus recommended Sati but none enjoined it. 
 
Having undermined the scriptural basis for Sati he even drew from available empirical 
evidence to show that the incidence of Sati was largely restricted to a few districts like 
Calcutta, Shahbad, Sarun and Ghazipur. Therefore he tried to argue that the practice had no 
general significance for Hindus. However, the literature suggests that this empirical 
questioning of Sati did not undermine the significance of questions regarding the religious 
nature of Sati. Thus W. B. Bayley could be intrigued that adjoining districts could display 
wide discrepancies in the reported instances of Sati. Mani argues that this could only be 
because of the larger scriptural background in which the practice of Sati was located by the 
Company government.
278
 
 
Mani argues that the indigenous opinion on Sati formed something of a native public sphere 
which debated amongst itself as much as it spoke to the Company government. As she 
mentions 
(i)ndigenous discourse for and against sati was dispersed across a variety of texts, 
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their tenor and inflections shaped in part by the audience being addressed. ... In 
general, petitions to the government addressed the legality or illegality of sati. In 
them, opponents of widow burning emphasized its involuntary nature and only 
secondarily engaged questions of scripture, while proponents tended to integrate 
into a discussion of scripture, their claims regarding widow burning as a freely 
expressed and inalienable right of Hindus. By comparison, pamphlets on sati 
focused primarily on questions of scripture and turned only secondarily to the 
details of practice.
279
 
In petitions to the government on the legality of Sati it was perhaps not unexpected that the 
indigenous positions would attempt to mould their arguments in a manner that would be 
intelligible to the colonial State. However, Mani demonstrates that the nature of the 
indigenous debate was also gradually reformed along the lines of an increased 
scripturalisation of the practice. 
 
Ram Mohan Roy is Mani‘s archetypal instance of the Indian reformer who over years of 
interactions with the British government eventually came to argue against Sati in a manner 
quite similar to Ewer. Drawing from a tract published by Roy in 1830 Mani demonstrates 
how Roy‘s argument against Sati was constructed through a deep engagement with Hindu 
Upanishadic or scriptural literature. That is, he relied on Vedic texts attributed to the 
classical jurist Manu to argue that Sati is not imperatively enjoined by the Hindu religion. 
Similarly he also drew on classical Hindu law texts less authoritative than the Vedas and the 
Upanishads to argue that Sati was not an obligatory act even though it might be 
recommended in some of them. Having argued that Sati was not mandated by the 
scriptures, he also suggests that the incidence of Sati was caused by local reasons like the 
superior property rights that women enjoyed in Bengal under the Dayabhaga school of 
Hindu law.
280
 
 
Ram Mohan Roy therefore does not think that there is sufficient evidence in the scriptures 
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demanding or recommending the practice of Sati. It is important to note that he does not 
dispute that the Hindu classical texts are an appropriate way to determine whether the 
practice is legitimate or not. That is, he accepted the broader colonial account that founded 
the practices of Hindu society in the prescriptions of what was supposed to be Hindu 
classical or religious literature. Mani also demonstrates how Roy‘s forms of argumentation 
on divinity in general and the practice of Sati in particular changed over a fifteen year 
period from 1815 to 1829 as came into contact with the colonial establishment. As she 
notes, the earlier influences of Islamic rationalism which were also critical of ritual 
practices like Sati were replaced by a scriptural critique of these practices that derived from 
the colonial appreciation of Indian ritual practices. Arguments like those of Roy and Ewer 
eventually undermined the case that Sati ought to be tolerated and the practice was 
eventually banned by Governor General Bentinck in 1829. 
 
Protesting the ban imposed by Bentinck, a petition representing indigenous opposition 
argued that textual evidence was not crucial for the continuation of a custom. They argued 
that even though there was no scriptural mandate for a whole range of traditional practices 
like durga puja or dola jatra their performance was not inconsistent with the scriptures and 
that it would be impious not to perform these rituals. Presumably referring to the likes of 
Ram Mohan Roy they also argued that questions addressing issues relevant to the 
interpretation of sacred books and the authority of custom ought to be answered only by 
pious men. That is, the authority of customs could not be decided by ―men who have 
neither any faith nor care for the memory of their ancestors or their religion.‖281 
 
However, even this petition seemed to adopt the scripturally founded account of Sati when 
it argued that  
... the sacrifice of self immolation called suttee, which is not merely a sacred duty 
but is a high privilege to her who sincerely believes in the doctrines of their 
religion; and we humbly submit that any interference with a persuasion of so high 
and self-annihilating a nature, is … an unjust intolerant dictation in matters of 
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conscience ...
282
 (emphasis added) 
Nonetheless, the indigenous opposition to the ban on Sati clearly suggest that the practice 
could be understood as a traditional practice which was not necessarily understood by the 
native supporters of Sati as scripturally founded.  
 
Treating Sati as a traditional practice was however a way of rendering and interpreting the 
practice that the scriptural approach marginalised. This marginalisation is perhaps better 
explained through the position taken by Mrityunjay Vidyalankar a pundit at the Nizamat 
Adalat at Calcutta who gave an opinion to the Court that Sati was of ambiguous or low 
scriptural value. However, he also refused to go further along that line of argument and 
declare that the practice ought to be abolished or morally devalued.
283
 Vidyalankar‘s 
support for the pro Sati position would seem contradictory from the point of view of a 
scripturally founded doctrinal view of the practice. However, as I have repeatedly 
maintained traditional religious practices are understood not on grounds of foundational 
truth but merely on the grounds that a practice has been passed on through generations. 
Thus the forms of arguing about the legitimacy and permissibility of the practice would 
also be determined by this traditional character. However, the colonial forms of interpreting 
the practice of Sati were founded on the scriptural truth of the practice and could not 
comprehend the form in which Vidyalankar, and indeed many other pundits attached to 
colonial courts, responded to colonial questions on the scriptural status of Sati within the 
Hindu religion. 
 
By viewing the practice of Sati as the true religious law of the Hindus the colonial 
government drew a reflexive relationship of truth between the practice of Sati and the 
religious laws of the Hindus. The reflexive relationship of truth was not restricted to the 
practice of Sati. The annual reports submitted to parliament since record keeping on Sati 
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began in 1815 makes for fascinating reading on the centrality of scriptural truth in the 
determination of the manner in which Indian practices came to be considered as fit for 
toleration. 
 
Thus a Muslim man who buried alive his leprosy afflicted mother-in-law was convicted for 
committing a homicide; however, the courts suggested that the same decision would not 
apply to Hindus because ―in the case of the Hindoos it is countenanced and enjoined by 
their religion.‖284 Similarly in the case of human sacrifice made to the river Ganges, it was 
held that the practice could not be stopped among the aged and the infirm, since it was 
considered by the Hindus to be part of their religious books.
285
 However, where the victim 
was a child it was to be considered to be a criminal act and an 1802 law declared all 
persons who committed or assisted such acts guilty of murder.
286
 The logic of colonial 
toleration was so clearly driven by the search for scriptural foundation that even a custom 
of long standing was not accepted as a good reason for toleration. For instance in a case of 
women belonging to the Jogee caste who buried themselves along with their dead 
husbands, colonial judges took the opinion that the practice ought to be stopped as it was 
not permitted by the scripture despite recognising this to be a practice of long standing 
among the Jogees.
287
 Colonial toleration was therefore a curious disposition of the colonial 
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government that was not only based on the pragmatism and prudence. On the contrary the 
disposition to tolerate native practices only on the demonstration that such practices were 
founded in the truth of Hindu religious law suggests the normative character of colonial 
toleration. 
 
In contemporary scholarship the scripturalisation of practices like Sati has been understood 
by scholars like Mani to be significant because it points to the ‗modernity‘ of tradition.288 
That is, it points to the manner in which conceptions of traditions are produced by very 
contemporary renderings and mistranslations of ‗traditional‘ practices. However, most of 
these accounts on the modernity of tradition often proceed to reduce their insights on the 
contemporary transformation of tradition as an effect of domination, often of imperial 
domination. By doing so these accounts are unable to specify the precise manner in which 
their conceptions of domination structure contemporary understandings of tradition. It is in 
this context that I have argued that colonial toleration posits a reflexive relationship of truth 
between Hindu religious practices and Hindu religious laws which in turn has transformed 
the representation of these religious traditions. 
 
To conclude this section I also suggest that the colonial response to Sati constitutes a model 
that has played a determining role in all subsequent debates on the reform of Hindu society. 
That is, the official reformulation of Indian traditions as embodiments of a true Hindu law 
has been an important aspect of the social reform process ever since it took this shape in the 
legal debates on Sati.
289
 Though this broader claim about the will to truth in colonial 
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toleration is only suggestive, I buttress the claim by demonstrating a similar colonial 
reformulation or misrecognition of the ethical-legal tradition contained in the dharma 
shastra, as positivist and religiously revealed laws on which the colonial administration 
believed Hindu traditions like Sati were founded. To do so I first outline the emergence of 
the personal law system in British India and of Hindu law as one of its constituent parts. 
 
4.3. Colonial Toleration and the making of Hindu Law 
The span of British rule in India extended from 1757 when the East India Company 
defeated the Nawab of Bengal to 1947 when the Government of Great Britain relinquished 
control over all its Indian territories to the independent nation States of India and Pakistan. 
During this period the East India Company governed India till the revolt of 1857 under the 
authority of the British parliament. After the revolt the Crown assumed direct control of 
British India. The judicial landscape right through the period of Company rule was 
extremely complex and varied and included charters and acts of Parliament, Indian 
legislation, Company Regulations, English Common Law and Ecclesiastical and Admiralty 
law, Hindu Law, Muslim Law and customary law. However, right through this period the 
Company and later the Imperial government gradually increased its judicial footprint and 
clarified its legal authority in India, resolving all interstitial disputes through the maxim 
‗justice, equity and good conscience‘.290 
 
After the charter of 1833 the Company government in India began an overtly stated process 
of reform or modernisation of the Indian legal system. This followed from the appointment 
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of a series of Indian Law Commissions which explored the possibility of systematising, 
simplifying and codifying large parts of the existing law.
291
 However, the actual process of 
codification of Indian law commenced only after the Crown assumed the government of 
India in 1858. In the period stretching from 1860 to the early part of the 1880s large parts 
of the commercial, criminal and procedural law were codified on the basis of British and 
largely utilitarian legal principles. The only areas of law that were exempted were the 
personal or religious laws of various communities. As I have mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, in this domain of law dealing with matters of Inheritance, Marriage, Caste, and 
other religious usages or institutions, the law applicable was not territorial but the personal 
or religious laws of the relevant communities.
292
 
 
It could be argued that codification and modernisation of Indian law in the 19th century 
emphasised the distinction between a public sphere where the colonial State asserted its 
absolute authority and a sphere in which it permitted personal laws as the private practices 
of religious communities. However, though the colonial legal system attempted to carve out 
a zone of toleration for personal laws, these laws were incorporated as a constituent part of 
the larger colonial legal system. Consequently the broader intellectual currents of colonial 
modernisation and reform impacted on these laws as well. Thus it is the reformed manner 
in which the personal laws were tolerated and incorporated into the legal system of British 
India that I explore and emphasise in the discussion that follows in this chapter. 
 
The first explicit step incorporating Indian personal law regimes into the colonial legal 
system is attributed to the policy of government toleration for native laws contained in 
Warren Hastings‘ judicial plan for Bengal in 1772. Commenting on this plan, Robert 
Travers notes that it inaugurated a radically new conception of sovereign government in 
India. The earlier Moghul system permitted a plurality of legal authority and was at ease 
with the State courts being one among other options in a wide variety of disputes. However, 
once approached, plurality was not countenanced within the Moghul court system. The 
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British colonial legal order differed from the Moghul legal scheme in that it incorporated 
indigenous legal forms into one common sovereign system of law and government.
293
 
 
Though the process of incorporating indigenous religio-legal forms into the colonial legal 
system was structured by the language of toleration, I demonstrate in this chapter that 
indigenous legal forms were not tolerated on their own terms but were reformulated as the 
true religious foundation of native practices. As with Sati, this ‗will to truth‘ in the colonial 
legal system demonstrates its mis-recognition of indigenous legal forms. Such a mis-
recognition lies at the heart of what is involved in the reformulation of these traditions as 
foundational truths and religious dogma. Though the search for the true scriptural 
foundations must have marked the making of all the major religio-legal traditions in 
India,
294
 in this chapter I focus only on the attempts to uncover the foundations of the 
Hindu religious law.
295
 
 
The early attempts to uncover the foundations of Indian religio-legal forms were 
undertaken by an extensive codification of Indian religious laws. This early codification of 
Indian religio-legal traditions was different from the efforts carried out in the latter part of 
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the 19th century in that the former was purportedly based on indigenous (in this case 
Hindu) legal traditions. Duncan Derrett describes this process as one through which the 
British emerged as patrons of a ―flourishing, but not assertive or brilliant tradition of sastric 
learning available both for intellectual exercise and for the direction of the Hindu 
public.‖296 The conceptual contours within which early codification was developed is 
attributed to the work of three scholar administrators of the Company – Nathaniel Halhed, 
William Jones and H.T. Colebrooke. All three viewed the toleration of native laws to be an 
important aspect of colonial governance and importantly each of them viewed this task as 
involving the determination of the true foundations of Hindu religious law. 
 
Having associated the foundations of Hindu Law with Dharma Sastric learning, the British 
had to make sense of this tradition whose ideas of law and justice were most unlike their 
own. Responding to this challenge, Warren Hastings began a process of codifying and 
consolidating the texts of the Sastric tradition to facilitate the administration of those areas 
of law reserved to be governed by the laws of the Hindus under his judicial plan of 1772. 
To codify Hindu law on marriage, inheritance and religious usages, eleven pundits were 
persuaded to compile a legal digest of these areas from the available Hindu legal literature. 
The results of this exercise, a Sanskrit text called the Vivadarnanva Setu or bridge across 
the ocean of litigation, was the first law code commissioned under the watch of the 
Company government. This text was later translated from its original Sanskrit to Persian 
and then from Persian it was translated to English by Nathaniel Halhed a civil servant with 
the Company.  
 
On finding Halhed‘s Code insufficient as a definitive guide to deal with the disputes that 
the Company had to address, William Jones undertook the next major exercise of codifying 
Hindu legal authorities, especially on contracts and inheritance, into one comprehensive 
digest. However, Jones died before he could complete the digest and that task was 
completed by H.T. Colebrooke. This new Sanskrit text was titled Vivadabhangarnava or ‗a 
break wave on the ocean of disputes‘. Besides completing Jones‘ digest Colebrooke is also 
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credited with organising the dharma shastras, the supposed Hindu legal texts, in the 
manner in which they are understood by the Indian legal system up to the present day. In 
this chapter I am particularly concerned with what these colonial administrators made of 
the texts that they designated the religio-legal foundation of the Hindu religious tradition. 
 
Prefacing his Code on Hindu Law, Nathaniel Halhed argued for its toleration, saying that 
... materials may be collected towards the legal accomplishment of a new system of 
government in Bengal, wherein the British laws may, in some degree, be softened 
and tempered by a moderate attention to the peculiar and national prejudices of the 
Hindoo; some of whose institutes, however fanciful and injudicious, may perhaps 
be preferable to any which could be substituted in their room. They are interwoven 
with the religion of the country, and are therefore revered as of the highest 
authority; They are the conditions by which they hold their rank in society. Long 
usage has persuaded them of their Equity, and they will always gladly embrace the 
permission to obey them;
297
 
That is, he viewed the laws of the Hindus as worthy of toleration because they are 
interwoven with the religion of the country and are therefore held to be of the ‗highest 
authority‘. 
 
Similarly, prefacing his translation of Culluca's rendition of the commentary on Hindu Law 
attributed to the Hindu jurist Manu, William Jones says that 
(i)t is a maxim in the science of legislation and government, that Laws ... unless 
they were congenial to the disposition and habits, to the religious prejudices, and 
approved immemorial usages of the people for whom they were enacted; especially 
if that people universally and sincerely believed that all their ancient usages and 
established rules of conduct had the function of an actual revelation from heaven: 
the legislature of Britain having shown, in compliance with this maxim, an intention 
to leave the natives of these Indian provinces in possession of their own Laws, at 
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least on the titles of contracts and inheritances, we may humbly presume, that all 
future provisions, for the administration of justice and government in India, will be 
conformable, as far as the natives are affected them, to the manners and opinions of 
the natives themselves;
298
 (emphasis added) 
Similarly H. T. Colebrooke also designated Hindu law as tied to the sacred laws of the 
Hindus and therefore worthy of toleration. However, as the process of uncovering the 
nature and features of Hindu law gathered pace, the question was not so much whether 
Hindu law was tied to the sacred laws of the Hindus but the manner in which the large body 
of Hindu sacred texts would be organised into a body of law which could be judicially 
administered. 
 
To get a better sense of what Colebrooke and his predecessors attempted to do it is perhaps 
useful to make a small detour into the classification of Hindu religio-legal texts from a 
contemporary perspective. At the broadest level Hindu legal texts were concerned with 
upholding dharma or the eternal laws that maintain right order in the world.
299
 Robert 
Lingat mentions that in a juridical sense Dharma can be derived from three sources – the 
Veda, Tradition, and Good Custom, of which each preceding source is understood to be 
more authoritative than the other. Early colonial reflection on the classification of legal 
texts primarily referred to the textual traditions of the Veda and ‗Tradition‘ when they 
attempted to decipher and classify these sources of dharma from the perspective of colonial 
legal requirements. The Veda and Tradition as sources of dharma are also differentiated as 
the Sruti or the revealed or heard texts and the Smriti or the remembered or inspired 
texts.
300
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Collectively called the Vedic texts the Sruti included a range of texts that are associated 
with various Sages and are considered to be amongst the earliest texts in the classical Hindu 
tradition.
301
 In one understanding of these texts they are understood to consist of traditions 
of understanding and interpreting the four principal Vedas – The Rig Veda, Sama Veda, the 
Yajur Veda and the Atharva Veda.
302
 However the Vedas are also understood to be the font 
of all knowledge and the source of all justification in the Hindu tradition. In this sense the 
Veda is understood as the totality of all knowledge and exceeds the Vedic text. Thus as 
Lingat mentions if a rule of dharma has no evident source in the Vedic texts then it is to be 
assumed that such rules rests upon parts of the Vedas which is either lost or hidden from 
view.
303
  
 
The Smriti or remembered texts on the other hand are attributed to a later period in Indian 
history. At the broadest level the smriti consists of the six Vedangas, the epics (the 
Mahabarata and the Ramayana) and the Puranas.
304
 Though all these texts deal with 
various aspects of dharma the task of expounding dharma is more specifically tied to the 
vedangas. These texts themselves are divided into various classes of treatises dealing with 
phonetics, metres, linguistic analysis and grammar, astronomy, etymology and ritual. Of 
these the texts that deal with ritual or the kalpa sutras are the most important from the 
perspective of determining dharma. The kalpa sutras themselves are divided into to three 
classes – the srauta sutras that deal with large sacrifices, the grhya sutras that deal with 
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domestic ritual and the dharma sutras which deal with the rules of and rituals associated 
with member of a community.
305
  
 
Of the kalpa sutra texts the dharma sutras developed into an independent science of 
Dharma or the dharma shastras. As with the dharma sutras the dharma shastra texts also 
deal with questions that approximate the modern conception of law and justice. These texts 
are attributed to various Sages of whom the text attributed to Manu is the most widely and 
highly regarded. Ludo Rocher distinguishes between the dharma sutras and the dharma 
shastras by pointing out that the former is written as aphorisms while the latter is more 
systematic elaboration of Vedic conceptions of law and customs.
306
 From the 7
th
 century 
A.D onwards these Dharma Sastra texts were the subject of extensive commentaries and 
digests. Commentaries explore and discuss the intricacies of specific dharma shastra texts 
in considerable detail while digests discuss legal issues across the dharma shastra texts by 
drawing from a range of texts. 
 
The task the colonial administrators set themselves was to distil a Hindu Personal Law 
from these supposedly sacred texts of the Hindus. Having identified Hindu law as a 
personal law, codification was an attempt to organise the sources of Hindu law and the 
manner in which they would be interpreted under that label.
307
 The challenge of interpreting 
Hindu legal texts was the large number of texts that could be brought to bear on a legal 
question and the relative unimportance of following precedent in the traditions of 
interpreting these texts. In this context the first colonial code, the Vivadarnanva Setu, was 
absorbed by the pandits attached to the company courts as yet another of the numerous 
texts they used to provide opinions on the legal questions that were posed to them by the 
colonial courts.
308
 However, deciding that this form of interpreting Hindu textual sources 
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permitted too much ambiguity on the applicable law, William Jones initiated the task of 
compiling the digest that would fix the permissible band within which pundits could 
interpret the applicable law. 
 
Digesting the available legal authorities on Hindu law, Jones wrote of the project in the 
following terms: 
I would begin with giving them a plan divided into Books, Chapters, and Sections; 
and would order them to collect the most approved texts under each head, with the 
names of the Authors, and their Works, and with the chapters and verses of them. 
When this compilation was fairly, and accurately transcribed, I would write the 
Translation on the opposite pages, and after all inspect the formation of a perfect 
index. The materials would be these; Six or Seven Law Books believed to be divine 
with a commentary on each of nearly equal authority; these are analogous to our 
Littleton, and Coke.
309
 
It is said that Jones saw himself as an Indian Tribonian who would give Indians ―security 
for the due administration of justice among them, similar to that which Justinian gave to his 
Greek and Roman subjects.‖310 Though Jones completed a substantial part of this project, 
he died before his digest, the Vivadabhangarnava, could be translated into English. 
 
The task of completing the Vivadabhangarnava was taken up Colebrooke who in the course 
of his work on Hindu law in India also organised the vast list of authorities into a scheme 
that took root in the colonial legal system. Jones‘ digest was a vast collection of legal 
opinions by various Hindu legal authorities which Colebrooke found unsatisfactory because 
of the 
... author‘s method of discussing together the discordant opinions maintained by the 
lawyers of the several schools, without distinguishing in an intelligible manner 
which of them is the received doctrine of each school, but on the contrary leaving it 
uncertain whether any of the opinions stated by him do actually prevail, or which 
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doctrine must now be considered to be in force and which obsolete, renders his 
work of little utility to persons conversant with the law, and of still less service to 
those who are not versed in Indian jurisprudence; especially to the English reader, 
for whose use, through the medium of translation, the work was particularly 
intended.
311
 
Thus to make sense of the large and discordant body of legal Indian materials Colebrooke 
introduced the idea of schools of Hindu law thereby subjecting the field of dharma to his 
own scheme of classification. 
 
Colebrooke suggested that these commentaries and digests were tied to traditions or schools 
of interpretation which were localised to particular regions of India. He argued that in each 
region a particular commentary or digest occupied the place as the most authoritative 
exposition of the position of that particular school. Thus Colebrooke divided the dharma 
shastra tradition into two main schools located at Bengal and Banaras. The Bengal School 
was said to follow the Sanskrit text Daya Bhaga written by Jimutu Vahana while the 
Banaras school followed Vijnanesvara‘s commentary, the Mitaksara. The Mitaksara was 
also said to be followed in most other parts of the country though supplemented by other 
texts in specific regions. 
 
Colebrooke suggested that the authentic or the most authoritative doctrine of each school 
could be accessed by establishing a chronology of texts and fixing the authoritative position 
of each school with the oldest available text.
312
 However, as scholars like Lingat have 
noted, ―the most insurmountable obstacles stand in the way of any solution being given to 
the chronological problem. They force it to depend on deductions which are bound always 
to have a purely hypothetical character‖.313 Lingat notes that these texts display an 
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astonishing ability to dissimulate the epoch at which they wrote and the circumstances 
which motivated their writing. Thus he mentions the fact that these texts borrow 
extensively from each other, often contain interpolations not present the original texts, are 
attributed to mythical personages and so on, as reasons why it is impossible to establish 
historical dating of these texts with any degree of certainty.
314
 
 
The difficulties in dating texts meant that the chronology that Colebrooke desired could not 
conclusively established and eventually resulted in British judges increasingly relying on 
their own precedents to decide issues in Hindu law. Over the early half of the 19
th
 century 
these precedents were systematised into texts that could be used by the judicial process 
through the work of scholar-administrators like Francis Macnaughten, William 
Macnaughten and Thomas Strange and others.
315
 Furthermore, in 1864 with the 
reorganisation of the British court system in India, pundits attached to the courts to assist 
with the interpretation of the Hindu legal texts were dispensed with. Under this new 
dispensation, the British judge took over sole charge of the interpretation of what has since 
come to be known as Anglo-Hindu law, thereby completing the influence of precedent in 
determining the shape the contours of the dharma shastra tradition. 
 
Scholars like Derrett, Cohn, Larivierre and Menski point out that the introduction of the 
principle of stare decisis to deal with Hindu Law distorted and dislocated the manner in 
which the dharma shastra texts were read and interpreted. They consider it ironical that this 
should have happened even though British judges resorted to Hindu law in the name of 
tolerating Indian religio-legal traditions. I have tried to build on this line of argument by 
arguing that the structure of colonial toleration which viewed these texts as the embodiment 
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of Hindu religious truth plays a determining role in the dislocation of these texts. In the 
next section I try to demonstrate the specific manner in which colonial toleration reformed 
or distorted Hindu law and to what effect. 
 
4.4. The Colonial Misrecognition of Hindu Law 
Commenting on the manner in which Supreme Courts and the Company Courts
316
 dealt 
with Indian law Henry Maine identifies an interesting problem arising out of the toleration 
of these native legal forms. Maine observes: 
At the touch of the Judge of the Supreme Court, who had been trained in the 
English school of special pleading, and had probably come to the East in the 
maturity of life, the rule of native law dissolved and, with or without his intention, 
was to a great extent replaced by rules having their origin in English law-books. 
Under the hand of the judges of the Sudder Courts, who had lived since their 
boyhood among the people of the country, the native rules hardened and contracted 
a rigidity which they never had in real native practice.
317
 
This raises the question – why the colonial legal regime committed to the toleration of 
indigenous legal forms ended up transforming or distorting these laws in the image of 
English laws or rigidifying them in a manner unknown to the practice of native law? I argue 
that this distortion was produced by the manner in which these texts were viewed and 
tolerated by the colonial legal framework. 
 
There are many levels at which the issue of reformulation or distortion of Hindu legal 
traditions can be addressed. For instance it can be addressed at the level of State interests 
and power as in the argument that the Anglo-Hindu law was a product of the British need 
for legal certainty.
318
 Though an important way of thinking about Anglo-Hindu Law, I do 
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not emphasise this kind of argument and focus instead on the conceptual schemes within 
which particular interests were made possible. Even at the conceptual level there are 
various levels of specialisation at which the issue of the distortion of Hindu legal traditions 
can be addressed. I posit that all of these are subsets of the problems involved in translating 
words and concepts across cultural frameworks of understanding. 
 
4.4.1. The Making of a ‘Religious’ Law  
In the case of Hindu law an important aspect of its reform arose from the semantic slippage 
involved in the process of translation of Hindu legal texts from Sanskrit to English so that 
they could be comprehended by the British judges. In an early attempt to deal with this 
question Theodore Goldstucker poses the issue in terms of the right of the Hindus to 
‗question whether the present English translations of the law books can be implicitly relied 
upon as an equivalent for the originals.‘319 As scholars like Goldstucker have demonstrated, 
the slippages arising from semantic translation resulted in profound transformation in the 
colonial appreciation of Hindu Law. However, I do not address the issue at this level of 
detail and specialisation partly because I do not have the expertise to deal with linguistic 
problems but more importantly because I pitch the issue of the transformation at a far more 
fundamental level of translation – viz. the mistaken religious identity that is attributed to 
Hindu Law.  
 
In an important comment on the distortion of Hindu Law Werner Menski draws attention to 
scholarship on Hindu Law that suggests that Hindu law derives from divine legislation in 
the same manner as Muslim law.
320
 Opposing these positions Menski asserts that Hindu 
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Law is 
(n)either premised on a monotheistic core belief nor on the resultant systematic need 
to obey God‘s law to the letter. Islamization of the law, as a forensic process of 
seeking to ascertain what God meant … may be a political strategy as much as a 
religious need. For Hindu law, such a systematic need never arose, since the 
religiously elevated position of the Vedas was not seriously transposed into 
processes of Hinduization.
321
 
The equation of Hindu Law with Semitic traditions is an important aspect of the distortion 
of Hindu Law and I follow Menski‘s suggestion by considering what is implied in the 
treatment of Hindu law as apiece with the Semitic conception of law and religion. 
 
Menski views the equation of Hindu law with the legal traditions of Semitic cultures as 
caused by the colonial construction of Anglo-Hindu law and suggests that there are three 
aspects to this comparison. First, the suggestion that Hindu law is based on divine 
revelation though it is not clear what kind of divine entity is responsible for such revelation 
or even what such revelation entails for Hindu Law. Second, it is presumed that the Hindu 
textual tradition derives from social facts in the same untenable manner as the suggestion 
that the Western legal tradition is founded on the Bible. Lastly, and most significantly, the 
British architects of Anglo-Hindu law equated the traditions of reflecting on dharma with a 
positivist conception of law. Menski argues that the equation of dharma with the positive 
law of the Hindus was perhaps the most significant distortion of a tradition of ethical 
reflection that made up the dharma based approach of Hindu law.
322
 I illustrate some of the 
important issues involved in the transformation of the dharma shastra tradition into the 
religious laws of the Hindus through the judicial career of James Henry Nelson. 
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4.4.2. Nelson’s Comment on Hindu Law 
Nelson came to India in 1862 as a judge in the Madras civil service. As Derrett observes the 
highest position that he could aspire to in his chosen calling was a seat on the bench of the 
Madras High court. However, few civil servants were known to rise through the ranks in 
this manner and therefore to facilitate his case he had to demonstrate judicial distinction 
beyond his regular professional activities, and publication was a recognised form of 
distinction. Nelson sensed the need to establish merit and started his career with two well 
received publications – one an anthropological and administrative manual on the Madura 
District and the other a Commentary on the Code of Criminal Procedure. These ensured 
early promotions, eventually leading to an appointment as District and Sessions Judge, 
Cuddapah in 1876. Derrett mentions that Nelson was justified up to this point in expecting 
to become a judge of the Madras High Court in due course. However, additional 
publication would be required to strengthen his chances.
323
 
 
Nelson fatefully decided to write on the state of the Administration of Hindu law in the 
province of Madras.
324
 Though his three books on the subject were an honest critique of the 
administration of Hindu Law, they were unfortunately not well received by the judicial 
administration at Madras and consequently sealed his chances of being promoted to the 
Madras High Court.
325
 However, as a judge overseeing the administration of Hindu Law 
almost a hundred years after the first efforts to codify Hindu law, Nelson brought to notice 
many of the problems regarding its administration that continue to exercise contemporary 
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scholars like Menski. 
 
Nelson devoted his books on Hindu law to ―call attention to the absurdity and injustice of 
applying what is styled the ‗Hindu Law‘ to the great bulk of the population of the Madras 
Province ...‖.326 The problem Nelson raised about the administration of Hindu law at 
Madras was polemically posed in the following terms: 
Has such a thing as Hindu Law at any time existed in the world? Or is it that Hindu 
Law is a mere phantom of the brain, imagined by Sanskritists without law and 
lawyers without Sanskrit? For myself, I have always been unable to bring myself to 
believe that the innumerable non-Muhamedan tribes and castes of India have at any 
time agreed to accept, or have been compelled to guide themselves by, an aggregate 
of positive laws or rules set to them by a sovereign or other person having power 
over them. In other words looking at law from Austin‘s point of view, I have always 
been unable to bring myself to believe that law has at any time been known to the so 
called Hindu population of India.
327
 
In other words Nelson asserted that Hindu Law as it was administered to the Indians by the 
British had nothing to do with their own laws, customs and usages. In turn this meant that 
the British did not abide by their promise to tolerate native usages and customs and to 
found rule on native usage.
328
 
 
Nelson raised the issue of tolerating native laws and customs at two levels. First the 
competence of the Colonial judicial system to interpret and administer the Sanskrit texts 
they designated to make up Hindu Law, thereby resulting in numerous linguistic slippages 
in the appreciation of these texts. Second, problems arising from the wrongful application 
of Hindu Law to non-Muslim inhabitants of British India who Nelson claimed had nothing 
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to do with these laws. He elaborated these problems by positing a set of 15 false principles 
on the basis of which Hindu Law was built in the province of Madras. 
 
Three of these 15 false principles are particularly relevant to the present discussion. These 
are: 
i. That there exist or formerly existed, in India certain ―Schools of Hindu law‖: and 
that such schools have authority in certain imaginary parts of India such as the 
Karnataka Kingdom, the Andhra country, the Dravida country, ... 
ii. That the so called ―Hindu Law‖ is applicable to all persons vulgarly styled 
Hindus and to their descendants however remote and whether pure or not pure 
iii. That a custom which has never been ―judicially recognized‖ cannot be permitted 
to prevail against distinct authority.
329
 
Of the remaining 12 principles, many dealt with specific issues in the interpretation of 
Hindu law which lie beyond the scope of the present discussion. Rather, I emphasise the 
gap that Nelson noticed between Hindu Law and the customs and usages of the peoples of 
Madras. 
 
Derrett notes that the gulf that Nelson brought to attention between the Brahmins and Non 
Brahmins while working on his manual on the district of Madura had played an important 
role in determining his approach towards Hindu law.
330
 Drawing on this sociological 
understanding of the Madras province, Nelson attacked the practice of Hindu law by 
asserting that most of the people of Madras were governed by their specific usages and had 
no knowledge whatsoever of Anglo-Hindu law.
331
 Nonetheless he had to account for the 
                                                 
329
 Nelson, A View of the Hindu Law as Administered by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, 18. 
330
 Derrett, ―J. H. Nelson: A Forgotten Administrator-Historian of India,‖ 363. 
331
 In his cutting style he asserts that  
 ...with the exception of a few pleaders and others acquainted with the ways of the High Court, not a soul 
the Madras Province had even referred to or heard of the Mitaxara as a treatise on law. 
... the conduct of an ordinary Chetti, or Maravan or Reddi of the Madras Province, unless indeed he 
176 
 
presence of the dharma shastra tradition which he did by pushing back to the supposed 
Aryan history of the Vedic people. 
 
Nelson‘s history of the dharma shastra tradition is tied to the Aryan Invasion theory in 
which Indo Aryan peoples were supposed to have invaded parts of north India and brought 
with them their religio-cultural traditions. The Brahmans of south India as he observed 
them were racially very different from those of the North and had their own local customs 
which also seemed to have nothing to do with the Shastric tradition. Nonetheless since 
Aryan groups could have migrated to the south, the only groups to whom these texts could 
possibly apply were the Brahmins if they were found to have accepted the authority of the 
Smriti texts. Thus he asserts that the resonance or the relevance of these texts, if at all they 
were relevant, were limited to the Brahmins who accepted their authority and not to the 
‗Hindu‘ community in general.332 
 
Nelson‘s history of the Aryan people to whom Hindu law applied is perhaps questionable. 
However, his sociological refutation of the relevance of Hindu law is particularly important 
against the weight of the colonial legal framework which asserted it scriptural significance 
for all the territories they controlled. Thus in the place of Hindu law he argued that the 
Madras government was 
... strictly obliged, to preserve unbroken the customs and usages of the various tribes 
and castes subject to its rule. Adequate efforts must be made to ascertain what are 
the customs and usages of the same; and once ascertained, the High Court must be 
compelled by law to judicially recognize them.
333
 
That is, he tried to displace the legal significance of the dharma shastra tradition for 
colonial law by arguing for a detailed assessment and determination of the sociological role 
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that customs played in the governance of the various communities in Madras. 
 
4.4.3. Hindu Law as Custom 
Subsequent scholarship has by and large vindicated Nelson‘s assessment of the importance 
of custom and his suggestion that the dharma shastra tradition is not the positive law of 
India‘s Hindus. However, as many scholars suggest, Nelson perhaps overstated his case on 
the irrelevance of the dharma shastras for Indian conceptions of legality and for customs 
and usages generally.
334
 Even while conceding Nelson‘s point on the significance of 
custom, scholars have asserted the significance of Hindu Law and that the sociological 
precedence of custom was entirely compatible with the shastric tradition.
 335
 In other words 
‗Hindu‘ conceptions of law could be empirically marked by customary practices and yet 
braided by the force of dharma shastric reasoning. Thus it is against the background of this 
intellectual tradition that Menski suggests that the equation of dharma with positive law 
distorts the Indian conceptions of law and legality.
 336
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Menski demonstrates that conceptions of the State and its law are not alien to Hindu Law 
but they are always charged with upholding an order subordinated to Dharma. Though 
Menski leaves questions such as ‗what is dharma?‘ or ‗who is a Hindu?‘ unsatisfactorily 
unsettled, his work is heuristically productive because it points to a gap between Hindu 
Law as understood within the tradition of the dharma shastras and Hindu law as conceived 
within the colonial legal framework. Menski himself points out that insufficient work has 
been carried out to concretely determine the precise conceptual contours of the term 
dharma and how it might be productively compared to a positivist conception of law. 
 
Scholars like Menski do however suggest the possible import of conceiving the dharma 
shastras tradition as distinct from positive law. That is, as a way of ethically reflecting on 
problems it was primarily an opinion of the dharma shastris and was to that extent distinct 
from the sovereign expression of judicial will.
337
 Further, these opinions were often 
personal and private opinions, which could, though did not necessarily, have practical 
consequences for dispute resolution in a formal legal process.
338
 Additionally, as a science 
of righteousness, opinions on dharma applied to all situations and did not apply solely to 
situations involving personal law as was the case in the scheme of Anglo-Hindu law. 
 
It could also be argued that Hindu Law wove together diverse customary systems within the 
framework of a dharma and was an approach towards disputes and conflict which was 
entirely distinct from one marked by sovereign State control. Thus as an approach to 
regulation it could apply to all groups who adopted and inherited the forms of Hindu law. 
Tahir Mahmood expresses this aptly: 
At present the law described as Hindu Law is applicable, or may be applied, to a 
heterogeneous section of the Indian citizenry, many groups in which are not ‗Hindu‘ 
by religion. So Hindu law is not the law of the Hindus. Hindus are only one of those 
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communities who are governed by this law
339
 
Derrett states this differently and perhaps more accurately by saying that a Hindu is one to 
whom Hindu law applies,
340
 which has historically even included Muslim communities like 
the Khojas and Mappilas.  
 
In the latter part of the 19
th
 century the colonial legal system did recognise this aspect of 
Hindu law to some extent when it granted that local custom was perhaps the most important 
source of Indian law and allowed the recognition of custom if long usage could be 
demonstrated. For instance the State of Punjab, which was acquired towards the latter part 
of the Company rule in India, had fashioned a system of administration that explicitly relied 
on custom and usage. However, as demonstrated in the work of Neeladari Bhattacharya, the 
determination of custom in the Punjab was navigated through practical manuals which drew 
on textual sources which included the Shastric legal texts translated by William Jones, T. A. 
Strange, W. Macnaughten and H.T. Colebrooke. Thus its customary practices were perhaps 
also rationalised in a manner very similar to that by which the texts and codes were given 
scriptural foundations and made the positive law of the Hindus.
341
 
 
Thus Bhattacharya notes that the movement towards custom in Punjab ―did not make 
colonial law any closer to ‗tradition‘, it did not preserve the practices of the community 
uncontaminated. Understanding and codifying custom was as problematic as translating 
and interpreting ancient texts. Both in different ways, subjected tradition to transformative 
processes.‖342 Additionally, the reorganisation of the colonial legal system in 1864 did away 
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with the office of the pundits attached to colonial courts. This brought to an end the 
officially recognised practice of the dharma shastra and its reflection on the customs and 
usages of different communities. 
 
Though the application of the dharma shastric tradition was not conceived as one based on 
religious identity, I will argue that this perspective on this tradition began to acquire official 
and broader intelligibility because it was drawn into the developing language of liberal 
politics and of the modern Indian nation. I develop this idea in the next chapter. That is, that 
the traditions of Hindu law and its reflections on Indian customary practices were 
eventually reformed and incorporated into the colonial legal system as a religious law 
applicable to the adherents of a supposed Hindu religion. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have demonstrated the emergence, significance and reforming effects of 
normative toleration at a micro and at a macro level. At the micro level I have argued that 
the eventual proscription of Sati in 1829 was born out of the colonial policy of normative 
toleration which transformed the representation of local social norms into religious truth 
embodied in the religious laws of the Hindus. At the macro level I have demonstrated that 
specific practices like Sati were set in a broader debate in which the ethical framework of 
the Dharma Shastra tradition was reformed in government discourse as the positivist legal 
injunctions of the Hindus. As a synoptic comment on an emerging reforming framework of 
religious freedom in India this chapter is presented as an explanatory account tracing the 
genealogical roots of reform as it influences contemporary Indian constitutional law. In the 
next chapter (i.e. Chapter 5) I hope to show that this is an account that is intellectually 
productive by demonstrating the manner in which the process of social reform acquires 
intelligibility because it is tied to a similar project of reform in the making of modern 
Indian politics and nationhood. 
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5. Community and the Making of Constitutional Politics 
 
In the previous chapter I outlined a synoptic genealogy of an important aspect of the Indian 
secular State. I argued that the colonial project of toleration was committed to the 
production of scripturally founded religious law, the effect of which was the reformulation 
of Indian social categories. Though I outlined this reform argument through the making of 
Hindu law, there is evidence to suggest that a similar reform project also shaped the making 
of contemporary Muslim legal identity in India.
343
 However, if this is indeed the case then I 
have to explain how these reformed religious categories are presented as plausible accounts 
of community in India even though they are wrenched out of the contexts that gave them 
socio-cultural significance and intelligibility. I do so by suggesting that the religious reform 
instituted by colonial toleration was incorporated and rolled into Indian political 
institutions. That is, reformed religio-legal identities were made constituent elements of a 
‗social‘ sphere in relation to which the ‗political‘ project of colonial government was 
fashioned. 
 
5.1. Sovereign Trust and the Birth of Colonial Politics 
In this section I argue that conceptions of Indian society were tied to the emergence of a 
coherent project of government in colonial India. Fashioning government for India was a 
crucial step in providing colonial rule with the clarity and confidence that is captured in the 
phrases ‗civilising mission‘, ‗white man's burden‘ and perhaps even ‗modernity‘. However, 
the mission of government was anything but clear in the early period of British rule in 
Bengal following Robert Clive‘s defeat of the Nawab of Bengal. Writing about early 
colonial government in an essay on Warren Hastings, T. B. Macaulay speaks of the 
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confusing attitudes that colonial officials and administrators in London displayed when 
giving instructions on the government of India. Thus speaking of the directors of the 
Company in London, Macaulay notes that ―... whoever examines their letters … will find 
there many just and humane sentiments … an admirable code of political ethics. … Now 
these instructions, being interpreted, mean simply, ―Be the father and the oppressor of the 
people; be just and unjust, moderate and rapacious.‖‖344 Though these instructions might 
sound confused, I argue in this section that these sentiments were part of a process through 
which the colonial government clarified its purpose of rule in India and in the process 
generated the idea of an Indian people under its trust. 
 
Mithi Mukherjee characterises British Rule in India as marked by two ―competing but also 
collaborating discourses: the discourse of the ‗colonial‘ and the discourse of the ‗imperial‘.‖ 
While the ‗colonial‘ discourse was driven by ideas of territorial conquest and domination, 
the ‗imperial‘ discourse was based on ―a supranational de-territorialized discourse of justice 
under natural law, and was critical and censorial towards the arbitrary exercise of power by 
the colonial government ...‖345 An early iconic moment in colonial history that illustrates 
the tension between these discourses was the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings led by 
Edmund Burke. Following this distinction that Mukherjee draws I also elaborate on aspects 
of the trial to demonstrate the manner in which it served to interrogate and question the role 
of colonial government and its bonds with its Indian subjects. 
 
The tension between the imperial and colonial discourses that Mukherjee notes is 
significant because it illustrates the manner in which differing accounts of British 
sovereignty in India were braided into a coherent conception of colonial governance. 
Providing a detailed account of the manner in which the tensions between the ‗colonial‘ and 
‗imperial‘ discourse contributed to the concrete historical shifts that marked the 
development of British rule in India is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, by 
extensively excerpting from the arguments of Burke and Hastings I outline the implications 
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of their contending positions for conceptions of an Indian nation or ‗people‘ as subjects of 
government. Systematic and coherent formulations on the character of the Indian nation 
and its ‗people‘ only emerge in the latter part of the 19th century and in this chapter I will 
outline its development only from the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909. Nonetheless as 
Mukherjee persuasively demonstrates, a crucial aspect of its pre-history draws from a 
vigorous debate in the earliest history of British India that grappled with the nature of the 
sovereignty exercised by the East India Company. 
 
At his impeachment trial Hastings defended himself against various charges of breach of 
trust, treaty violations, prosecution of illegal war and other illegal acts of a similar nature 
by relying on the politically degenerate conditions in which his actions were located. 
Defending his allegedly arbitrary and illegal actions Hastings asserted that 
(e)very part of Hindostan has been constantly exposed to these and similar 
disadvantages ever since the Mahomedan conquests. The Hindoos, who never 
incorporated with their conquerors, were kept in order only by the strong hand of 
power. The constant necessity of similar exertions would increase at once their 
energy and extent; so that rebellion itself is the parent and promoter of despotism. 
Sovereignty in India implies nothing else. For I know not how we can form an 
estimate of its powers, but from its visible effects; and those are everywhere the 
same, from Cabool to Assam. The whole history of Asia is nothing more than 
precedents to prove the invariable exercise of arbitrary power…. 
 
To be robbed, violated, oppressed, is their privilege. Let the constitution of their 
country answer for it. I did not make it for them. Slaves I found them, and as slaves 
I have treated them. I was a despotic prince. Despotic governments are jealous, and 
the subjects prone to rebellion. This very proneness of the subject to shake off his 
allegiance exposes him to continual danger from his sovereign‘s jealousy, and this is 
consequent on the political state of Hindostanic governments
346
 (emphasis added) 
                                                 
346
 Edmund Burke, The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol. 9, 12 vols. (Project Gutenberg, 
2005), http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13968. (accessed 22/5/2010) 
184 
 
Thus speaking of the Mogul State in which his actions were located, he admitted to 
despotic rule but justified his actions through a dubious sociology and history that cast 
India in a state of pre-political anarchy. In other words, he cast the basis of sovereign 
authority in India as governed by necessity and therefore marked by the absence of legal 
and constitutional restraint. 
 
Burke on the other hand challenged Hastings‘ formulation of British sovereignty in India at 
two levels. First he challenged the sociological and historical assumption that India knew 
no law and was governed by arbitrary despots. Speaking of the advanced legal order of 
India he says that 
(t)hose people lived under the Law, which was formed even whilst we, I may say, 
were in the Forest, before we knew what Jurisprudence was … It is a refined, 
enlightened, curious, elaborate, technical Jurisprudence under which they lived, and 
by which their property was secured which yields neither to the Jurisprudence of the 
Roman Law nor the Jurisprudence of this Kingdom
347
 
In addition and more importantly he also attacked the constitutional grounds on which 
Hastings justified arbitrary rule in India. 
 
Expounding the source of legal authority in India, Burke argued that 
(t)he East India Company itself acts under two very dissimilar sorts of powers, 
derived from two sources very remote from each other. The first source of its power 
is under charters which the crown of Great Britain was authorized by act of 
Parliament to grant; the other is from several charters derived from the Emperor of 
the Moguls, the person in whose dominions they were chiefly conversant,-
particularly that great charter by which, in the year 1765, they acquired the high-
stewardship of the kingdoms of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa. Under those two bodies 
of charters, the East India Company, and all their servants, are authorized to act. 
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As to those of the first description, it is from the British charters that they derive the 
capacity by which they are considered as a public body, or at all capable of any 
public function. It is from thence they acquire the capacity to take from any power 
whatsoever any other charter, to acquire any other offices, or to hold any other 
possessions. … In delegating great power to the East India Company, this kingdom 
has not released its sovereignty; on the contrary, the responsibility of the Company 
is increased by the greatness and sacredness of the powers that have been entrusted 
to it. Attempts have been made abroad to circulate a notion that the acts of the East 
India Company and their servants are not cognizable here. I hope on this occasion 
your Lordships will show that this nation never did give a power without annexing 
to it a proportionable degree of responsibility.
348
 (emphasis added) 
Thus Burke held the company to account by arguing that they derived their power in India 
from both the British crown and the grant of the Moghul emperor. The joint derivation of 
the company sovereignty was important because the company sought to present their 
authority as merely deriving from the Diwani or the right to collect taxes in Bengal which 
they received from Mogul emperor in 1765. However, as Burke sought to argue, the root of 
their ‗public powers‘ arose from the British charters from which they could not escape 
responsibility. 
 
During Hastings‘ governorship Mogul power had long declined and was hardly able to 
exercise authority over the company who were the de facto rulers of Bengal. Therefore 
Burke also had to explain how the company was to be tied to Mogul authority under such 
circumstances. To address this challenge Burke argued that flowing from the various 
charters they received from the Moguls, the British 
… bound themselves (and bound inclusively all their servants) to perform all the 
duties belonging to that new office, and to be held by all the ties belonging to that 
new relation. If the Mogul empire had existed in its vigor, they would have been 
bound, under that responsibility, to observe the laws, rights, usages, and customs of 
the natives, and to pursue their benefit in all things: for this duty was inherent in the 
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nature, institution, and purpose of the office which they received. If the power of the 
sovereign from whom they derived these powers should by any revolution in human 
affairs be annihilated or suspended, their duty to the people below them, which was 
created under the Mogul charter, is not annihilated, is not even suspended; and for 
their responsibility in the performance of that duty, they are thrown back upon that 
country (thank God, not annihilated) from whence their original power, and all 
subsequent derivative powers, have flowed. When the Company acquired that high 
office in India, an English corporation became an integral part of the Mogul empire. 
When Great Britain virtually assented to that grant of office, and afterwards took 
advantage of it, Great Britain guarantied the performance of all its duties. Great 
Britain entered into a virtual act of union with that country, by which we bound 
ourselves as securities to preserve the people in all the rights, laws, and liberties 
which their natural, original sovereign was bound to support, if he had been in 
condition to support them. By the disposition of events, the two duties, flowing 
from two different sources, are now united in one.
349
 (emphasis added) 
That is, he argues that Great Britain was bound defend the rights and liberties of the Indian 
people as Mogul rule would have done if it was in full vigour. However, by committing 
himself to the protection of the ‗rights, laws and liberties‘ of the Indian people he also 
distinguished his case from what he called a morality tied to Geography. According to him, 
he was defending a conception of sovereignty which was tied to a universal morality which 
was the same everywhere.
350
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Mithi Mukherjee identifies Burke‘s allusion to universal morality as the defence of natural 
law which had been a key aspect of European debates of the time, especially of the laws of 
war and relations between nations. I do not explore Burke‘s defence of natural law in much 
detail except to note that it played an important role in transcending the purely ‗colonial‘ 
justification of rule as defended by Hastings. Hastings‘s model of British rule painted India 
as a private fiefdom that the East Indian Company acquired through the grant of the diwani 
in 1765. In addition he also characterised Mogul rule as an arbitrary order maintained over 
and against an anarchic society. On the other hand Burke‘s ‗imperial‘ argumentative 
framework challenged both these lines of argument. Legally and constitutionally, Burke‘s 
account subordinated Company government to parliament and to the notional Mogul 
constitution. Historically and sociologically he denied Indian anarchy in favour of a 
tradition of laws underpinned by natural law or universal norms. My extended discussion of 
this debate was primarily intended to demonstrate the framework within which Burke 
rejected claims suggesting the absence of organised society in India and consequently his 
necessary commitment to explore the idea of India as a nation or a ‗people‘. 
 
While debating Indian nationhood it is important to note that Burke‘s framework was not 
necessarily committed to ideas of government as they sociologically existed in India. 
Instead, his recognition of these institutions was premised on their subordination to the 
standards and principles of natural law. Nonetheless I argue that conceiving of India as a 
‗people‘ subordinated to universal principles Burke brought purpose to British rule, 
enabling it to transcend the merely interest based considerations entailed by the despotic 
and ‗colonial‘ model of sovereignty defended by Hastings.  
 
Drawing on colonial officials with widely differing political opinions, Reginald Coupland 
notes that an overwhelming majority of them were united by the sense of purpose that 
Burke‘s thought brought to their consideration of the Indian problem. Thus Coupland notes 
that 
Englishman who have thought about India seem never to have supposed that its 
subjection to British rule, however long it might last, was a permanent dispensation. 
The ultimate enfranchisement of India was implicit in Burke‘s doctrine of 
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trusteeship, since the guardian‘s duty ends once his ward comes of age.351 
Coupland therefore casts the ‗imperial‘ project of British government in India as one of 
tutelage and trust. As Coupland himself suggests, by the end of the 19
th
 century the most 
significant political goal the British government identified for their Indian wards was the 
eventual realisation of representative government in India.
352
 
 
Even if the project of political education was the dominant influence on the question of 
government in India it was obviously not a universal position. Thus in contrast to the 
Burkean position James Fitzjames Stephen argues that  
(t)he first steps in the political education essential to take change in the foundations 
of the British Government cannot be taken without incurring the risk of furious civil 
war. A barrel of gun powder may be harmless or may explode, but you cannot 
educate it into household fuel by exploding bits of it. How can you possibly teach 
great masses of people that they ought to be rather dissatisfied with a foreign ruler, 
but not much; that they should express their discontent in words and in votes, but 
not in acts; that they should ask from him this and that reform (which they neither 
understand nor care for), but should on no account rise in insurrection against 
him.
353
 
In hindsight it is possible to argue that opinions like those of Stephen only inflected the 
trajectory of political education but did not influence it sufficiently to block the 
development of representative institutions in India. The dominant opinion which was 
shared by the likes of Macaulay and John Stuart Mill was that representative government 
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could take root in India once native ‗political will‘ had sufficiently matured.354 
 
In this chapter I argue that the possibility of a mature political will was the common ground 
on which the discussion on representative government in India was conducted at least since 
the latter part of the 19
th
 century. Even though nationalist opinion challenged the colonial 
charge of an underdeveloped political will they were particularly opposed to positions like 
those of Stephen which argued that it was not feasible for colonial rule to mentor civil 
political institutions in India. Thus despite reservations about the form in which the 
language of pedagogy was presented to them, Indian nationalism did not fundamentally 
undermine the language of political pedagogy and did not at any point fundamentally 
question the superiority of the British political institutions.
355
 That is, the question of 
government was not one that sought to reconstruct or develop sociologically available 
native political forms but accepted the goal of forming a nation that could represent a 
developing Indian political will. In the rest of this chapter I will outline the gradual 
development of representative government in India, the manner in which it relied on 
reformed conceptions of community, and most importantly suggest the ways in which this 
history is relevant for the problem of constitutional secularism in India I have outlined in 
previous chapters. 
 
5.2. The Beginnings of Pedagogy in Indian Constitutional Politics 
The vision of Macaulay, Mill, Munro and others inspired by Burke‘s legacy of trusteeship 
was only gradually instituted as an aspect of government.
356
 Thus discussing the 
                                                 
354
 J.S Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London: Longmands Green and Co., 1867), 130-
41. 
355
 Gandhi was perhaps the most important exception to this position arguing for a fundamentally different 
approach to society and government. M. K. Gandhi, Hind swaraj and other writings, ed. Anthony Parel, 
Cambridge texts in modern politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
356
 Government in India was divided between territories directly governed by the British called British India 
and the territories governed by native rulers over whom the British exercised suzerainty in the areas of 
external affairs, defence and communications. This chapter outlines the development of government in 
British India, though it could be argued that many aspects of rule in British India was also adopted in the 
190 
 
parliamentary discussions on the charter of 1833 Macaulay explicitly stated that India was 
not ready for European institutions. However, as he noted 
... by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better 
government; that, having become instructed in European knowledge, they may, in 
some future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come 
I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or to retard it. Whenever it comes, it 
will be the proudest day in English history. To have found a great people sunk in the 
lowest depths of slavery and superstition, to have so ruled them as to have made 
them desirous and capable of all the privileges of citizens, would indeed be a title to 
glory all our own.
357
 (Emphasis added) 
The process of actualising Indian political will was therefore seen as the gradual progress of 
political education. The first significant step towards including Indians in the administration 
of colonial government was brought about by the revolt of 1857 which forced the 
government to enact the Indian Councils Act, 1861. 
 
The Act of 1861 mandated a legislative council that would expand both the Governor 
Generals Council and the council of the Governors in the provinces. Of these legislative 
councils half the members had to be Indians chosen from outside the Indian civil services. 
However, non official members of the legislative councils were not elected but were 
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government nominees and had extremely limited oversight over the executive actions and 
financial dealings of the government of India. Thus set in the context of the revolt, the Act 
was primarily intended as a safety valve and a channel of communication that ‗alerted the 
government to native discontent before it became disaffection.‘358 Between 1861 and 1909 
this was the model through which Indian voices were incorporated into the administration 
of Indian government. The Government of India and the Provinces during this period did 
not provide for significant native participation in the higher levels of government. 
However, efforts were made to increase native participation in government at the level of 
local and municipal bodies.
359
 
 
The history of local self government in India is generally traced to the Government 
resolution of 1882 stewarded by Lord Rippon. This resolution is a particularly clear 
statement of the pedagogic mission of colonial government stating that  
… the Governor General in Council must explain that, in advocating the extension 
of local self-government, and the adoption of this principle in the management of 
many branches of local affairs, he does not suppose that the work will be in that first 
instance better done than if it remained in the sole hands of the Government district 
officers. It is not, primarily, with a view to improvement in administration that this 
measure is put forward and supported. It is chiefly desirable as an instrument of 
political and popular education.
360
(emphasis added) 
This was perhaps the first systematic efforts of the colonial project seeking to facilitate the 
‗political education‘ of India. The importance of these efforts being based on what was 
called the ‗elective principle‘ cannot be overstated especially because of the large numbers 
of the nationalist leaders who cut their political teeth fighting in the electoral politics of 
local bodies.
361
 However, it is not relevant for present purposes to follow the development 
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of representative politics at the level of local bodies. Therefore I only try to outline the 
manner in which the developing Indian political will was grafted onto the colonial 
administration at the level of the Government of India and the Provincial Governments. 
That is, I focus on the conception of an Indian ‗political will‘ as it developed at the higher 
levels of Indian government. 
 
5.3. Nation and Faction: Nurturing Political Interests 
As an immature nation in need of political mentoring the problem with India was the 
absence of a unified political will. Thus speaking of the fragmented condition of Indian 
society while introducing the Indian Councils Act, 1892, Lord Lansdowne describes Indian 
society as ―congeries of widely separated classes races and communities, with divergences 
of interests and hereditary sentiments which for ages have precluded common sentiment or 
local unanimity.‖362 (emphasis added) The curious aspect of British government in India 
was the effort to graft this conception of society onto the task of fashioning constitutional 
government. That is, British efforts at introducing native participation in government in 
India was focussed on organising these diverging interests so that they could be 
incorporated into the very structure of government. 
 
Though fledgling efforts to represent Indian communities in government along the lines of 
interest groups and communities trace back to the Indian Councils Act of 1892, these 
constitutional measures found their feet only with the passing of the Indian Councils Act, 
1909, also referred to as the Morley-Minto reforms. Stewarded by the Secretary of State for 
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India, Viscount Morley, and the Viceroy of British India, Lord Minto, the 1909 statute 
brought about constitutional reforms that sought to dramatically increase the presence of 
Indian voices in both executive and legislative arms of the government of British India. 
 
The defining feature of the 1909 statute was the scale on which it sought to expand the size 
of the legislative councils and increase their powers. On average the size of the legislative 
council doubled both in the provinces and in the imperial legislative council. Though a 
majority of the members of the legislatures were to be government officials and nominated 
members, there was a significantly increased representation for elected members.
363
 
However, the most significant aspect of all was the special electorates that it sought to 
provide for groups like Muslims, landholders, and representatives of commerce in the 
Imperial Legislative Assembly. In itself the special electorates granted to these groups was 
not novel as provincial assemblies did provide for some manner of selecting candidates 
representing special interests even before 1909.
364
 However, special electorates did not 
determine election to the imperial assembly and, further, no special electorates for Muslims 
existed previously. 
 
There is a tendency in the nationalist literature to view the scheme of the 1909 statute as an 
attempt to divide Hindus and Muslims and hinder an emerging nationalism.
365
 However, 
this cannot be entirely accurate because representation on the lines of interest and 
community did not begin with the Morley-Minto scheme and more importantly Muslims 
were not the only group granted special electorates by the 1909 statute. Most importantly, 
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within a political scheme conceived on the basis of fragmented and irreconcilable interests 
it was perhaps not possible for government to unify these interests. Thus it is important to 
emphasise that the Morley Minto scheme was the product of a conception of politics and 
society in India rather than a merely conniving contrivance of the British Government to 
divide Indian people among themselves. 
 
As both Morley and Minto stressed, their reforms only envisaged an ordered increase in the 
presence of Indian voices in government and were not an attempt to introduce 
representative government styled on European lines.
366
 In Minto‘s justification of these 
reforms he explicitly mentioned that he was no ‗advocate of representative government for 
India in the Western sense of the term‘ as it was alien to the instinct of the people of India. 
Quoting Sir Courtney Ilbert with approval he says that 
British authority in India may be traced historically to a two-fold source: it is 
derived partly from the British Crown, partly from the Great Moghul and other 
Native Rulers of India. These are the two sources of our authority and they involve 
important consequences. As heirs to a long series of Indian Rulers we are bound to 
reserve to ourselves the ultimate control over all executive action and the final 
decision in matters of legislation; as trustees of British principles and traditions we 
are equally bound to consult the wishes of the people and to provide machinery by 
which their views may be expressed as far as they are articulate
367
 
Speaking more particularly about the reforms of 1909 he asks: 
Can we fuse these two principles into a definite system of government, into what 
may be called a ‗constitutional autocracy‘ and thus give to our administration a 
definite and permanent shape? There is all the difference in the world between the 
arbitrary autocracy of the Asiatic despotism and the constitutional autocracy which 
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binds itself to govern by rule, which admits and invites to its councils 
representatives of all the interests which are capable of being represented, and 
which merely reserves to itself, in the form of a narrow majority, the predominant 
and absolute power which it can only abdicate at the risk of bringing back the chaos 
to which our rule put an end.
368
 (emphasis added) 
Thus Minto locates the British role in the government of India against the background of a 
divided people and their diverging interests. By implication his position also entirely ruled 
out the possibility that the divergent interests that the British held together could mature 
into a unified political will. Therefore to include native opinion in government, 
―representation by classes and interests is the only practicable method of embodying the 
elective principle in the constitution of the Indian Legislative Councils‖.369 
 
The Minto-Morley scheme clearly did not envision Indian political maturity or its 
facilitation, and representative government in the European sense. However, it is significant 
to my account of political pedagogy for two important reasons. First, because of the scale 
on which it increased native political participation across British India. Second, by inviting 
the participation of native interests the reforms actually did facilitate a form of political 
pedagogy – viz. learning to articulate ‗political interests‘, which was to have a significant 
effect on subsequent constitutional developments in India. 
 
Though the colonial State identified numerous conflicting interest groups,
370
 the cleavage 
between the Hindus and Muslims was understood to be a particularly important division 
that any conception of Indian politics would have to mediate.
371
 However, it is important to 
emphasise that the idea of an India divided amongst its factions and interests is not an 
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empirical or sociologically derived proposition but a British conception of community in 
India. Nonetheless, organising government along the axes of diverging interests was an 
invitation by the colonial government to different Indian social groups to learn to present 
themselves as such divided identities. I demonstrate the divergence of the British 
conception of divided interests from Indian conceptions of their social milieu through a few 
anecdotal examples. 
 
First, though the government speaks of an India irreconcilably divided among itself, this 
conception was made possible only through active British support. Thus it is important to 
note in this context that the provincial government at Bombay admitted that one of the 
principal ‗nations‘ within India, the Muslims, did not form an organised group and would 
have to transformed into one through fostering associations among them. Similarly, for 
reasons not fully explained in his submissions, the lieutenant governor of Punjab 
considered it impossible to form Muslim electorates in the Punjab.
372
 
 
Second, a cursory review of numerous submissions to responses solicited by the 
government on the Morley-Minto reforms suggests a measure of incomprehension of the 
narrative of irreconcilable difference of social interests. In this context the nature of the 
opposition expressed by Honourable Rai Sundar Lal Bahadur to the proposal suggesting 
separate electorates for Muslims is particularly illuminating and quoting him at some length 
is useful to explain my argument. According to Bahadur, 
Muhammadans, like other minorities, should be represented by nomination made by 
the Government as hitherto, if not already returned by election in sufficient number. 
It is of course desirable that the Muhammadan community should be fully 
represented in the council, and there is no objection to four or even a larger number 
of seats being assigned to them. Under the scheme proposed Muhammadans get 
three special advantages over other members of the Indian communities, viz.- 
(a) a reservation of four seats in addition to any to which they may be otherwise 
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elected; 
(b) election by their own co-religionists, whereas others will have to depend for 
their election upon the votes of their own co-religionists as well as others ; 
(c) they obtain a very large electorate of landholders and all persons having an 
annual income exceeding Rs. 1,000 and in which all graduates of certain standing 
will be represented. 
These privileges will be possessed by no other community. A Hindu, Parsi, or 
Christian graduate will have no franchise as such which his more lucky 
Muhammadan brother will enjoy. This is by no means a small advantage and I have 
no doubt that if it is granted to Muhammadans, every other community in India will 
vigorously claim it. It will be a matter of considerable practicable difficulty to adjust 
these claims on a Satisfactory basis. In these days of caste, class and religious 
conferences much will be made of this apparent disparity of treatment. The best 
interests of the Government, I believe, require that if the Muhammadans are given 
the proposed special electorate, a similar special electorate on exactly the same lines 
should be given to other communities. 
 
The selection of the representatives of a class, by members of that class alone, is 
necessary where the differences between it and other classes of the community are 
such as will render the nomination or election of a representative futile by the 
ordinary method. This does not, so far as my experience goes, exist in the case of 
Muhammadans. I have not come across one legislative measure in which the 
interests of the Hindus and Muhammadans were not common. Differences no doubt 
exist, but they are mainly in the question of the distribution of official patronage and 
honours, in which the candidates themselves are very often the more interested 
persons.
373
 (emphasis added) 
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Rai Sundar Lal Bahadur‘s position was similar to that of the non Muslim political groups 
like the Indian National Congress who opposed the proposal for separate electorates. 
However it is crucial to note that he did not cast this opposition as the irresolvable social 
divisions or diverging interests of communities but merely a case of competition for the 
same interest – viz. government patronage.374 
 
Third, it is perhaps possible to dismiss opinions like that of Rai Sundar Lal Bahadur as 
motivated against the special electorates granted to Muslims. However, even dominant 
Muslim positions seem to suggest similar conclusions. From the contemporary Indian 
nationalist perspective, the Muslim League is singled out as having punctured the idea of a 
unified nation by wholeheartedly accepting the British conception of India as a set of 
irreconcilable nations. However, as Sufiya Pathan‘s excellent analysis of representative 
politics in colonial India demonstrates, the League‘s difference with the Congress was over 
the nature of politics rather than over the character of the social. Thus Sir Syed Ahmed 
Khan, the founder of the Muslim League, speaks of his opposition to the Indian National 
Congress‘ conception of nation in the following manner: 
Those questions on which Hindus and Mohammedans can unite, and on which they 
ought to unite, and concerning which it is my earnest desire that they should unite, 
are social questions. We are both desirous that peace should reign in the country, 
that we two nations should live in a brotherly manner, that we should help and 
sympathise with one another, that we should bring pressure to bear, each on his own 
people, to prevent the arising of religious quarrels, that we should improve our 
social condition, and that we should try to remove that animosity which is every day 
increasing between the two communities. The questions on which we can agree are 
purely social. If the Congress had been made for these objects, then I would myself 
have been its President ... But the Congress is a political Congress, and there is no 
one of its fundamental principles, and especially that one for which it was in reality 
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founded, to which Mohammedans are not opposed.
375
 (emphasis added) 
It is crucial to note Sir Syed viewed the social interests of both Hindus and Muslims in 
India as identical or at least not irreconcilably at odds with each other. It was the perceived 
dangers of representative politics which led him to oppose the nationalism of the Indian 
National Congress. That is, the possibility that politics might swamp Muslim interests 
through the force of sheer numbers. 
 
By raising the question of the distinct ‗political‘ interest of the Muslims it might seem that 
Sir Syed endorses the British conception of an India divided among its different interests. 
However, as Pathan demonstrates, this charge has to be set in the context of Sir Syed‘s deep 
suspicion of representative politics and his suggestion that the interests of participation in 
governance was best served by nomination rather than election. As Pathan points out, his 
conception of citizenship itself seemed unconnected to representative democracy and was 
tied to the notion of reform and betterment of individuals. However, when this conception 
of politics was later translated into the Morley-Minto scheme, the unique ‗political‘ 
interests of the Muslims could only be safeguarded by participation in the scheme of 
separate electorates. 
 
Situated at the intersection of colonial conceptions of politics and native responses to it, 
separate electorates must be viewed not as a vindication of colonial political sociology, but 
as a way in which different groups and especially the Muslims were taught or invited to 
represent their distinct ‗interests‘ within colonial government. As this section has shown, 
there were gaps in the manner in which the colonial government and their subjects 
conceived politics. However, since there was no fundamental challenge to the conception of 
politics contained in the Morley-Minto scheme, it was the only avenue open to the natives 
to participate in the higher levels of colonial government. It is in this context that the modes 
of separate electorates and representation of sectional interests gained considerable traction 
among various Indian social groups. I demonstrate its significance by placing it alongside a 
slightly different conception of political society as envisioned by the next tranche of 
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political reforms in India, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. 
 
5.4. A Nation of Minorities: The Journey Towards Political Maturity 
The Government of India Act 1919 was the next major constitutional reform of the 
constitutional scheme fashioned by the Morley-Minto reforms.
376
 Based on a report by 
Secretary of State Edwin Montagu and Viceroy Lord Chelmsford, these reforms sought to 
deepen the participation of Indians in government and thereby move towards representative 
democracy. As signalled by Montagu in August 1917, the British Government sought to 
increase the ―association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual 
development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of 
responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire‖.377 Eight months 
later the document entitled The Report on Indian Constitutional Reform (the Montagu-
Chelmsford Report) was produced and was the basis of the Government of India Act 1919, 
which in turn was brought into force in 1921.
378
 
 
The Act explicitly sought to move Indian government away from the ‗constitutional 
autocracy‘ of the Minto-Morley scheme towards the path of ‗responsible self-government‘ 
within the framework of empire. The thrust of the report was a scheme that sought to 
devolve executive power to Indians. Also termed ‗dyarchy‘, the new scheme of government 
proposed an executive divided into two parts in the provinces. The Governor in Council 
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would have exclusive powers over certain ‗reserved‘ subjects while Indian ministers chosen 
from the provincial legislatures would have power over a list of ‗transferred‘ subjects.379 On 
the legislative side, government civil servants were now reduced to a minority and a 
majority of the representatives to the provincial and central legislatures were to be either 
nominated or elected. At the level of the central government the statute constituted two 
legislative houses – an upper house called the Council of State and a lower house called the 
Legislative Assembly. However, dyarchy was not intended to work at the level of the 
Central Government where the Governor General was primarily responsible to the 
Secretary of State for India in London. 
 
Significantly the statute continued with separate electorates for Muslims, extended this also 
to the Sikhs, and through the course of the working of the new dispensation included 
nominated representatives of other groups like the Depressed Classes, Christians, 
Europeans, Factory Workers and so on. It is this aspect of the statute, its conception of 
Indian society, and its different orientation towards political education that I examine in this 
section. 
 
The Montagu-Chelmsford scheme was quite different from the Morley-Minto system of 
government in that it was actively concerned with fostering a sense of citizenship among 
the Indians so that representative government would take root in India. Thus this scheme 
could not hold to the same conception of Indian society as divided by diverging interests. In 
a section titled ‗the conditions of the problem‘ the Montagu-Chelmsford report mentions 
the difficulty that government based on the ‗electoral principle and a respect for rights‘ 
would face in India: 
Two dominating conditions will be quickly apparent to anyone who turns to the 
records and reports. One is that the immense masses of the people are poor, 
ignorant, and helpless far beyond the standards of Europe ; and the other is that 
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there runs through Indian society a series of cleavages - of religion, race, and caste 
which constantly threaten its solidarity, and of which any wise political scheme 
must take serious heed.
380
 (emphasis added) 
This would seem like a reiteration of the Morley-Minto scheme. However, there is a critical 
difference. That is, the irremediably divided social condition of India has now become an 
opportunity for citizenship. As the report goes on to say 
(w)e have to bring about the most radical revolution in the people‘s traditional ideas 
of the relations between ruler and ruled, and it will be a difficult, and even a 
dangerous business, for it is neither safe nor easy to meddle with traditional ideas in 
India. Unless the political changes now in contemplation are accompanied by an 
educational campaign directed to awaking in all classes alike, … a sense of 
citizenship, disaster will certainly result.
381
 
Thus the report believed that India continued to be divided among its various communities 
which inhibited the development of citizenship. However, the report claimed that it was 
possible and in fact the duty of government to educate Indians to see past their narrow 
identities towards their journey to citizenship and nationhood within the empire. These 
were the first conscious and tangible steps taken by the colonial government towards the 
realisation of the earlier stated pedagogic commitments of Macaulay, Mill and others. 
 
Having declared national consciousness or citizen identities as the pedagogic goal for 
Indian communities, the Report had to address the rights of various social groups, 
especially the Muslims, as they existed under the Morley-Minto scheme. Addressing the 
question of communal electorates as it had developed up to that point, the report made it 
clear that these separate electorates were ―a very serious hindrance to the development of 
the self-governing principle.‖ However in relation to Muslims it went on to say that 
(t)he Muhammadans regard separate representation and communal electorates as 
their only adequate safeguards. But apart from a pledge which we must honour until 
we are released from it, we are bound to see that the community secures proper 
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representation in the new councils. How can we say to them that we regard the 
decision of 1909 as mistaken, that its retention is incompatible with progress 
towards responsible government, that its reversal will eventually be to their benefit; 
and that for these reasons we have decided to go back on it? Much as we regret the 
necessity, we are convinced that so far as the Muhammadans at all events are 
concerned the present system must be maintained until conditions alter, even at the 
price of slower progress towards the realization of a common citizenship.
382
 
The decision to permit continuation of separate electorates for the Muslims compelled the 
government to consider the claims of many other communities for special representation. 
Of these the government acceded only to the claims of the Sikhs in Punjab whom they 
argued were ―a distinct and important people; they supply a gallant and valuable element to 
the Indian Army; but they are everywhere in a minority, and experience has shown that they 
go virtually unrepresented.‖383 All other groups were to be represented by nomination 
which the report reasoned was a better way of extending class or communal representation 
since they could be abolished more easily when their task was accomplished. 
 
It might perhaps seem that by recognising and granting political rights to many new social 
groups the government was just extending the Morley Minto framework of divergent 
interests. However, this new scheme introduced an important difference in terminology to 
understand these differences. Unlike the Morley Minto scheme where the interests of the 
Muslims were understood to be irreconcilably at odds with those of Hindu, the Montagu 
Chelmsford report cast this relationship in terms of Minority and Majority. Thus in the 
quest for unified nationhood, minorities and majorities would now have to learn to go 
beyond their particular interests and represent the interests of the collective or national 
political will. I cannot explore the question of whether Indians actually learned this new 
political goal of national unity as it is not an immediate concern for the present chapter. 
However, the partition of British India in India and Pakistan on the grounds of religion 
suggests that the project was less than successful.
384
 On the other hand as with the 
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conception of an India divided on grounds of interests, the new framework of majority and 
minority was as much a British conception of Indian society than an empirically grounded 
reflection on the nature of community in India. That is, the very intelligibility of these 
terms was difficult to determine and sustain. 
 
Recounting an exchange in the Legislative Assembly
385
 at Delhi, Pathan illustrates some of 
the confusions produced by the new terminology of majority and minority. Replying to a 
query on how the government understood the terms majority and minority and how it 
proposed to be equal and fair between them, the government replied that the terms were not 
easy to define and that their meaning was to be grasped from the circumstance.
386
  
(w)hen in March last Mian Mohammad Shah Nawaz asked for an interpretation of 
the terms ‗Minority and Majority Communities‘ and ‗inequality of communal 
representation‘ we felt it would be dangerous to commit ourselves to any definition 
of a ‗minority community‘ until the whole matter had been carefully examined in 
the light of the local Governments‘ replies. The local Governments were, I 
understand, asked how they defined the term and their replies, which have been 
received, are under separate examination. I have not seen the file yet, but I 
understand from the Assistant Secretary that the replies do not help. Some 
Governments have merely sent up the information contained in the Census tables, 
others have just stated what communities are generally regarded as minority 
communities and so on. 
 
A ―minority community‖ is a perfectly well-understood term and does not, I 
suggest, stand in need of a definition. It would not serve any useful purpose, and it 
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may be dangerous to attempt to attach to it too precise a meaning. The difficulties in 
the way of a strict definition are enormous. As Sir Malcolm Hailey explained in the 
debate on Mr. Nayar‘s motion on 10th March, 1923, for representation of classes 
and communities not well represented in the Services, though the main criteria for 
determining the existence of a community are religion, language or caste and tribe, 
we have by no means arrived at a solution when we have determined communities 
on these criteria. For example, the Hindus are all one community on the criterion of 
religion but in Madras, Brahmins and non-Brahmins want to be treated as separate 
communities; in Bombay, the Lingayats, who are Hindus, want to be treated as a 
separate community for franchise and other purposes; Rajputs and Mahrattas would 
claim recognition on a tribal or national basis and reject any discrimination based on 
language. As Sir Malcolm pointed out, a common language would not unite the 
Lingayats and Mahrattas, still less the Sikhs and the Punjab Moslems, while a 
difference of language does not keep apart the different sections of non-Brahmins in 
Madras. The reason is that according as caste, tribal or national consciousness 
develops, the emphasis is changed from one to another and at a particular moment 
it is difficult to say on what element emphasis should be placed. (Secretary will 
remember the protests we received when Bedi was nominated to the I.C.S because 
some Sikh organisations disowned him on the ground that he is not a ‗Keshadhari‘ 
Sikh). 
 
So far as the position of the Legislature on this matter is concerned, we accepted an 
agreed resolution in the Assembly in 1923 laying down the principle that in making 
new recruitment for the Services under the control of the Central Government steps 
should be taken to secure that the Services are not unduly overweighted with 
representatives of one community or province and that, as far as possible, claims of 
all communities and provinces should be considered. The resolution thus adopted 
provided for prevention of the over-representation of a particular community and 
was thus, in effect, a re-affirmation of the policy which the Government of India 
had been following which was not to seek to represent minority communities but to 
attempt to prevent a preponderance of any one class or community in our 
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Services
387
 
Through this rather long extract I hope I have illustrated some of the difficulties of 
identifying a minority in this new dispensation under the 1919 statute. 
 
The government had no criteria to determine what a minority was. It could range from 
religious, caste, tribal and linguistic groups and most importantly there were no identifiable 
constraints on the proliferation of these categories. A British commentator reflects on the 
absurd possibilities that this could produce in the following manner: 
The facts of the communal position will support any view you take. For example, 
the ‗minorities‘ if we include the Depressed Classes as non-Hindus, outnumber the 
Hindu ‗majority‘. You may regard this as a reason for putting the Hindu community 
(on democratic grounds) in a subordinate place at the Centre, in Legislature and 
Cabinet; or as a reason for championing their extreme claims, as those of a 
‗minority‘, against any other minority, especially the Moslems388 
There was however no way of dealing with this problem because the very idea of a 
minority was just a carryover from, and modification of, the earlier conception of India as 
divided by interests. The only difference from the earlier conception of community was the 
added constraint that a divided nation should and could find a way to move beyond its 
differences. The acuteness of the problem was made salient by the next batch of 
constitutional reforms in India where there was a further proliferation of the demand for 
and the consequent government recognition of minority status to many new interest groups. 
 
5.5. On the Political Sociology of Modern Indian Constitutional Practice 
The Government of India Act 1935 was the last of the major constitutional revamps 
undertaken by the British government before the transfer of power to the States of India and 
Pakistan. Unlike the earlier constitutional reforms, the making of this statute was drawn out 
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over 7 years and set in the context of the enormously increased political clout of the Indian 
National Congress.
389
 The legal trajectory leading up to the Act was set off by a sunset 
clause in the 1919 Act which mandated that the statute be comprehensively reviewed at the 
end of ten years so that the project of Indian political education could be evaluated and 
advanced.
390
 This review process however commenced two years in advance of schedule in 
1927 by the Indian Statutory Commission led by Sir John Simon, whose report which was 
submitted in 1930 was the basis of round table discussions in London. These round table 
discussions were consolidated into a ‗white paper‘ which was then subjected to the scrutiny 
of a parliamentary committee chaired by Lord Linlithgow and after a Parliamentary vote 
received the Royal Assent in August 1935, and was brought into operation in 1937.
391
 
 
The Government of India Act 1935 replaced the system of dyarchy under the Montagu 
Chelmsford scheme and instituted a system of full responsible government in the provinces. 
Legislative powers were divided into federal, provincial and concurrent lists which survives 
right up to the present constitution.
392
 However, even though the Act prescribed that the 
Governor of the province was to be advised by a council of ministers it also permitted the 
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Governor to ‗act in his discretion‘393 in certain matters and to ‗exercise individual 
judgment‘ on certain other matters.394 These powers of the Governor were derived from the 
‗Governors‘ instructions‘ which were to be presented to Parliament and formed an 
important part of the working of government under the 1935 Act. Thus despite the 
substantial powers being transferred in the provinces to the elected ministers the Governors 
continued to exercise considerable power that was not accountable to elected legislatures.
395
  
 
Most importantly for the discussion in the present chapter, the 1935 Act also continued with 
the policy of separate electorates for Muslims. In the Simon commission this was justified 
by noting that ―in the absence of a new agreement between Hindus and Muhammadans, we 
are unanimous in holding that communal representation for the Muhammadans of a 
province must be continued, and that Muhammadan voters could not be deprived of this 
special protection ... without doing such violence to Muhammadan sentiment as could not 
be justified either on grounds of policy or on grounds of equity‖.396 That is, as with the 
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Montagu Chelmsford scheme the Simon Commission also set universal citizenship as the 
pedagogic goal for Indian communities but one that could not be easily achieved because of 
divided nature of Indian society and the assurances granted to the Muslim minority under 
the Minto Morley scheme that they would be granted separate electorates. 
 
As in the Montagu Chelmsford Scheme the inability to resolve the tension inherent in the 
modelling of Indian society as defined by minorities who were supposed to be 
fundamentally at odds with each other only led to a further proliferation of minority claims. 
Thus speaking of communal electorates the report of the Indian Central Committee notes 
the difficulty of dealing with demands for communal electorates made by all kinds of 
communities across the country who asserted that ―only by separate electorates or special 
representation ... can the different interests of each community be safeguarded.‖397 The 
minority question was not satisfactorily resolved even by the round table discussions that 
followed the submission of the Simon Commission report.
398
 Thus the Government of India 
Act 1935 was compelled to extend recognition to a very large number of minorities.
399
 
Perhaps the most significant controversy produced by the Act was the proposal to grant 
separate electorates for the Scheduled Castes. I therefore end this chapter by discussing the 
issue of caste and the manner in which the model of ‗competing interests‘ elaborated in the 
Morley Minto scheme could not be effectively removed from subsequent attempts to model 
Indian in terms of an integrated nation of minorities. 
                                                 
397
 Most shades of Indian political opinion boycotted the Simon Commission because it was unilaterally 
constituted and consisted solely of British Parliamentarians. However the Upper Chamber of the Indian 
Central Legislature decided to constitute a commission which would work alongside and supplement the 
efforts of the Simon Commission. This report was a product of their labours. East India (constitutional 
reforms). Report of the Indian Central Committee, 1928-29., 1929, 40, 
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:1929-
030361. (accessed 20/1/2011) 
398
 Coupland, Report on the constitutional problem in India, 113-31. 
399
 Under the 1935 Act seats in the legislatures were reserved for Scheduled Castes, representatives of 
backward areas and tribes, Sikhs, Muslims, Anglo-Indians, Europeans, Indian Christians, representatives 
of Industry Mining and Planting, Landholders, Representatives of Universities, Labour and Women. Of 
these groups there were separate electorates for Sikhs, Muslims, Anglo-Indians, Europeans, and Indian 
Christians. I have drawn this Scheduled 5 and 6 of the Government of India Act 1935. 
210 
 
 
5.5.1. Salvaging the Nation from Caste Idenitity? 
Marc Galanter identifies the nationalisation and politicisation of caste by the Indian 
nationalist movement as being roughly co-terminous with the passing of the Indian 
Councils Act, 1909. He illustrates this through contrasting conceptions of caste before and 
after the 1909 statute. Drawing from Dadabhai Naoroji‘s response to objectionable caste 
practices in an address to the Indian National Congress in 1886, Galanter shows that 
Naoroji resisted incorporating the issue of caste into the Congress national program by 
asking: 
What do any of us know of the internal home life, of the customs, traditions, 
feelings, prejudices of any class but our own? How could a ... cosmopolitan 
gathering like this, discuss to any purpose the reform needed in any one class? Only 
the members of that class can effectively deal with the reforms therein needed. A 
National Congress must confine itself to questions in which the entire nation has a 
direct participation, and it must leave the adjustment of social reforms and other 
class questions to class Congresses.
400
 (emphasis added) 
However, by the early part of the 20
th
 century Indian nationalism no longer viewed the 
question of caste reform within the bounds of caste autonomy and in fact increasingly 
regarded it as an obstacle to the development of a national consciousness.
401
 
 
The passage of the 1909 Minto Morley statute highlighted the significance of the 
untouchable castes or depressed classes in the new conception of the Indian nation and 
different strands of politics tried to appropriate the depressed classes within the possibilities 
provided by colonial government. As early as the negotiations for the 1909 statute a 
delegation of Muslims argued with Secretary of State Morley to exclude the depressed 
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classes from the Hindu community.
402
 In a sign of its changing policy the Congress passed 
a resolution in 1917 urging the people of India to take note of the ―necessity, justice and 
righteousness of removing all disabilities imposed by custom upon the depressed classes 
the disabilities being of a most vexatious and oppressive character, subjecting those classes 
to considerable hardship and inconvenience‖403 
 
However, Galanter suggests that it was the various non brahmin political parties of the 
Bombay and Madras Presidencies that made the most of taking forward the caste agenda 
through government measures that provided preferences for the depressed classes in 
educational institutions and government posts. All these latter measures were made possible 
through the Government of India Act, 1919 as revised in 1924 by the Muddiman 
Committee Report.
404
 However, on the issue of political representation the depressed 
classes were the only recognised minority entitled to special representation through 
nomination by the 1919 statute. This position however came up for review with the next 
round of constitution change in India, a process that began with the Indian Statutory 
Commission which began its work in 1927. 
 
In its report the Simon Commission considered the possibility that separate electorates now 
reserved only for Muslims and Sikhs as a matter of right be extended to depressed classes 
as well. Though it went on to reject the demand that separate electorates be granted to the 
depressed classes,
405
 the demand was brought up again by depressed caste leaders like B R. 
Ambedkar during the round table discussions in London. The Congress was entirely 
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opposed to this demand as it considered itself a representative of all Indians and not merely 
of Hindus alone as the minority groups chose to portray it. Thus in the round table 
discussions the Congress and the various minority ‗interests‘ groups opposed to its position 
on separate electorates could not broker a compromise on the issue. As no agreement was 
possible the government eventually had to come up with a plan protecting the rights of the 
minorities.
406
 Consequently the government of Ramsay MacDonald devised what was 
called the ‗communal award‘ which granted separate electorates to the depressed classes in 
addition to other groups like the Muslims. 
 
Gandhi was vehemently opposed to the communal award and went on a fast finally forcing 
the famous Poona pact between the Congress and depressed classes that would reserve 
seats for them in the legislature and other related measures but under the framework of a 
single joint ‗Hindu‘ electorate. 407 Gandhi was however unsuccessful in dismantling the 
framework within which ‗interests‘ were represented in government and all that his efforts 
could secure was a reversion to the scheme envisaged under the previous 1919 statute. As 
this scheme was not entirely free of a conception of India in terms of contending interests, 
the contending politics of the Congress and the Muslim League eventually lead to the 
partition of British India into the States of India and Pakistan on the supposed grounds of 
an irreconcilable difference of religious interests. 
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The Constitution of independent India tried to do away with the scheme of contending 
interests as it has developed in the British constitutions since 1909. Most notably the 
Constitution did away with the system of Separate electorates. Further, by reorienting the 
discussion of the rights granted to the erstwhile minorities in terms of ‗backwardness‘ the 
Constitution did make a serious attempt to steer away from the colonial scheme of interests. 
However, as my discussion in chapter 2 has shown, in important ways the group rights 
granted by the Constitution continues to be tied to colonial model of contending interests. 
Especially the manner in which the grant of group rights in the Indian Constitution is 
dependent on a reformed or monolithic conception of the Hindu (majority) community. 
That is, despite the sincere efforts of the constitution makers, the contemporary constitution 
continues to labour under the conception of Indian society as fundamentally divided among 
its various irreconcilably contending interest groups. 
 
5.6. Concluding Note 
To summarise the discussion in this chapter, I have argued that contemporary constitutional 
identities like caste and religion replay and entrench the British conception of political 
community in India. As I have repeatedly stressed through the last two chapters, these 
models of community are not drawn from communities as they empirically obtain in India. 
In other words, colonial toleration and colonial politics produce reformulated conceptions 
of social and political community that screen off Indian experience from these debates. In 
the next and final chapter I explore the implications of the argument that I have sketched up 
to this point – that the character of the Indian secular State is founded on the reformulation 
of Indian society on the lines of colonial conceptions of politics and community. 
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6. Rethinking the Ayodhya Case: On the Semantics of Secular Reform 
 
In the course of this thesis I have argued that the reforming scheme of the secular State in 
India operates as a conceptual and theoretical veneer that screens or blocks off Indian social 
transactions from being made available to comprehend and respond to contemporary 
constitutional problems. In this chapter I revisit this claim and subject it to greater scrutiny 
by exploring the manner in which the High Court at Allahabad resolved one of the longest 
standing religious disputes in independent India between Hindus and Muslims over a 
monument located at the temple town at Ayodhya. Through my study of this case I illustrate 
the gap between the semantic structure of secular reform and the institutional practices 
through which problems associated with the secular State are resolved. Doing so I highlight 
once again the problem that this thesis has demarcated and outline some issues that require 
further study. 
 
6.1. The Background 
In September 2010 the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court delivered judgment in 
a set of civil suits grouped together in a case titled Gopal Singh Visharad and Others v. 
Zahoor Ahmad and Others
408
 (Hereafter, Ayodhya). The decision dealt with a dispute 
almost as old as the Indian republic and whose political significance continues to resonate 
in contemporary Indian politics. At its core this case is a property dispute between various 
Hindu and Muslim groups over a 16
th
 century religious structure which stood in the north-
Indian temple of town of Ayodhya. On the one hand the Hindu parties asserted their rights 
to the property on the grounds of its association with the birthplace of the Hindu deity 
Rama. The Muslim parties on the other hand claimed that the structure was built as a 
mosque by Babur, the first of the Mogul Emperors and, that its ownership should vest with 
those charged with the management of the property for the benefit of the faithful of the 
community. The dispute has produced deep social and political divisions causing some of 
the worst instances of communal rioting, especially after the temple-mosque was 
demolished by ‗Hindu‘ mobs in 1991. Apart from the human tragedy that followed the 
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demolition, the event also challenged many of the political certitudes that had held sway till 
that point. The most important of these was the nature and extent of the Indian commitment 
to the secular State, the central concern of this thesis. 
 
The earliest legal dispute in relation to the disputed structure at Ayodhya however traces 
back to 1885 when the Sub-Judge of the trial court at Faizabad decided a case brought 
before him by the Mahant or priest at the Ram Chabutra, a Hindu shrine within the 
premises of the disputed property. The Mahant petitioned the court to grant him permission 
to build a permanent structure over the Ram Chabutra to provide shelter while ministering 
to and paying respects to the deity. However, Mohammad Ashgar, who claimed to be the 
Mutawalli or caretaker of the mosque at the property, argued that permission to construct a 
temple ought not to be granted. He contended that as owners of the property the Muslim 
parties had granted Hindu devotees permission to use the property, but that this was not to 
be construed as the right of ownership or possession. 
 
The court found that the disputed property contained a Mosque and a Hindu temple which 
were divided by a grilled wall. The wall was said to have been erected in 1855 after a 
violent dispute between Hindus and Muslims, to allow both communities to perform their 
religious rites in well demarcated zones. Information from local gazettes suggested that 
before 1855 the disputed site was used by members of both communities to perform their 
respective religious rites. 
 
Even after 1855 the court found that the chabutra was in the possession of the Hindus who 
were performing their traditional rites at the structure. However, in its decision the court 
made the rather strange observation that 
(t)his place is not like other places where the owner has got the right to construct 
any building as he likes ... The prayer for permission to construct the temple is at 
such a place where there is only one passage for the temple as well as for the 
mosque. The place where the Hindus worship is in their possession from of old and 
their ownership cannot be questioned and around it there is the wall of the mosque 
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and the word Allah is inscribed on it. If a temple is constructed on the Chabutra at 
such a place then there will be sounds of bells of the temple and shankh ... and if 
permission is given to Hindus for constructing a temple then one day or the other a 
criminal case will be started and thousands of people will be killed. For this reason 
of breach of law and order the officers have restrained the parties from making any 
new construction. So this court also considers it to be proper that awarding 
permission to construct the temple at this juncture is to lay the foundation of riot 
and murder ... between Hindus and Muslims.
409
 (emphasis added) 
Perhaps there was legitimate nervousness on the part of the colonial administration to 
permit an arrangement that would allow communities to carry on their practices in such 
close proximity to each other, especially because there were known instances of past 
violence. However, preventing the Hindus from exercising their property rights as regards 
the chabutra on grounds of potential communal riots was odd. 
 
The District Judge, rephrased the lower court judgment on appeal and stated that in the 
circumstances of the case it was redundant to assert that the ‗ownership and possession‘ of 
the chabutra was with the Hindus. However, he also found that there was evidence to 
suggest that one portion of the building was used by the Muslims and that the Ram 
Chabutra was occupied by the Hindus. Significantly he also described the religious 
structure as representing the divisions between Hindus and Muslims, especially the 
historical injustice committed by a Muslim emperor on his Hindu subjects: ―(i)t is most 
unfortunate that a masjid should have been built on land specially held sacred by the 
Hindus, but as that event occurred 356 years ago it is too late now to remedy the grievance. 
All that can be done is to maintain the parties in status quo.‖410 (emphasis added) 
 
In the court of second appeal the judge seemed to suggest that the disputed property was in 
the joint use of both Hindus and Muslims. However, it held that there was insufficient 
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evidence to support the proprietary claims of the Hindus. As in the lower court, the appeal 
court also represented the disputed structure as a mark of historic injustice suffered by the 
Hindus. Thus Justice W. Young, Judicial Commissioner, Oudh, observed that: 
The matter is simply that the Hindus of Ayodhya want to create a new temple or 
marble baldacchino over the supposed holy spot in Ayodhya said to be the 
birthplace of Shri Ram Chandar. Now this spot is situated within the precinct of the 
grounds surrounding a mosque erected some 350 years ago owing to the bigotry 
and tyranny of the Emperor Babur, who purposely chose this holy spot according to 
Hindu legend as the site of his mosque. 
 
The Executive authorities have persistently refused these encroachments and 
absolutely forbid any alteration of the ‗status quo‘. I think this is a very wise and 
proper procedure on their part and I am further of the opinion that the Civil Courts 
have properly dismissed the Plaintiff‘s claim.‖411 
This status quo was maintained until December 1949 when at the cusp of the transition to 
the government of the Indian republic, ‗Hindu‘ miscreants broke into the disputed property 
and installed a set of idols under the central dome of the Mosque. This event triggered off 
the contemporary Ayodhya case. 
 
6.2. The Contours and Challenges of the Contemporary Dispute 
The installation of idols and the occupation of the disputed site by Hindus resulted in the 
provincial state government passing orders attaching the disputed property and handing it 
over to a government appointed receiver. Since that time the Muslims have not been able to 
use the mosque. However, the conditions of the attachment permitted the performance of 
various Hindu religious rites to the idols installed at the disputed structure. The attachment 
gave rise to a set of civil suits which were the basis of the present case. Of the five suits 
filed in the case, one was withdrawn and the other four divide into three sets of claims for 
title and possession of the disputed property. 
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The Muslim parties claimed that the disputed structure was a mosque constructed by the 
Mogul emperor Babur upon either barren land or, in the alternative, on the ruins of a 
temple. As it had been dedicated to the public, they claimed that they were in possession of 
the property till 1949, when they were dispossessed. However, they also admit the 
existence of a small chabutra in the outer courtyard at which Hindus were permitted to pray. 
The Hindu parties made one of two kinds of claim. On the one hand, the ‗Nirmohi Akhara‘, 
a religious sect that managed the chabutra and other religious structures outside the 
mosque, claimed that the disputed structure was never a Mosque. Therefore, as the group 
traditionally associated with the management of structure, the Akhara argued that they 
should be given possession of the entire premises. Other Hindu groups contended that, even 
if the attached disputed property was a mosque, it ceased to be so when it was substantially 
damaged in a communal riot in the year 1934. All Hindu parties claim that after this date 
the property was not used as a mosque by Muslim parties and that they were in possession 
of the property which they believe to be the birthplace of Rama. 
 
While these suits were pending, the attachment order was modified in 1986 to open the 
locks to the disputed property and permit all members of the Hindu public to offer respects 
to the idols installed in the disputed structure, which until this point were only performed in 
a restricted manner by specially appointed priests. This event is attributed to the 
machinations of the then ruling Congress party pandering to the demands of electoral 
politics, especially to what they believed to be Hindu interests. Justice Khan, one of three 
judges who decided the contemporary Ayodhya case, was scathing in his criticism of the 
legality of this order altering the terms of attachment of the disputed property. In his 
opinion this order opening the disputed structure to the general public, catapulted the 
problem onto the national stage and set off a chain of events that eventually led to the 
demolition of the disputed mosque in 1992. 
 
The demolition, which had the tacit if not open support of many of the Hindu parties in the 
case, unleashed an orgy of communal violence across the country prompting the central 
government to enact the Acquisition of Certain Areas at Ayodhya Act, 1993. This statute 
219 
 
acquired the disputed property and abated all pending suits regarding the property. 
Separately the government initiated a presidential reference to the Supreme Court, asking 
the question ―(w)hether a Hindu temple or any Hindu religious structure existed prior to the 
construction of the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid (including the premises of the inner 
and outer courtyards of such structure) in the area on which the structure stood.‖ In Ismail 
Faruqui v. Union of India
412
 the Supreme Court refused to answer the presidential 
reference, struck down the provisions of the statute that abated all pending suits, and 
directed the central government to hold the disputed property as a receiver until the earlier 
suits which they had reinstated were decided. According, the Lucknow Bench delivered its 
decision in the revived suits of the Ayodhya case in September, 2010. 
 
The judgment of the High Court divided the disputed property equally between the three 
main claimants. However, this decision has provoked a fiery debate on whether it is a 
solomonic resolution of an intractable problem or an instance of panchayat justice that 
violates canons of legal procedure and propriety.
413
 The sense of unease expressed 
regarding the judgment stems from the perception that the court overlooked the role played 
by the Hindu parties in the demolition of the Mosque in 1992 and perhaps granted these 
groups rights they would otherwise not have secured. That is, it has been asserted by some 
commentators that the court violated the demands of India‘s secular constitution obliging it 
to treat all communities equally and fairly.
414
 
 
Running over eight thousand pages, a detailed legal evaluation of the rights and wrongs of 
the Ayodhya judgment would form a study in itself and is not the objective of the present 
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discussion. Thus for present purposes I only extract the problem that the judgment poses for 
the Indian secular State, especially the manner in which it legally renders what it views to 
be the challenge posed by religious freedom and religious conflict. From this perspective I 
argue that the significance of this decision lies not merely in the manner in which it has 
treated different religious communities but the fact that the solution that it has devised is 
almost entirely unconnected to the way in which important parts of the decision are 
justified. 
 
6.3. Revisiting Essential Practices: Justifying the Rights of the Contending Litigants 
The secular State in liberal democracies is charged with the task of protecting religious 
liberty, a task it performs through an institutional commitment to the toleration of different 
religious persuasions. Though the Indian constitution is committed to the protection of 
religious freedom, I have argued in this thesis that its practice in specific instances implies a 
commitment to the semantics of reform where traditional religions are recast as founded in 
doctrine. However, I have also suggested that reform is merely a conceptual and theoretical 
screen that prevents access to Indian religious traditions which continue to defy these 
reformed descriptions in very important respects. It is against this background that I revisit 
the claim that reform is merely screens off Indian social experience from being made 
available for institutional challenges through the example of the Ayodhya case. 
 
In Ayodhya the social history of the disputed structure as recounted by the colonial courts 
had clearly demonstrated the existence of both religious conflict and cooperation. The 
cooperation witnessed at the site even implied that many religious groups performed their 
respective ritual observances at the disputed structure. However, the judicial history of the 
Ayodhya case also demonstrates that the colonial judges were extremely wary of such 
contiguous religious activity. Thus colonial courts repeatedly attempted to separate the 
Hindus from the Muslims to maintain what they believed to be the status quo and prevent 
situations that they felt would lead to a communal conflagration. Ironically, the colonial 
wariness of Indian social practices was part of the British legal regime that was deeply 
committed to religious toleration. 
 
221 
 
In the contemporary Ayodhya case the High Court was not noticeably constrained by what 
the colonial courts understood to be the problem of communal order. The decision to 
partition the disputed property equally between the three principal parties would suggest 
that this is the case. However, this is also the puzzle that the case poses because the 
decision to partition the property sits alongside and is almost entirely disjointed from the 
justifications advanced for this decision. In what follows in this section I elaborate the 
nature of this disjointedness. 
 
In important respects the High Court‘s justification of the partitioning of the property was 
tied to the finding that the disputed site was part of the ‗essential practices‘ of the religious 
traditions of the contending parties.
415
 I illustrate this through two of the issues that the 
court addressed in the Ayodhya case.
416
 First, whether the disputed property is the 
birthplace of Rama; second, whether the building at the disputed site was a valid mosque 
(according to the tenets of Islam). Discussing the court‘s treatment of these issues I argue 
that the manner in which the court justified its responses to these issues had no bearing on 
the decision that it delivered. 
 
Answering the question whether Rama was born at the disputed site the three judges who 
decided the case took different positions. Justice Khan distinguished the ‗spot of 
conception‘ from the ‗geographical place of birth‘. Doing so he expressed doubts about 
drawing conclusive links between the spot on which the mosque stood and the spot where 
Rama was conceived. That is, he held that it could at best be established that the mosque 
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explore this question any further for the present discussion and restrict myself to the manner in which the 
court elaborated the issue of the essential practices of the religious tradition of the respective parties to the 
conflict. 
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was built at the birth place of Rama as opposed to the spot where Rama was conceived.
417
 
Therefore he argued that the demand for possession and title of the property on this ground 
would not succeed. Justice Agarwal and Sharma however differed from Justice Khan in 
their consideration of this issue. 
 
Justice Agarwal reframed the issue of the birthplace of Rama in terms of popular Hindu 
religious sentiment. That is, he cast the issue as the question whether the disputed property 
was the birth place of Rama according to the tradition, belief and faith of the Hindus.
418
 He 
answered the question by drawing on the ‗essential practices doctrine‘, the principle of 
Indian constitutional adjudication on questions of religious freedom discussed in chapter 1. 
Relying on precedent, Justice Agarwal explained that ―what really constitutes an essential 
part of religion or religious practice has to be decided by the Courts with reference to the 
doctrine of a particular religion or practices regarded as parts of religion.‖419 (emphasis 
added) Accordingly, he decided that the manner in which Hindu belief and practice 
converged on the disputed property was sufficient to establish that Hindus believed the site 
to be of essential significance to their faith. More importantly, the disputed site itself was 
held to be a deity and along with Hindu beliefs, was collectively protected by the 
fundamental right to religious freedom granted by the Indian constitution.
420
 
 
Justice Sharma‘s judgment is similar to that of Justice Agarwal. However, he audaciously 
historicised the issue of Rama‘s birth at Ayodhya. That is, he held that the accounts of 
travellers, gazetteers and similar anthropological records on the habits and beliefs of the 
local people at Ayodhya actually established that Rama was born at the disputed site.
421
 In 
his words 
(i)t is manifestly established by public record, gazetteers, history accounts and oral 
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evidence that the premises, in dispute, is the place where Lord Ram was born as son 
of Emperor Dashrath of solar dynasty. According to the traditions and faith of 
devotees of Lord Ram, the place where He manifested Himself has ever been called 
as Sri Ram Janmbhumi by all and sundry through ages. Thus, the Asthan, Ram 
Janambhumi has been an object of worship as a deity by the devotees of Lord Ram 
as it personifies the spirit of divine … Birth place is sacred place for Hindus and 
Lord Ram, who is said to be incarnation of God, was born at this place. 
In other words the existence of a mythological or religious figure, Rama, was strangely 
justified in historical terms. Having held that Rama was born at the disputed property 
Justice Sharma also held that the property itself was believed to be a deity and that these 
beliefs formed an essential aspect of the Hindu religion. 
 
A significant aspect of the reasoning advanced by Justices Sharma and Agarwal was the 
manner in which they tied their discussion on religious freedom of the Hindu parties in a 
civil suit dealing with a property dispute. That is, by arguing that the disputed property was 
a deity and part of the essential features of the Hindu religion, judicial relief was organised 
around the constitutional right to religious freedom. However, a similar form of reasoning 
was not extended to Muslim parties when the court considered the status of the mosque. 
Both Justice Agarwal and Justice Sharma relied on the decision in an earlier Supreme Court 
ruling in Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India
422
, a decision in which the majority had held that 
it would have to be demonstrated by a petitioner that a particular mosque had an special 
place in the Islamic tradition for it to be essential to the Islamic faith.
423
 
                                                 
422
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423
 In addition Justice Sharma also held that the mosque itself was not constructed according to the tenets of 
Islam for the following reasons: (1) the mosque did not have minarets as mandated by Islamic tenets; (2) It 
was unusual and against Islamic tenets for a mosque to be surrounded by graveyards; (3) It was unusual 
for a mosque to be surrounded by Hindu religious structures; (4) The mosque did not have a bathing pool 
for devotees to wash themselves before worship; (5) There were images and idols on the walls of the 
disputed property; (6) Discussing the nature of Islamic public trusts or wakfs he said the property on which 
a mosque is constructed must belong to the person dedicating the wakf if such dedication was to be valid. 
As an invader he held that Babur could not have owned the disputed property and therefore the mosque 
was not validly constructed according to the tenets of Islam; (7) Lastly, and strangely, Justice Sharma even 
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The essential practices doctrine was thus applied asymmetrically to the Hindu and Muslim 
parties. In this regard it is important to note that Ayodhya could have been decided without 
considering the issue of essential aspects of the Hindu and Muslim religions. The suit could 
have been decided on the narrow grounds of the relevant property and endowment laws. 
Additionally, it has also been argued by commentators that it was inappropriate to decide 
the case on constitutional grounds because the essential practices doctrine was not intended 
to decide questions of religious freedom in cases of inter-religious conflict.
424
 However, I 
argue that the fact that it was decided on these grounds is significant because it highlights 
the disjuncture between this justification advanced to argue the rights of the Hindu parties 
and the partitioning of the disputed between all the three parties. 
 
6.4. The Redundancy of Essential Practices 
The disjunction that I refer to is best highlighted by contrasting the decision of the 
Allahabad High with those of the colonial courts. Apprehensive of communal discord the 
colonial court thought it best to keep apart the contending parties in this dispute. Though 
the decision of the colonial courts did not appreciate the terms on which social practices 
were jointly transacted on such sites by different religious traditions, it is possible to 
account for the colonial action. That is, in the light of the discussion in chapter 5 it possible 
to assert that it was directed at holding the peace, based on the courts understanding of 
Hindus and Muslims as possessing irreconcilably opposed religious interests. 
 
On the other hand the decision of the Allahabad High Court to partition the property three 
ways between the parties is not so easily explained. That is, if the court held that the right 
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of the Hindus stemmed from an understanding of the disputed property as forming part of 
the essential practices of their religion, then on what grounds were Muslims granted a third 
of the property if their religious claims to the property were denied by the court? Perhaps 
the Muslims were granted rights purely on grounds of the property rights claims they were 
able to advance before the court. However, if that was the case then the Hindu claims 
should also have been appreciated on similar grounds.
425
 Alternatively, the question that 
needs to be addressed is the role that ‗essential practices‘ or the justification based on 
religious freedom plays, in arguing the claims of the Hindu parties. 
 
In the Ayodhya decision I argue that that the best way to understand the court‘s discussion 
of essential practices is that it played no significant role the decision of the court. Instead it 
has cast a veil over what the court has actually done in the case. That is, the court‘s decision 
equitably divided the property between the contending parties thereby resolving an 
intractable problem that has defied solution for well over a century. However, the court has 
not been able to justify its decision satisfactorily because its use of doctrines like ‗essential 
practices‘ that have little if no bearing on the decision to partition the disputed property. In 
other words, the influence that the essential practices test has exerted on the court has 
operated as a veil that has screened off the court‘s engagement with the dispute thereby 
making it unavailable for legal and institutional processes of justification. 
 
Ayodhya is therefore an analogy for the kind of problem that this thesis has tried to point 
towards. That is, the reforming disposition of the Indian secular State has operated as a 
discursive veil that has screened of Indian social transactions and the courts efforts to deal 
with them. I have pointed this out in my discussion of religious freedom in Chapter 1 and 
especially in my discussion of the Satsangi case. Similarly my discussion of Indian equality 
jurisprudence also demonstrated the difficulties that the reformed ‗Hindu‘ identity posed for 
the determination of constitutional backwardness. In all these cases the ‗essential practices‘ 
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doctrine or the effects of a reforming conception of religious freedom has acted as a 
semantic screen that has blocked off Indian social traditions and its associated problem 
solving practices. 
 
Thus to conclude, in this thesis I have demonstrated the aspects of secular constitutionalism 
in India that have contributed to the occlusion of Indian social and political experience. In 
this chapter through the Ayodhya example I have suggested the ways in which the 
limitations imposed by secular constitutionalism can be overcome. That is, by pushing past 
the veil of secular constitutionalism and interrogating the practices through which Indian 
institutions resolve or fail to resolve the problems placed before it. Though I have not been 
able to undertake such a study in this thesis I believe I have cleared ground for future 
projects of this nature. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have examined the role of the secular State in the making of constitutional 
government in India. In the introductory chapter the problem of the thesis was set in the 
context of a general crisis posed by the by the resurgence of religion in the public sphere to 
liberal secular States across the world. Placing the Indian secular State against this 
background I have argued that the Indian practice of constitutional secularism is an 
unrealised pedagogical project whose goal is the transformation of Indian society and its 
politics. 
 
Toleration is the core value defended by liberal the secular State and drawing on this liberal 
tradition the Indian constitution is no exception. Thus I began the thesis in chapter 1 by 
describing the manner in which toleration was incorporated into the practice of the Indian 
secular State. I demonstrated that the practice of toleration in the Indian constitutional 
scheme compels religious groups to reformulate their traditions into ‗essential truths‘ or 
‗doctrinal foundations‘ to successfully claim religious freedom. 
 
As numerous court decisions have shown, the demand for doctrinal foundation is an 
especially odd demand of non-Semitic traditions like Hinduism because even up the 
contemporary moment it continues to be difficult to cast these traditions in terms of 
doctrinal truths. The emphasis on doctrinal truth is often also a baffling demand on 
supposedly Semitic groups like the Chistiya Sufis, Ismailis and other such sects. 
Nonetheless all claimants for religious freedom have had to learn to reformulate their 
claims along the lines of doctrinal truth as demanded by the Indian model of constitutional 
toleration thereby occluding the description of important aspects of Indian social life.  
 
In Chapter 2 I also demonstrated that the occlusion produced by the institutional form in 
which religious freedoms are protected is reinforced by the practice of Indian equality 
jurisprudence and the conceptions of community on which it is based. Thus elaborating the 
constitutional rights granted to the ‗scheduled castes‘, ‗scheduled tribes‘, ‗other backward 
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classes‘ and ‗minorities‘, I demonstrated the significance of a reformulated doctrinal 
conception of the Hindu religion to maintain the intelligibility of each of these 
constitutional groups. 
 
Noting in Chapter 3 that the existing scholarship and especially the normative approaches 
to the secular State did not provide a satisfactory explanation of the reforming disposition 
of the constitutional secularism in India I proceeded to outline a synoptic genealogy of this 
institutional scheme. In Chapter 4 I traced the genealogy of the secular State in India to the 
institution and operation of normative toleration in India by the British colonial government 
and their mischaracterisation of Indian religious traditions as founded in doctrines or 
creeds. I argue that this misunderstanding is at the roots of the process by which Indian 
religious traditions were reformulated as they passed through the institutions of government 
and argued my case through the case of the abolition of Sati and the making of Hindu Law. 
 
In Chapter 5 I noted that the colonial history of toleration is closely related to the manner in 
which reformulated religious identities were incorporated into another and perhaps more 
explicitly stated project of reform – the making of modern Indian politics and nationhood 
whose institutional history traces back at least to the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909. This 
project envisioned that India would have to be tutored in the art of self government to 
overcome the supposed irreconcilable ‗interests‘ that comprised Indian society. These 
irreconcilable interests, religion being one such interest, prevented the development of a 
unified national polity. The fragmented ‗interests‘ of Indian society was later debated as the 
problem of ‗minority rights‘ and formed the backdrop to the constitutional settlement in the 
independent Indian republic. Though the Indian Constitution reworked the politics of 
interests toward the amelioration of backwardness, I have argued that the rights granted to 
the Scheduled Castes, Other Backward Classes, and Minorities continue to mobilise these 
groups as reformulated religious identities with associated interests. 
 
Thus I have argued in this thesis that the reforming or pedagogical character of the secular 
State in India is produced by the histories of toleration as it was drawn into the government 
of religious identities in modern Indian politics. However, even though the secular State 
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was envisioned a project of reform and pedagogy, I have argued that it functioned more like 
a discursive veil that screens off Indian social experience from the task of generating 
solutions to legal and institutional problems. The practice of equality jurisprudence in India 
and my description of the Ayodhya case are examples of this broader problem. Thus in 
Chapter 6 I have drawn from the Ayodhya case to suggest that the task awaiting future 
research on the Indian secular State in particular and of its constitutional theory in general 
is that of generating descriptions of Indian government that draw on Indian practices in 
ways that are not blinded by the perspective of secular reform. 
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